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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS: THE ENTREPRENEURIAL
SIDE OF GOVERNMENT
by
Gina Scutelnicu
Florida International University, 2010
Miami, Florida
Professor Howard A. Frank, Major Professor
In an effort to reduce the cost and size of government public service delivery has
become more decentralized, flexible and responsive. Public entrepreneurship entailed,
among other things, the establishment of special-purpose governments to finance public
services and carry out development projects. Community Development Districts (CDDs)
are a type of special-purpose governments whose purpose is to manage and finance
infrastructure improvements in the State of Florida. They have important implications for
the way both growth management and service delivery occur in the United States.
This study examined the role of CDDs for growth management policy and service
delivery by analyzing the CDD profile and activity, the contribution of CDDs to the
growth management and infrastructure development as well as the way CDD perceived
pluses and minuses impact service delivery. The study used a mixed methods research
approach, drawing on secondary data pertaining to CDD features and activity, semistructured interviews with CDD representatives and public officials as well as on a
survey of public officials within the counties and cities that have established CDDs.
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Findings indicated that the CDD institutional model is both a policy and a service
delivery tool for infrastructure provision that can be adopted by states across the United
States. Results showed that CDDs inhibit rather than foster growth management through
their location choices, type and pattern of development. CDDs contributed to the
infrastructure development in Florida by providing basic infrastructure services for the
development they supported and by building and dedicating facilities to general-purpose
governments. Districts were found to be both funding mechanisms and management tools
for infrastructure services. The study also pointed to the fact that specialized governance
is more responsive and more flexible but less effective than general-purpose governance
when delivering services. CDDs were perceived as being favorable for developers and
residents and not as favorable for general-purpose governments.
Overall results indicated that the CDD is a flexible institutional mechanism for
infrastructure delivery which has both advantages and disadvantages. Decision-makers
should balance districts’ institutional flexibility with their unintended consequences for
growth management when considering urban public policies.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction
Community Development Districts (CDDs) are localized governmental entities
which provide fundamental infrastructure improvements that are geared toward new
development. They are both a policy and service delivery tool. From a development
perspective CDDs can be considered important tools for local growth policies. They have
significant implications for growth management by coordinating the timing and financing
of infrastructure provision with development as well as by making choices about
location, type and pattern of development. From a service delivery perspective CDDs can
be considered flexible institutional choices for providing and maintaining efficient and
responsive public services. In an effort to reduce the cost and size of government, public
service delivery is no longer a direct function of the government. In the United States,
public service provision has been devolved from state governments to local levels of
government or other governmental entities and agencies. Therefore, special-purpose
governments such as CDDs are providing more and more services due to their flexibility
in delivering services.
In considering the issue of how to better coordinate infrastructure provision with
urban development this study examines the role CDDs play in growth management and
service delivery. By trying to answer the major question: What are the benefits and
downsides of CDD for both growth management policy and public service delivery in
Florida? the study contributes to a better understanding of specialized governance
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through a critical analysis of CDDs’ performance. The terms special-purpose
governments, specialized governance and special districts are interchangeably used
throughout the study and they refer to local governmental entities which provide one or a
limited number of functions.

1.2 Research Topic
Community Development Districts (CDDs) are specialized governments, created
by a state charter, whose main purpose is to manage and finance infrastructure services
that accommodate new development within the State of Florida. They are a specific
subtype of special districts which are independent, special-purpose units of local
government (other than counties, municipalities, townships or school districts) that have
administrative and financial independence from general-purpose governments (US
Census, 2007).
Like any other independent special districts CDDs differentiate themselves from
local governmental entities of general-purpose through their specific characteristics.
These are: narrow specialization (districts are authorized to provide specific types of
infrastructure services), administrative and financial independence (districts are governed
by independent boards of supervisors and levy ad-valorem taxes on property, impose
special assessments, charges and fees and issue bonds), geographic flexibility (districts
partially or totally overlap other jurisdictions) and low political visibility (districts are
often being characterized as “shadow governments” because the general public is
unaware of the functions they perform).
These entities can be categorized as entrepreneurial governments because of their
administrative autonomy, their perceived fiscal independence from general-purpose
governments that facilitates efficiency in delivering services as well as because of the
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belief that CDDs are a means for development to pay its own way (Bartling, 2007;
Nicholas & Chapin, 2007). Public entrepreneurship has been defined as “a process of
introducing new procedures, policies or organizational forms to the public sector” (Daft
& Becker, 1978 (as cited in Roberts & King, 1991, p. 150)). Public entrepreneurship
enables government to provide more services without increasing its size, by delegating
part of its functions to other public, private or non-profit entities. Thus, government
becomes more decentralized, flexible and responsive. For the purposes of this study
public entrepreneurship refers to the establishment of special-purpose governments to
finance and manage public services and to carry out development projects.
The CDDs are similar to other multi-purpose special districts, especially Business
Improvement Districts (BIDs). The CDDs are similar to BIDs because they fulfill
multiple functions and because they have financial and administrative autonomy from
other local governments. The CDDs differ from BIDs with regard to their process of
establishment, the array of services they are authorized to provide and the type of
development they support (residential development vs. business-oriented development).
The State of Florida enabled the creation of CDDs as a response to the inability of
local general-purpose governments to provide adequate infrastructure to service projected
growth. Even though the enabling legislation for CDDs was passed in 1980, their
proliferation increased significantly in the 1990s and 2000s. According to the Florida
Department of Community Affairs, as of September 1, 2010 there were 579 active CDDs
in the State of Florida. Districts are concentrated in the counties and cities located within
the southern and central parts of Florida. Famous examples of CDDs include New
Urbanism type of communities such as Celebration – a master-planned community which
was developed by Walt Disney Corporation in Osceola County and Tradition – a mixeduse community comprising of ten CDDs located in Port St. Lucie. Other examples of
famous CDDs are known under the name of census designated places and refer to The
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Villages – a residential retirement community comprised of twelve CDDs that are located
in Sumter, Lake and Marion counties or Westchase – one of the wealthiest communities
in Hillsborough County that is organized into twenty eight neighborhoods. Finally, the
City of Weston located in the western part of Broward County was originally developed
as a CDD in 1981 and then, was incorporated as a city in 1996.
The CDDs are authorized to manage, fund and construct basic infrastructure
facilities and services such as water management and control, water supply, water and
wastewater, bridges and culverts, district roads and certain projects for concurrency as
well as parks and recreation facilities, security, fire prevention, education-related
facilities and the like. In doing so, they enjoy administrative and financial independence
from general-purpose governments. The CDDs are governed by an elected board of
supervisors initially comprised of landowner’s representatives and, subsequently, after
certain requirements are met, by residents within the district. Districts may levy advalorem taxes, impose special assessments, charges and fees and, most importantly, they
can issue tax-exempt bonds.
The use of CDDs to provide public infrastructure services has engendered praise
and criticism. On the one hand, CDDs are praised because they deliver efficient services
that are managed and financed primarily through special assessments that are paid by
residents. Districts allow communities to raise revenues without increasing general taxes,
thus taking the financial burden for major infrastructure improvements off the shoulders
of general-purpose governments. Because of their financial capacity CDDs provide
communities with infrastructure services and facilities that are completed in a timely
manner. Finally, CDDs create new communities or improve the existing ones through
their ability to incorporate into new municipalities or to be annexed into the existing
ones. On the other hand, CDDs are open to criticism because they encourage
governmental fragmentation, they seek mainly the interests of developers and ignore
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those of residents or they can abuse their powers due to a lack of traditional local generalpurpose government oversight.
Since CDDs are a functional subtype of special districts, they should be
understood in the context of formation and proliferation of special-purpose governments.
Special-purpose governments were created as a consequence of the federal government
intervention in local service delivery and the use of revenue bonds to finance public
services (Foster, 1997; Porter, Lin, Jakubiak & Peiser, 1992; Sbragia, 1996).
Special-purpose governments’ formation and proliferation has been well
documented in the scholarly literature. Special districts were created for several reasons
among which are: addressing a public or a private market failure in service provision
(Porter et. al, 1992), fulfilling a demand for new services (Burns, 1992; McCabe, 2000)
and overcoming state imposed limits and constraints placed on the taxing and borrowing
capacity of local general-purpose governments (Bowler & Donovan, 2004; Carr, 2006;
Foster, 1997; McCabe, 2000) or on municipal and county formation and boundary change
(Carr, 2004; Foster, 1997).
The creation of CDDs should be related to the tax and expenditure limitations
imposed by states on local governments as a consequence of the tax rebellion of the
1970s. In Florida such constraints have been instituted since 1980 with the adoption of
millage caps, followed by referendum requirements for issuing general obligation bonds
and limits on the annual increase in the assessed values of homestead properties. From
this perspective CDDs represent an alternative solution for funding infrastructure services
since they do not contribute to raising ad-valorem taxes for the Florida taxpayers.
The context within which CDDs were created should also be related to the
concurrency requirement of the Florida Growth Management Act. Concurrency is a
growth management tool which requires that adequate public facilities be available or
fiscally accounted for prior to or concurrent with new development. The Florida Growth
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Management Act requires every local government to adopt a capital improvement
program for public facilities and to establish minimum level-of-service standards for
certain public facilities to accommodate projected growth. Through its requirements,
concurrency was intended to control growth and to foster economic development (BenZadok, 2007).
The growth management legislation had been criticized because it addressed the
concurrency requirement without state commitment to fund it, the so-called "unfunded
mandate of concurrency" (Ben-Zadok & Gale, 2001; Connerly, Chapin & Higgins, 2007;
Pelham, 2001). Therefore, local governments had to identify financial sources for
infrastructure development.
Today infrastructure management and financing represent a thorny issue for
policy-makers in Florida and across the country. While local taxes such as increases in
local sales taxes and local gas taxes as well as impact fees and connection charges
constituted a temporary solution for the infrastructure funding problem, researchers argue
that independent special districts, in general, and CDDs, in particular, can fund
infrastructure improvements (Bartling, 2007; Porter, 2008; Porter, Lin, Jakubiak &
Peiser, 1992) as opposed to or in addition to traditional financing sources.
It is within this context that the present study aims at describing CDDs as both as
a policy development tool and a flexible institutional framework for delivering public
services. On one hand, CDDs are innovative financing mechanisms that link the costs of
public facilities to the development that benefits from them. In theory, CDDs may be
considered adequate managerial and financial mechanisms for infrastructure provision
and maintenance. Considering their administrative and financial autonomy, CDDs can
provide and maintain infrastructure facilities and services for new development, thus
funding the “unfunded mandate of concurrency.”
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On the other hand, CDDs are flexible institutional alternatives for delivering
public infrastructure services. In theory, they are expected to deliver services in a
business-like and responsive manner and to provide high quality services due to their
narrow functional purpose and their small size.
The existing empirical literature on special-purpose governments focuses on the
implications of specialized governance on service delivery. It discusses special districts in
general and subtypes of special districts such as BIDs but is almost silent on the effects of
CDDs. Even though CDDs have been around since the early 1980s there is a lack of
systematic scholarly studies on their effects. This study fills in this gap in the literature by
analyzing the impacts of CDDs from the perspectives of development policy and service
delivery.
Most of the reviewed studies analyzed the effects of special-purpose governments
in general rather than differentiating them according to their functions or purpose. The
literature typically neglects to address the impacts of multi-purpose special districts.
Districts that fulfill multiple functions such as CDDs might yield different results than the
single-function ones since their functions are broader and governance implications are
more varied. By focusing on a subtype of multi-purpose governments that provide
infrastructure-related services, the present study fills up another important gap in the
extant literature.
The largest body of literature about special-purpose governments has dealt with
explaining the determinants of formation and use of specialized governance. There is
little empirical research on impacts such as efficiency, responsiveness, accountability
and/ or equity of special-purpose governments on service delivery. This study partially
addresses these issues by analyzing the perceived efficiency and responsiveness of CDDs
in delivering services.
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The present study also tries to overcome methodological shortcomings previously
identified in the literature by using primary data coming from semi-structured interviews
and a self-administered survey as well as secondary data coming from the state level and
from local general-purpose governments in Florida. The extant studies on special-purpose
governments rely heavily on data provided by the Census Bureau. These data have been
criticized for not being accurate enough because of inconsistencies between Census and
state-level data (Axelrod, 1992; Leigland, 1990).

1.3 Purpose and Objectives of the Study
The purpose of the study is to analyze how CDDs function as an institutional choice
for managing and funding public infrastructure services. It discusses the CDD profile and
activity, the contribution of CDDs to the infrastructure development and growth management
in Florida, the drivers of variation for CDDs-supported infrastructure as well as the way CDD
perceived pluses and minuses impact service delivery.

The specific objectives of the study are:


to offer an overview about CDD institutional structure with regard to districts’
powers, functions and activity;



to assess the role of CDDs to the growth management in Florida;



to assess the role of CDDs to the infrastructure development in Florida and



to determine the role of CDDs for service delivery by assessing districts pluses
and minuses as well as their efficiency and responsiveness as service providers

The overall contribution of the study is to offer a better understanding of the specialized
governance with an eye to the effective practice of CDDs.
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1.4 Overview of Research Design
The research design for the present study consists of a three-stage sequential
mixed methods approach. The first stage is an exploratory analysis which uses secondary
data sources and document analysis of different official documents and legislation to
provide a general overview about how CDDs operate and the magnitude of their activity.
The next stage is comprised of a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis. The
author employs the qualitative methodology of semi-structured interviews for a detailed
exploration of CDDs, specifically the manner in which infrastructure development occurs
in local communities. Quantitative analysis draws on state-level secondary data and
intends to complement the qualitative inquiry with numerical data about the contribution
of CDDs to the growth management and infrastructure development. Finally, the last
stage employs common themes and patterns derived from the qualitative analysis to
develop and execute survey analysis. The author uses a survey of public officials to
assess the pluses and minuses of CDDs as well as their degree of efficiency and
responsiveness in delivering public infrastructure services.
There are two reasons for combining qualitative with quantitative methodologies.
The first one is to better understand the impact of CDDs on infrastructure development
by combining the in-depth analysis of qualitative inquiry with the numerical form of
quantitative inquiry. The second one is to use qualitative research as a means of
generating variables for developing a survey instrument. The expectation is that
combining “words and numbers” will add to the reliability and validity of findings.
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1.5 Research Questions
This study seeks to answer the following major question:
What are the benefits and downsides of CDDs for both growth management
policy and public service delivery in Florida?
and sub-questions:
1. Which are the contributions of CDDs to the growth management in Florida?
2. Which are the contributions of CDDs to the infrastructure development in
Florida?
3. Are CDDs perceived to be an efficient and responsive institutional model for
infrastructure delivery?
This study is conducted with the purpose of shedding light on “shadow
governments” and providing an assessment of CDDs more than twenty five years after
their inception. The study focuses on the implications CDDs have for the way growth
occurs, the type of infrastructure services provided and the effectiveness and
responsiveness through which infrastructure services are delivered.
The choice of focusing on these particular research questions resides in the fact
that CDDs have significant implications for both growth management and urban service
delivery. The CDDs have broader implications for growth management than solely
securing availability of financial resources to build infrastructure. This study aims at
assessing not only their obvious benefit of coordinating timing and financing of
infrastructure provision with new development but also at analyzing districts
consequences with regard to the location, type and pattern of development they support.
Moreover, in order to provide a realistic assessment of CDDs activity it is
important to analyze the types of public improvements that CDD actually finance and to
determine the role districts play in infrastructure provision and maintenance. This part of
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the study intends to shed light on whether CDDs help general-purpose governments or
themselves to finance the needed infrastructure.
Finally, this study intends to determine how effective and responsive CDDs are
when delivering services. Evaluating CDDs’ performance has significant implications for
the way urban service delivery occurs today in the United States. Since service delivery
has become extremely decentralized, it is important to assess whether one type of local
government (specialized government) is better than another (generalized government).

1.6 Significance of the Study
The significance of this study resides in its original contributions to the scholarly
research, to practitioners and to the public policy process. The contribution of the present
study to the academic literature is multifold. The CDDs have been an understudied
mechanism for infrastructure development and this work will help fill in the knowledge
gap. The study addresses the need expressed in the literature for analysis of specific
subtypes of special-purpose governments by thoroughly investigating the contribution of
CDDs to the infrastructure development and service delivery within the State of Florida.
The study also assesses the efficiency and responsiveness of CDDs in delivering services
when compared to general-purpose governments through the perceptions of public
officials, thus filling up another important gap in the literature. Finally, another original
contribution of this study to the scholarly literature resides in using a mixed- methods
approach with data coming from semi-structured interviews, CDD-provided secondary
data and a self-administered survey. Thus, the present study addresses past
methodological shortcomings by relying on primary and state-level secondary data rather
than on US Census data.
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By examining the role of CDDs for growth management and service delivery this
study will make a significant contribution to the fields of public policy and public
management. It will provide decision-makers with useful information about the pros and
cons of CDD deployment and will shed light on their implications for growth
management policy and infrastructure delivery.
The findings of the study will provide evidence that the CDD is a flexible model
of institutional design for infrastructure provision that has both advantages and
disadvantages. The CDDs can be a useful institutional model with potential for other
states, especially those that need to accommodate their growth needs. However, decisionmakers should balance districts pluses and minuses when considering urban public
policies. Similar districts are already in place in states such as Arizona (county
improvement districts), Colorado (metropolitan districts), Georgia (community
improvement districts), Tennessee (utility districts) and Texas (municipal utility districts)
and are on the rise in others. Therefore, the experiences in Florida reported herein will
offer lessons to be learned for other states that favor multi-purpose independent special
districts.

1.7 Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one introduced the
problem statement, purpose of the study, a brief overview about the research design, the
research questions and sub-questions, and the importance and contribution of the study.
Chapter two describes the theoretical framework for the study, reviews the theoretical
and empirical literature about special-purpose governments and comments on the
contribution of the present study to the existing literature. Chapter three presents the
research methodology for this study. It includes the description of the purpose and
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objectives of the study, the research questions to be addressed, the mixed-methods
research design, target population and sample selection, data collection sources and
research instruments, data analysis as well as reliability and validity issues of this study.
Chapter four places CDDs within the broader context of specialized governance. It
provides background information about special districts and CDDs in the State of Florida
by describing districts characteristics, functions and activity. Chapter five describes the
role of the CDDs to the infrastructure development and growth management in Florida by
analyzing the type of infrastructure provided by CDDs as well as the location, size and
type of development they support. Chapter six identifies the drivers of infrastructure
variation to determine the role of CDDs in providing and maintaining infrastructure for
new development. Chapter seven describes how favorable of an institutional choice for
infrastructure delivery CDDs are by analyzing the perceived strengths and weaknesses of
CDDs as well as their efficiency and responsiveness in delivering services. The final
chapter, chapter eight, discusses the implications of the present research and suggests
further research venues.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction
Special-purpose governments are entities which provide one or a limited number
of public services. They are known under different names such as special districts, public
authorities, public corporations and the like. In the present chapter the term specialpurpose governments includes special districts, public authorities and subtypes of special
districts such as Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), Community Development
Districts (CDDs) or Community Improvement Districts. In this study the terms specialpurpose governments and specialized governance are interchangeably used. The review
focuses on the literature concerning special-purpose governments because they provide a
general conceptual framework for the present study and because CDDs have occasionally
been researched empirically.
This chapter is comprised of three sections. First it describes the theoretical
framework of the New Public Management. Then it presents both the theoretical
perspectives and empirical literature on special-purpose governments. The final section
summarizes the gaps in the literature and comments on the way this study addresses
them.

2.2 New Public Management and Service Delivery
New Public Management (NPM) is a public management reform movement
comprised of a set of core principles that have been developed in the 1970s as an
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alternative to the traditional theory of public administration. The term was coined in 1989
by Christopher Hood to describe the common features of the administrative reforms
undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s in countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zeeland,
United Kingdom and later in the United States (Lynn, 2006, p. 107).
Based on the theoretical assumptions of economic theory and business
management, NPM was embraced with the intent of reducing the cost and the size of
government. The aim of NPM is to make the public sector act more like the private one
and it calls for government to focus on results rather than on procedures, adopt marketlike competition and entrepreneurial strategies, become customer-driven and rely on
market-based mechanisms to deliver public services.
There are as various definitions and descriptions of the NPM values as the
number of authors who wrote about it. To shed light on the concept of NPM this study
describes the six fundamental NPM values identified by Kettl (2000) which successfully
summarize the core concepts of this public management doctrine. These values are:


Making government more efficient and effective by achieving more things
with less resources;



Using market-like mechanisms to make government more competitive;



Treating citizens as customers or clients and make government a
consumer-driven one with choices of public services;



Using decentralization to make government more flexible and responsive;



Improving the process of policy adoption and implementation by
revisiting the role of government in the provision and delivering of public
services and



Focusing on outputs and outcomes instead of processes and structures.

According to Osborne & Gaebler (1992) NPM is a customer-driven government
which is more entrepreneurial and more accountable to the public and which generates
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more services choices than the traditional bureaucracy (p.180). Therefore, NPM replaced
the principles of “Old Public Administration” with a set of new principles. These are:
contracting out, decentralization, granting more freedom to managers, availability of
customer

choices,

deregulation,

competition

and

performance

measurement

(Frederickson & Smith, 2003).
The contracting out phenomenon is a fundamental feature of NPM (Frederickson
& Smith, 2003) and has been on the rise in the last twenty years. It has been identified in
the public management literature under different names – the “hollow state” (Milward &
Provan & Else, 1993), government by proxy (Kettl, 1993), third party government (Smith
& Lipsky, 1993), and shadow government and the contracting regime (Kettl, 1988). This
study will use the term “hollow state” for the remainder of the chapter as it appears more
appealing to the scope of the research.
Today, public services delivery is no longer a direct function of national
governments. It is taking place within “the hollow state” framework where state
governments are sharing or devolving authority to local levels of government or other
governmental entities and agencies. Under NPM public managers are challenged either to
find new ways to achieve results or to privatize functions previously provided by
government. They should “steer not row”, meaning they should not assume the burden of
service delivery themselves, but (…) others would carry them out (Denhardt & Dendardt,
2007, p. 13).
The “hollow state” model (HSM) was introduced to the public sector by Milward,
Provan & Else (1993). It was borrowed from the private sector where “the hollow
corporation” (Business Week, 1986) replaced the internal process of production with a
network of subcontractors. In the public sector, hollow state refers to a system of third
party governance. Within the hollow state framework policy design becomes the
responsibility of state governments and policy implementation the responsibility of a
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network of local governmental agencies, non-profit organizations and private companies
(Milward & Provan, 2000).
The hollow state is also used to pinpoint the importance of adopting public
policies in the context of governance rather than government (Frederickson, 1996). While
government refers to the traditional institutions of government that are dealing with direct
service delivery, governance is a broader term that refers to “the traditions, institutions
and processes that determine the exercise of power in society, including how decisions
are made on issues of public concern and how citizens are given voice in public
decisions” (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007, p.86). Milward & Provan (2000) state that
governance also includes agents in the private, non-profit and public sectors. Therefore,
governance implies the presence of a network of institutions that are involved in
delivering public services, possibly outside of direct public provision.
The HSM is perceived both in terms of strengths and weaknesses. On the one
hand, the hollow state is seen as a solution to a lack of federal funding and service
provision and it focuses on the privatization as well as on the efficiency and flexibility of
public service delivery (Milward & Provan, 2000). Devolution is a means of assuring
more flexibility in service provision by decentralizing services to local institutions that
are more responsive to a community’s needs (Kettle, 1988; Milward, Provan & Else,
1993) and provide more efficient and cost-effective services (Smith & Smyth, 1996). On
the other hand, the HSM is weak in addressing issues of accountability and coordination
(Fredericksen & London, 2000; Lynn, 2006; Milward & Provan, 2000), especially “with
application to control for abuse of out-sourced providers of services through reporting,
supervision and oversight” (Fredericksen & London, 2000, p.231). Moreover, critics of
NPM argue that in this management model the accountability is fragmented (Haynes,
2003), political control and accountability are weak (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000) and there
is a disconnection between specialization and coordination (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000).
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Within the NPM framework, CDDs represent one of the “hollowed-out”
alternatives for delivering public infrastructure services. Special-purpose governments
were created in order to professionalize the management of public services and to deliver
them in an efficient and business-like manner (Blair, 1986). Administrative and fiscal
decentralization for service delivery in the field of economic development is encouraged
within the HSM (Milward, Provan & Else, 1993). The CDDs as localized entities of
government can be seen as a flexible alternative means for service delivery. In theory,
consistent with tenets of NPM, they are expected to provide more responsive and more
efficient services. Since CDDs are smaller in size than general-purpose governments,
they should, in theory, better consider the needs of a community. Districts’ functional
specialization is supposed to offer higher quality services thus, making them more
efficient than general-purpose governments. The present study aims at demonstrating
that CDDs represent a flexible institutional choice for public infrastructure delivery.

2.3 Theories of Special-Purpose Governments
As stated earlier, the doctrine of NPM encouraged the rise of varied
administrative arrangements such as special-purpose governments for public service
delivery. The scope of this section is to describe the two competing theories about
specialized governance. The theoretical views about special-purpose governments focus
on a debate between two main theories describing specialized governance: metropolitan
reform theory and public choice theory. The debate refers to issues of consolidation vs.
fragmentation when discussing efficiency, responsiveness, accountability and equity of
specialized governance.
Metropolitan reform theory favors governmental consolidation as a way of
maximizing benefits within a region. It supports governmental consolidation of all local
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governmental entities into a single (Bish & Ostrom, 1973, p. 9) or a small number
(Miller, 2002) of jurisdictions for each metropolitan area and it encourages increasing
coordination of existing governments with a higher level of government (Miller 2002, p.
94). Metropolitan reformers consider special-purpose governments as contributing to the
fragmentation of government. Fragmentation drives confusion among citizens with
regards to which governmental entity is responsible for providing public services.
Therefore, specialized governments are perceived as inefficient and wasteful because
they increase the cost of government and contribute to duplication of services (Bollens,
1957). Fragmentation also contributes to inequality of distribution in service delivery
since special-purpose governments do not provide equal access to all citizens but only to
those who pay for them. In this theoretical view special-purpose governments are seen as
unaccountable to the public.
As a result of their small size special-purpose governments provide more
expensive and less efficient services than general-purpose governments. Metropolitan
reformers consider the activity of specialized governance as not being coordinated with
that of general governance. Moreover, reformers view special-purpose governments as
focusing on the interests of those who initiated their creation, mainly developers.
Public choice theory favors the polycentric model of governance that describes
the interactions of multiple local governments which are independent of each other
(Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom, Bish & Ostrom, 1988). Public choice theorists support
fragmentation because it offers a variety of choices for the services and taxes offered
(Bish & Ostrom, 1973; Ostrom, 1999). Within the public choice framework
fragmentation encourages competition among local governments which leads to
efficiency and effectiveness of service provision (Miller, 2002). Tiebout (1956) asserted
that competition among local governments allows citizens to choose where to live
according to the choices of taxes and services that fulfill their needs. Fragmentation
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supporters view efficiency in terms of benefits exceeding costs and higher quality for
services. Equity of service delivery is not a principal focus.
Public choice theory distinguishes between the production and provision of
services. Service provision is achieved through a variety of local entities such as counties,
cities, public authorities, special districts and the like. Special-purpose governments are
created to address the need of efficient service delivery. The polycentric model views
special-purpose governments as a flexible and responsive means of delivering services.
The smaller the units of government the better they will satisfy the preferences of citizens
(Ostrom, 1999). Special-purpose governments are accountable to the citizens they serve
through their elected boards of supervisors. Public choice perspective also addresses
issues of distribution equity since the establishment of special districts is seen as an
alternative to an increase in taxes. Specialized governance relies on the benefit principle:
those who benefit pay for it (Oakerson, 1999).
In summary, the two theories about specialized governance offer two competing
views. On the one hand, metropolitan reformers criticize special-purpose governments
and consider them as undesirable because they contribute to the fragmentation of a
metropolitan area. On the other hand, public choice theorists favor them as contributing
to the efficiency and responsiveness of a metropolitan area through competition and
flexibility. Both theories discuss special-purpose governments in general and do not
differentiate them according to their functions, structure or authority (Foster, 1997;
Mullin, 2009) or the politics of special-purpose governments (Berry, 2009).

2.4 Special-Purpose Governments and Service Delivery
This section discusses the contribution of the empirical literature on specialpurpose governments and service delivery by classifying the reviewed studies into four
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main categories: determinants of special-purpose governments’ formation, determinants
of their use, efficiency of specialized governance in delivering services as well as
descriptive functional impacts of special-purpose governments.
The first line of research about special-purpose governments refers to the
determinants of their formation and proliferation. Specialized governance was found to
be a consequence of several factors. First, special-purpose governments were created
because of the inability and inflexibility of general-purpose governments to provide
services for current needs (Bollens, 1957). Thus, specialized governance was created to
address a public or a private market failure (Porter et. al., 1992) by providing services in
areas where other public or private entities were not able or not willing to.
Second, special-purpose governments were created to fulfill a demand for new
services (Billings & Leland, 2009; Burns, 1994; McCabe, 2000). Billings & Leland
(2009) argued that population, income and urbanization contributed to an increase in the
number of Business Improvement Districts. Special-purpose governments were initiated
by citizens, by specific interests of individuals and groups (Bollens, 1957) such as
developers (Burns, 1994; McCabe, 2000) or by general-purpose governments which had
a desire for special districts to perform certain functions (Bollens, 1957). Burns (1994)
indicated that the formation of special districts varied according to the historical context.
Therefore, from 1950s until 1970s district creation reflected the desire of citizens for new
services while in the 1980s special districts were created both as a consequence of the tax
and debt limits placed by states on local general-purpose governments and as an initiative
of developers to provide new services.
Third, there are studies that explained the creation and proliferation of specialpurpose governments as a result of state legislation. Some authors found that district
enabling legislation is the determinant of their creation (Billings & Leland, 2009; Foster,
1997). Special-purpose governments were more likely to form in states that had more
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permissive statutes about district formation and powers (Foster, 1997) or did not have
such legislation in place (Billings & Leland, 2009). Other scholars explained that growth
management legislation led to the formation of specialized governance (Bartling, 2007).
Thus, as the Florida Growth Management legislation requires, Community Development
Districts could provide the necessary infrastructure at the time growth occurs.
Fourth, there are numerous studies that explain the formation of special-purpose
governments as a means of overcoming state-imposed limits and constraints on the taxing
and borrowing capacity of the local general-purpose governments (Bowler & Donovan,
2004; Carr, 2006; Foster, 1997; MacManus, 1981; Marlow, 1995; McCabe, 2000). From
this perspective the creation of new local governments represents an institutional
mechanism that continues to provide services when tax and expenditure limitations
(TELs) are adopted. MacManus (1981) considered that an increase in the number of
property-based tax special districts was a consequence of restrictions placed both on advalorem taxes and on borrowing capacities of local governments. Partially consistent with
MacManus (1981), Foster (1997) found that states with debt limits experienced an
increase in the number of special districts while those with property tax limits had a
reduced number of special districts.
McCabe (2000) focused on a wider array of state limitations such as property tax
and debt constraints, expenditure limits and income tax measures placed both on
municipalities and counties. Evidence suggests that states with TELs and debt limits
placed both on cities and counties tended to create more special districts. Also, special
districts were more likely to occur in states that allowed sales and income taxes to both
municipalities and counties or to municipal governments only.
Bowler and Donovan (2004) did not consider typologies of constraints; they
focused on whether the adoption of TELs by states had any influence on the creation of

22

special-purpose governments. Results indicated that special districts are unintended
consequences of TELs.
Unlike previous scholars who used only fiscal autonomy measures Carr (2006)
employed four different measure of local autonomy - fiscal, functional, administrative
and structural. He found that states that TELs were the only category of limitations that
had an impact on the number of special districts. Moreover, states that had less restrictive
TELs were associated with a higher reliance on special-purpose governments.
While some studies explained the relationship between TELs placed by states on
cities or municipalities and the number of special-purpose governments (MacManus,
1981; Marlow, 1995), others considered constraints placed both on municipalities and
counties and found that special-purpose governments/special districts were more likely to
occur in states that adopted revenue and expenditure limitations on both categories of
general-purpose governments (Carr, 2006; McCabe, 2000). The results about the impact
of TELs on special-purpose governments were consistent for both the creation of new
districts (McCabe, 2000) and the assessment of existent districts (Bowler & Donovan,
2004).
Other type of legislation that contributed to the creation of special-purpose
governments is represented by state imposed limitations on municipal and county
formation and boundary changes (Carr, 2004b; Foster, 1997). Special districts are
preferred to consolidation because their formation is easier to accomplish (Carr, 2004b)
and because districts are flexible, self-supporting mechanisms that fulfill service
provision demands, provide citizens with choices in the services and taxes offered and
provide services that distinguish a district supported community by a city or a county
(McCabe, 2004).
The majority of studies within the state legislation framework explained district
formation and proliferation as a consequence of one type of state legislation such as
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district enabling legislation (Billings & Leland, 2009), growth management legislation
(Bartling, 2007), tax and expenditure tax limitations (Bowler & Donovan, 2004; Carr,
2006; MacManus, 1981; Marlow, 1995; McCabe, 2000) and state limitations on
municipal and county consolidation and boundary changes (Carr, 2004b). Foster (1997)
acknowledges that special districts formation is a consequence of different types of state
legislation such as statues and constitutions regarding the creation of special districts,
state-imposed limitation on municipal and county formation, boundary changes, service
provision, revenue raising capacity and federal income tax laws. Furthermore, Foster
(1997) pointed to the fact that not all special districts are the same and different subtypes
of districts have different reasons for their formation. Therefore, the creation of
specialized governance should be understood as a combination of different factors such
as legal, institutional and political factors (Foster, 1997).
The literature in this category does not distinguish among different districts
subtypes. Even though special-purpose governments have been differentiated by their
geographical location there is a need for explaining the creation of specialized
governance by functional subtypes of districts since different subtypes of districts have
different reasons for their formation (Burns, 1994; Foster, 1997). Furthermore, the studies
focusing on the determinants of special-purpose governments’ formation used simplistic
measures for the operationalization of specialized governance such as number of special
districts instead of relying on more standardized measures.
The second line of research on special-purpose governments deals with studies
that try to explain how and why these entities are used. Reliance on special-purpose
governments was explained primarily through these entities’ character of financial
mechanisms. Special-purpose governments were considered “tax-relief mechanisms”
(MacManus, 1981) that take the financial burden off general-purpose governments
shoulders, “borrowing machines” (Leigland, 1994) that try to escape constitutional debt
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limits (Bunch, 1991) and alternative funding mechanisms for infrastructure provision due
to their ability to finance themselves and to their access to bond markets (Porter et. al.,
1992).
Reliance on special-purpose governments was also seen beyond their revenue
raising capacities. There are scholars who demonstrated that there are alternative reasons
for state and local use of these entities besides their financial abilities. Special-purpose
governments are used also because of demographic indicators such as population, area
and urbanization (Frant, 1997) as well as for their institutional characteristics which were
expected to solve service delivery concerns in a framework of political competition
(Bourdeaux, 2005). The reliance on special-purpose governments is also seen as a means
of overcoming collective action problems such as coordination (Baer & Feiock, 2005;
Mullin, 2010) and division (Baer & Feiock, 2005). Mullin (2010) argued that the
boundary flexibility of special districts led to their likelihood of entering into interlocal
agreements, thus solving local coordination issues.
A third line of research on special-purpose governments looks at their efficiency
in delivering services when compared to general-purpose governments. The studies in
this category point to a consensus that specialized governance is less efficient than
general-purpose governance (Berry, 2009; Bourdeaux, 2007; Foster, 1997; Mullin, 2009;
Nunn & Schoedel, 1997). The evidence in this category is not convincing since there is
no consistent measure to assess efficiency. Efficiency was measured in different ways as
follows: capital spending patterns to determine the quantity of infrastructure that gets
built by both specialized and general governmental entities (Nunn & Schoedel, 1997),
cost of services provided by comparing metropolitan areas that had special-purpose
governments with those that had only general-purpose governments (Foster, 1997), rate
of completed projects for solid waste projects for both public authorities and counties
(Bourdeaux, 2007), quality of services for library services offered by both special-
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purpose and general-purpose governments (Berry, 2009) and adoption of progressive
rates for potable water by special districts and general-purpose governments (Mullin,
2009). The diversity of measures operationalizing efficiency makes it difficult to
generalize findings beyond the context under analysis.
Unlike the supporters of public choice theory who view special-purpose
governments as being more efficient than the general-purpose ones these empirical
studies suggest the opposite. Specialized governance costs more due to its focus on longterm strategic reasons vs. short-term political and financial reasons for general-purpose
governments (Foster, 1997). It costs more even when it does not provide higher quality
services when compared to general-purpose governance (Berry, 2009). Therefore, the
magnitude of special-purpose governments’ budgets does not justify the quality of
services they offer (Berry, 2009). Moreover, special-purpose governments’ contribution
to service provision is modest in comparison to that of general-purpose governments
(Bourdeaux, 2007; Nunn & Schoedel, 1997). Bourdeaux (2007) showed that specialized
governance was less efficient than general-purpose government in delivering solid waste
services because the completion rate of public authorities was low (15%) in comparison
to that of counties (67%). Nunn and Schoedel (1997) compared the capital spending of
cities with that of special districts among metropolitan areas and found that cities were
the main providers of infrastructure because their capital spending was significantly
higher than the spending of special districts.
Mullin (2009) is the only one that found that specialized governance is more
efficient than general-purpose governments but only in certain circumstances. She
investigated the efficiency and responsiveness implications for local policymaking in
municipal water provision by analyzing the relationship between governing structure
(special districts vs. general-purpose governments) and the adoption of progressive rates
for water utilities. Findings demonstrated that specialized governance had a significant
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effect on the adoption of progressive water prices but only in communities with low
temperature values.
When assessing the efficiency of special-purpose governments in comparison to
general-purpose governments the scholarly literature investigated both special districts, in
general (Foster, 1997; Nunn & Schoedel, 1997) and subtypes of single-function districts:
water districts (Mullin, 2009), library districts (Berry, 2009) and solid waste authorities
(Bourdeaux, 2007). The studies in this category are scarce and efficiency of multipurpose governments has not been addressed.
Other impacts of specialized governance such as responsiveness have not been
rigorously investigated. Even though, in theory, specialized governance is considered to
be more responsive than general-purpose governments (McCabe, 2004) empirical
evidence about the responsiveness of special-purpose governments is almost nonexistent. This study seeks to fill this void in the literature by analyzing both efficiency
and responsiveness of specialized governance.
Finally, there is a fourth line of research that provides a descriptive perspective
about the impacts of organizational and functional characteristics of subtypes of multipurpose special districts such as Business Improvement Districts (Becker, 2010; Gross,
2005; Mitchell, 2001; Mitchell, 2008), Community Development Districts (Florida
Atlantic University/Florida International University Joint Center for Environmental
Studies, 1995) and Community Improvement Districts (Morcol & Zimmerman, 2006).
What these subtypes of districts have in common is their multi-purpose focus, among
other things, on infrastructure/capital improvement projects.
Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) provide services that cover the areas of
management and maintenance of public space, public safety and the promotion of
business functions (Becker, 2010). Their functions have been classified into seven main
categories: marketing, cleaning and maintenance, capital improvement, security,
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economic development, policy advocacy and community development (Mitchell, 2008).
Scholars explained that BIDs differ in providing services according to the city size within
which they are located (Mitchell, 2001) or according to the district size (Gross, 2005). On
one hand, BIDs located in large cities focused more on marketing, security and public
space while districts in small cities were involved in capital improvements projects and
marketing. On the other hand, large BIDs focused on capital improvement projects,
medium districts on marketing and promotional activities and small districts on
maintenance activities.
The Florida Atlantic University/Florida International University Joint Center for
Environmental and Urban Problems (1995) created a comprehensive database about the
number, size and type of CDDs, the type of land-use developed as well as housing units
and the type of infrastructure services provided. The study found that CDDs focus on
providing basic infrastructure such as water, sewer, drainage, groundwater recharge,
roads, parks and recreation facilities and solid waste. However, districts relied on
general-purpose governments for service maintenance.
Morcol & Zimmerman (2006) presented an exploratory analysis of the activity
and functions of Community Improvement Districts (CIDs) in Georgia to offer a general
understanding on how these districts operate. Findings showed that CIDs are
governmental entities created to accommodate economic growth. Their functions focused
on transportation and capital improvements, safety, cleanliness and traffic congestion.
Although informative in scope this body of literature does not adequately address
the impacts of multi-purpose special districts. Districts that fulfill multiple functions
might have different consequences than the districts which pursue single-functions since
the former’s implications are broader.
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2.5 Summary
There are two main issues to consider when discussing the contribution of the
extant literature about special-purpose governments and service delivery: content and
methodological issues. First, there are content issues that need to be emphasized. Most of
the studies under review analyzed the effects of special-purpose governments in general
rather than differentiating them according to their functions or purpose. The largest body
of literature referred to determinants of district formation and use in general and it did not
make any difference among various district subtypes.
The literature fails to consistently address the impacts of multi-purpose special
districts. Multi-purpose districts may be a solution to the criticism that the single function
districts do not justify the addition of another layer of government (Carr, 2004). Several
functions such as those relating to infrastructure might actually make districts efficient
and responsive enough to justify their addition to the governance system.
The empirical literature points to a consensus that specialized governance is less
efficient than general-purpose government. The studies about the efficiency impacts of
specialized governance are scarce and they used different measures to assess efficiency,
fact that makes it difficult to generalize their findings beyond the context under analysis.
Other impacts of specialized governance such as responsiveness have not been rigorously
investigated while accountability or equity issues are addressed only in theory.
There are also methodological issues that need to be addressed. The reviewed
literature relies heavily on secondary data while primary data are scarce. Most of the
empirical studies rely on data coming from United States Census of Governments to
determine the number and types of special districts. The Census Bureau data have been
criticized for not being accurate enough due to inconsistencies between U. S. Census and
state-level data (Axelrod, 1992; Leigland, 1990). The Census Bureau either undercounts
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special districts by not including the dependent districts or overcounts them by including
inactive districts. Recently, there have been attempts to overcome this issue (Berry, 2009;
Mullin, 2010) but only in the case of single-purpose districts. Moreover, the literature
uses simple measures for counting special-purpose governments such as number of
special districts rather than more standardized measures. The studies are cross-sectional
in nature.
The contribution of the present study to the literature concerning special-purpose
governments and service delivery is multifold. First, it addresses the need expressed in
the literature for the analysis of specific types of special-purpose government. It
completes the descriptive perspective in the literature about multi-purpose districts by
thoroughly analyzing the contribution of the CDDs to infrastructure development in the
State of Florida. Second, the study assesses the efficiency and responsiveness of CDDs in
delivering services when compared to general-purpose governments through the
perceptions of public officials, thus filling an important gap in the literature. Third, the
study analyzes the utility of an institutional choice for infrastructure delivery by relying
both on secondary and primary data. The study also addresses past methodological
shortcomings by relying on state-level data rather than U.S. Census data. Last but not
least, the study fills another important gap in the literature by providing a comprehensive
analysis for a specific subtype of multi-purpose districts.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the research approach and methods for this study. It is
comprised of three sections. The first section describes the purpose and objectives of the
study as well the research questions. The second section describes the research design
together with the research instruments and procedures used for data collection. The last
section presents the data analysis procedures and discusses reliability and validity issues.

3.2 Purpose and Objectives of the Study
The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze CDDs and to determine their
benefits and downsizes for growth management policy and service delivery. The specific
objectives of the study are:
The specific objectives of the study are:


to offer an overview about CDD institutional structure with regard to districts’
powers, functions and activity;



to assess the role of CDDs to the growth management in Florida;



to assess the role of CDDs to the infrastructure development in Florida and



to determine the role of CDDs for service delivery by assessing districts pluses
and minuses as well as their efficiency and responsiveness as service providers

The overall contribution of the study is to provide a better understanding of the multipurpose specialized governance through the specific analysis of CDDs.

31

In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives the study seeks to answer the
following major research question:
What are the benefits and downsides of CDDs for both growth management
policy and public service delivery in Florida?
and sub-questions:
1. Which are the contributions of CDDs to growth management in Florida?
2. Which are the contributions of CDDs to infrastructure development in
Florida?
3. Are CDDs perceived to be an efficient and responsive institutional model for
infrastructure delivery?

3.3 Research Design
The present study employs a mixed methodologies approach consisting of both
qualitative and quantitative research methods. According to Patton (2002) mixed
methodology strengthens the study design because different types of data are expected to
offer a better understanding of the subject matter. When used for the same study
qualitative and quantitative methods complement each other. While qualitative research
focuses on in-depth study of specific cases and contexts, quantitative research follows a
linear path focusing on testing hypotheses that are derived from existing theories
(Neuman, 2004).
The research design for this study is cross-sectional. The study uses sequential
research procedures (Creswell, 2003) consisting of the following steps. The author first
uses secondary data sources and document analysis of different official documents and
legislation to get a general overview about how CDDs operate and the magnitude of their
activity. The second step involves a combination of qualitative and quantitative
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methodologies. The author employs semi-structured interviews for a detailed exploration
of CDDs, specifically in the area of the way infrastructure service delivery occurs in local
communities. Quantitative analysis draws on secondary data and intends to complement
the qualitative inquiry with numerical data about the contribution of CDDs to the
infrastructure development in Florida. Last, the author uses a survey of public officials to
assess CDDs’ pluses and minuses as well as their degree of efficiency and
responsiveness.
The document analysis and secondary data analysis aim at providing background
information about CDDs and place the districts within a contextual framework. Semistructured interviews serve two purposes. First, they offer a detailed exploration of the
CDDs’ impacts as institutions of specialized purpose. Second, interviews serve as a
means of generating variables to help construct the survey instrument. Since little
research has been conducted about CDDs, qualitative research is a useful means of
identifying the important variables to be included in the survey. The survey serves as a
valuable data collection technique whose purpose is to develop indexes of favorability for
CDDs and to assess their strengths and weaknesses.
3.3.1 Qualitative Methodology
According to Neuman (2004) “qualitative data (…) involve documenting real
events, recording what people say, observing specific behaviors, studying written
documents or examining visual images“ (p. 87). Qualitative methods are primarily
preferred because they offer an in-depth view about CDD impacts. In qualitative research
investigators follow a non-linear path to better understand the details of a particular
context (Neuman, 2004). Qualitative methods are very helpful in this instance because it
is difficult to quantify something that has not been defined.
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The qualitative data for the present study come from twelve semi-structured
interviews which were conducted both on-site and via telephone between January and
March 2009. The interviews’ participants comprised of seven public officials (four
representatives of Planning Departments, one Financial Manager, one Manager of Public
Works Division and one County Attorney) and five CDD representatives (three attorneys
and two district managers).
The semi-structured interviews are based on an interview guide that is comprised
of a list of topics that need to be covered in a particular order (Bernard, 2000, p. 191).
Semi-structured interviews are suitable for situations in which the participants comprise
of managers, public officials and any other persons with supervisory functions who want
to efficiently use their time (Bernard, 2000). Also, semi-structured interviews will allow
“elites” to define issues to be used in subsequent research. This type of interview allows
the author to use flexibility within a guided framework.
The sampling technique for selecting participants was purposive. Purposive
sampling refers to selecting cases with a specific purpose in mind. In this study the
purpose was to select participants from the categories of public officials and CDD
representatives within the six counties in Florida that had more than thirty CDDs:
Hillsborough, Lee, Manatee, Miami-Dade, Pasco and St. Lucie. Since almost half of the
CDDs are located within these six counties, the selection of the participants provided
valuable information. This type of non-random sampling is adequate when the
investigator wants to select unique cases that are informative as well as when the
researcher wants to identify certain cases for in-depth investigation (Neuman, 2004).
In order to obtain access to the participants the author followed the following
steps. First, the author decided on the categories of participants to be included in the
study: public officials and CDD representatives. Then, the author contacted each of the
six counties to identify the most knowledgeable public officials about CDDs. With the
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exception of Pasco county the other five (Hillsborough, Lee, Manatee, Miami-Dade and
St. Lucie) responded. Cities that have established CDDs within the boundaries of the six
counties were also contacted. The only city that responded to the author’s request was the
City of Ft. Myers. Obtaining participation to CDD representatives involved a selection of
representative persons for the six counties according to the list provided by the Florida
Department of Community Affairs1.
The author developed an interview guide to assure the collection of consistent and
reliable data. The research instrument covered the following main areas: CDD functions
and activities, services provided and the type of development supported, the way service
delivery occurs in local jurisdictions and CDD benefits and costs. The interview guide is
attached in Appendix 1. Interviews were recorded with the consent of the participants.
Data obtained from interviews were supplemented with data from document
analysis. Document analysis entailed the following types of legal and official documents,
reports and publications:


State Legislation: Florida Statutes, Chapters 163, 189, 190 and Chapter 9J-5 from
the Florida Administrative Code



Petitions for CDD creation in the six aforementioned counties which were
obtained from cities, counties and directly from CDDs where necessary



Official reports and documents from both state and county levels (financial
reports, activity reports about special districts and the Florida Special Districts
Handbook)

1

The on-line data set about special districts to be found at www. Floridaspecialdistricts.org contains a
detailed list for each CDD where the name and contact information for each CDD representative is
displayed.
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3.3.2 Quantitative Methodologies
Quantitative methodologies consisted of both secondary and primary data
collection strategies. Secondary data come from Florida Department of Community
Affairs, Florida Department of Financial Services and US Census of Governments.
Primary data are the result of a hybrid on-line/mail survey which was
administered between February 23rd and mid April, 2010. The survey seemed to be the
appropriate means of collecting consistent primary data. At the moment, the Florida
Department of Community Affairs is the only agency that collects and publicly releases
limited data about special districts, in general, and CDDs, in particular. In order to
conduct the present research more detailed data were needed.
The survey design was used because it provides descriptive assertions about a
population by analyzing samples of respondents’ perceptions (Axinn & Pearce, 2006;
Babbie, 1990; Creswell, 2003). To assess the efficiency of CDDs, a structured method
such as a survey instrument provides consistent measures for respondents’ perceptions. It
is also a fairly rapid and convenient way of collecting primary data regarding perceptions
and attitudes of public officials. The author opted for a cross-sectional survey instrument
because of time and financial constraints.
The target population for the survey comprised of public officials within all local
general-purpose governments (counties and cities) that have established at least one
CDD. When selecting the survey respondents the author used cluster sampling. Cluster
sampling is appropriate in this instance because there is no good sampling frame
(Neuman, 2004). The procedure involved several stages. First, the author selected all the
cities and counties that have established CDDs according to the data provided by the
Florida Department of Community Affairs. In Florida there are a hundred and three local
general-purpose jurisdictions that have established at least one CDD. Thirty four local
jurisdictions are counties and sixty nine are cities. The next step of sampling consisted of
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selecting all the departments or divisions that have been involved in the CDD
establishment and activity overview. The author searched the websites of local generalpurpose jurisdictions and identified the departments that dealt with the CDD process of
establishment. These are: planning and zoning, growth management, county/city
manager’s office, budget and financial management office, county/city attorney and
utilities services. Since not all public officials within these departments were
knowledgeable about CDD activity and not all the departments were actually involved in
any way, the author obtained names of knowledgeable individuals by e-mailing one or
two representatives in each local jurisdiction (usually a member of the Planning and
Zoning Department, Growth Management Department or the County/City Attorney’s
Office). In instances where no recommendation was provided, the author chose the heads
of these three departments. The sample consisted of 197 persons. The number of
individuals to be surveyed was decided according to the number of CDDs in each county/
municipality as depicted in Table 3.1. The ranges depicted in Table 3.1 were selected
according to the suggestions of recommenders and to the minimum knowledgeable
persons within any local jurisdiction.

Table 3.1 Selection of Survey Participants
Number of CDDs/local jurisdiction

Number of participants selected

1

1

2-7

2

8 – 12

3

13 – 40

4

41+

5
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Even though cluster sampling is considered less accurate than the simple random
sampling (Neuman, 2004, p. 151) in this case the first cluster consisted of the entire
population (all the cities and counties that have established CDDs), fact that yielded a
representative sample. This is also a subject that does not constitute general knowledge
for every staff member within a local jurisdiction’s department or division and, therefore,
identifying the knowledgeable persons offered meaningful results and a fairly high
response rate.
The survey instrument was specifically designed for this study according to the
categories identified from the semi-structured interviews and according to the suggestions
previously identified in the literature review about special-purpose governments. The
content areas addressed in the survey are: CDD structure flexibility, financial
implications for general-purpose governments, developers and residents, CDD economic
development impacts concerning infrastructure provision and maintenance and CDDs
relationship with general-purpose governments. The scales used to measure items in the
survey consist of Likert and semantic differential scales. The entire instrument is attached
in Appendix 2.
The survey instrument was pilot tested on six persons who were knowledgeable
on the subject before the final version was sent out. Pilot testing was important to
establish the content validity of the survey instrument and to improve the format of the
questions.
The survey was administered as a combination of on-line and mail selfadministered questionnaires. The data were collected in three waves. The first two waves
consisted of an on-line survey that was sent out through www.surveymonkey.com. The
first electronic wave was sent out on February 23, 2010. A second electronic wave
followed up one week and a half after the first one. A third wave consisting of mail selfadministered questionnaires was sent out three weeks after the initial wave. The author
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followed up with phone calls and e-mails two weeks after the third wave as a reminder
for those who did not complete the survey.
When administering mail questionnaires, the author followed the principles
suggested by Neuman (2004) to increase the response rate. Thus, the questionnaire was
accompanied by a cover letter printed on Florida International University’s letterhead,
which explained the purpose and usefulness of the survey, the selection of participants,
statement of confidentiality and willingness to answer, included a small monetary
inducement and specified the name and contact information of the researcher. The length
of the questionnaire was five double-sided pages. Each mailing was comprised by a cover
letter, questionnaire and a post-paid, self-addressed envelope.
The survey response rate was 51%. This rate is fairly realistic these days when 40
to 50% response rate is the average in social sciences, especially in the United States
where “there are refusal rates as high as 30%” (Neuman, 2004, p. 179). Moreover, the
51% response rate is consistent with the results of other recent studies (Frank, Philip &
Scutelnicu, 2009) that reported a mean response rate of 49.1% for survey studies
conducted in the public budgeting discipline.
The choice of administering the survey both on-line and by mail was determined
by the author’s desire to achieve a high response rate given the limited financial
resources. While on-line surveys have the advantages of low administering cost and ease
in collecting and analyzing data, their disadvantage resides in their low response rate
(Dooley, 2001; Neuman, 2004). Mail self-administered questionnaires were needed to
boost up the response rate. The two electronic waves collected 23% of the data the
difference up to 51% was gathered through mail.
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3.4 Data Analysis
Data analysis followed three main steps whose findings are presented in Chapters
four, five, six and seven respectively. First, an exploratory analysis was conducted to
provide a general overview about special districts in general as well as background
information about CDDs’ powers, functions, proliferation and activity. Chapter four
describes the results for the first step of the analysis. This exploratory analysis consisted
of document analysis and secondary data analysis. Document analysis focused mainly on
state legislation comprised of Florida Statutes, Chapters 163, 189, 190 and Chapter 9J-5
from the Florida Administrative Code and Florida Special Districts Handbook - a
publication of the Florida Department of Community Affairs. Secondary data are publicly
accessible data and come from Florida Department of Community Affairs, Florida
Department of Financial Services and U.S. Census. Their purpose is to support the
narrative part with empirical data about the districts’ proliferation and activity.
The second step of the analysis consisted of analyzing the results of the semistructured interviews in conjunction with secondary data coming from the petitions that
CDDs have submitted when they were established. The results of this step of the analysis
are presented and discussed in detail in chapters five and six.
The qualitative analysis was administered first in order to identify common
themes and patterns in the interviews and to find connections among them. As specified
before, one of the interviews’ purposes was to determine the contribution of CDDs to the
public infrastructure in Florida. After transcribing the recorded interviews word-by-word,
the analysis focused on identifying common themes, patterns and differences about the
impacts of CDDs. In the initial stage of the analysis the author created a list of codes
based on a line-by-line analysis of the transcribed interviews. Then, the initial list of
codes was reduced to a matrix that served as the basis for the qualitative analysis. The
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last step of the qualitative analysis tried to relate the common themes and patterns among
them and generate more general explanations.
The qualitative analysis revealed emerging themes related to CDD profile, the
types of infrastructure provided by districts, the role of CDDs as both providers and
maintainers of infrastructure services, the type of development they support as well as the
CDDs' perceived advantages and disadvantages. In order to validate the findings from the
qualitative analysis the author followed-up with a quantitative analysis of secondary data
coming from the petitions which CDDs submitted when they were established as well as
financial reports from the Florida Department of Financial Services. Thus, the results of
the qualitative analysis were supplemented with descriptive secondary data analysis about
CDD characteristics, their financial activity and the types of development they support
within the six aforementioned counties.
Considering the fact that the CDD process of establishment by local and state
authorities differs considerably, this study considered only those CDDs that were
established through ordinances of local general-purpose governments (counties and
cities) and not those established through the Rule of the Florida Land and Water
Adjudicatory Commission. Copies of the CDD petitions located within six Florida
counties (Hillsborough, Lee, Manatee, Miami-Dade, Pasco and St. Lucie) were obtained
from the local general-purpose governments within which districts are located. The
missing data were partially completed from requests submitted directly to CDDs.
Secondary data consisted only of the petitions of the active districts that were established
by local general-purpose governments until April 2009. Out of a total of 274 active
CDDs, the author was able to obtain pertinent data for 257 districts. The missing data
could not be collected either because they were not on file anymore with local generalpurpose governments or the CDDs did not respond to the author’s information request.
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The variables included in the second step of the analysis consisted of the
following. The dependent variable was the total number of services provided by CDDs.
Independent variables referred to district size, district year of establishment, the county in
which CDDs were located, CDD status location (CDDs located in unincorporated areas
vs. districts located in incorporated areas), geographical location (CDDs located on the
west coast vs. districts located on the east coast), the type of development CDD support,
three dummy variables measuring whether districts have special powers, whether districts
provide off-site improvements and whether districts have outstanding debt, number of
public facilities owned and maintained by CDD as well as financial characteristics such
as total revenues, expenditures, amount of outstanding debt and CDD estimated
infrastructure costs.
The secondary data were analyzed by using univariate descriptive statistics,
contingency tables and multiple regression analysis which were performed using the
SPSS statistical package. Each method of analysis served different purposes. Univariate
descriptive statistics described trends and patterns across CDD characteristics and, thus,
supplemented the findings from the qualitative analysis. Contingency tables identified
significant differences for the infrastructure provided by CDDs. They represent a reliable
visual way of presenting the frequency of each value of the dependent variable for each
value of the independent variable (O’Sullivan, Rassel & Berner, 2003). Furthermore,
contingency tables are useful in analyzing relationships between variables that are
measured at nominal and ordinal level (Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero, 2006).
Finally, multiple regression analysis was employed to determine the factors that
contributed to the infrastructure variation among CDDs. Multiple regression analysis was
used to examine the effect of different independent variables on a single dependent
variable and to estimate the magnitude of that effect (Aiken, West & Pitts, 2003; Allison,
1999). The usefulness of multiple regression analysis is that it separates and examines the
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effects and contribution of each independent variable on the dependent variable (Allison,
1999).
The regression analysis used the stepwise method for exploratory purposes.
Initially, a number of seven independent variables were retained for the multivariate
regression analysis because they had significant correlations with the dependent variable.
Four out of the seven selected independent variables were significant in explaining the
variance in the final model. These were: number of services that were owned and
maintained by CDDs, whether CDDs had optional special powers or not, CDD estimated
infrastructure costs and whether CDDs were located in unincorporated vs. incorporated
areas.
The final step of data analysis refers to the analysis of the data collected through
the survey. The results for this step are described in chapter seven. The analysis of the
survey data served two main purposes. First, the survey aimed at analyzing the perceived
advantages and disadvantages of CDDs on service delivery by using univariate and
bivariate descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics helped at describing the demographic
and professional composition of the survey participants as well as at summarizing key
information about survey items. Cross-tabulations intended to identify significant
relationships between the demographic and professional indicators and the survey items.
The study used Gamma as a measure of association because all of the survey items are
measured at the ordinal level and the demographic and professional indicators have
dichotomous values. Dichotomous nominal variables may be analyzed using ordinal
measures of association (Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero, 2006; O’Sullivan et. al.,
2003).
The second purpose of this analysis was to assess the efficiency and
responsiveness of CDDs by constructing indexes of favorability. To achieve this scope
factor analysis was conducted in order to reduce the survey data to an appropriate number
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of common factors. Factor analysis (FA) is a data reduction statistical analysis technique
that aims at identifying factors that explain the variation among variables (Green &
Salkind, 2005, p. 312). It is derived from the concept of association among variables and
it shows the degree to which variables are measuring common factors (O’Sullivan et. al.,
2003). The scope of conducting exploratory FA was to reduce the number of variables
into common factors that helped construct composite measures reflecting CDD
favorability. Principal component analysis was chosen because it is more common in
exploratory studies and its usefulness resides in the fact that it generates factors that are
used in subsequent analysis (Bryant & Yarnold, 1995).
Principal component FA with varimax rotation was conducted to explore
seventeen items of the CDDs survey. There were four problematic items that were
eliminated from the analysis because they were cross-loading with several variables and
they did not belong to the factor structure. Principal component analysis indentified five
major factors as representatives for the perceptions of public officials. These are: CDD
cost-effectiveness,

managerial

responsiveness,

institutional

flexibility,

financial

mechanisms and developers’ interests.
On the basis of the results of FA three indexes reflecting CDD favorability on part
of public officials were constructed and described. These indexes measure practitioners’
general perceptions about developing and implementing CDDs. The option of developing
composite measures resides in the fact that indexes are expected to have higher reliability
and validity than individual variables (Babbie, 1990; Neuman, 2004; O’Sullivan, et al.,
2003). The composite measures were created by adding up the scores for the survey items
comprising the first three extracted factors in the principal component analysis. The items
in each index were given equal values. Index items are supposed to be weighted equally
unless there are theoretical or methodological reasons for weighing them differently
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(Babbie, 1990; Neuman, 2004). The three indexes were validated by conducting
reliability analysis.
Finally, the last stage of the survey analysis focused on the qualitative analysis of
one survey item that described the perceived drawbacks of CDD implementation in the
State of Florida. Common themes and patterns were first identified to summarize the
views of the respondents into six main categories that reflected CDDs’ shortcomings.
Then, additional recommendations that might be changed in the future implementation of
CDDs were presented to offer a comprehensive view of the respondents.

3.5 Reliability and Validity Issues
Although triangulation is probably the most complex way of researching the
subject, there might be some threats to the reliability and validity of the study. Reliability
means consistency or dependability of the researched constructs. The semi-structured
interviews may generate low reliability since they are difficult to replicate and
interviewees might not have expressed their honest views. Using a pilot test increased the
reliability of the survey constructs. Also, the creation of indexes improves reliability by
using multiple indicators for a construct, by weighing and standardizing data (Neuman,
2004).
Validity refers to the truthfulness of a measurement. In this study, mixed
methodology is perceived as a means of assuring validity of the data. The accuracy of the
findings is ensured by the review provided by experts in the field. The study may suffer
of low external validity since the results of this study cannot be directly generalized to
other states in the United States. However, CDDs have definitely potential for other states
that need to manage and finance infrastructure improvements.
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Another issue of this study refers to the non-involvement of developers. This fact
may bias the research findings towards the views of public officials and CDD
representatives. Initially developers were considered for inclusion in the study. In order to
identify developers who initiated CDDs in Florida the author both requested information
from the interview participants and conducted an internet search. The result was the
creation of a developers’ database. After several failed attempts (e-mails and telephone
calls) to get in touch with developers the author decided to exclude them from the present
study and acknowledge this limitation.
The author also acknowledges the fact that both the interviewees and the
respondents to the survey might not offer honest and complete answers. The findings of
the study are expected to point at the advantages and disadvantages of CDD as an
institutional means of financing infrastructure and creating new communities for other
states that favor special-purpose governments.

3.6 Summary
The present chapter described how the research methodology is used in this study.
It started with the description of the purpose and objectives of the study as well as the
research questions to be addressed. Then, it presented the research design as a sequential
mixed-methods one and detailed each approaches to research (qualitative and
quantitative) according to the following elements: target population and sampling
techniques, data collection sources and the research instruments for data collection. Data
analysis was described as a series of steps, beginning with an exploratory analysis that
offered background information about CDDs, following up with a combination of semistructured interviews and secondary data analysis and finishing with a quantitative
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analysis that draws on survey collected-data. Finally, the author acknowledges possible
limitations of the study.
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CHAPTER IV
TOWARDS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS: THE
CASE OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS

4.1 Introduction
The scope of this chapter is to place and explain the specific case of Community
Development Districts (CDDs) within the broader context of specialized governance. The
present chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part provides a descriptive
overview of special districts by focusing on the characteristics that differentiate them
from general-purpose governments (narrow function, institutional independence,
geographic flexibility and low political visibility) as well as on the districts’ advantages
and disadvantages. Further, the chapter briefly portrays the picture of the special districts
within the State of Florida by discussing the main provisions of Chapter 189 Florida
Statutes as well as the functions that special districts fulfill. The second part presents an
exploratory analysis about CDDs. It describes CDD creation, the planning and financial
contexts within which CDDs should be understood, it presents an outline of CDDs by
documenting their proliferation and distribution throughout Florida as well as their
powers, functions and financial activity.
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4.2 Special Districts
4.2.1 General Overview
Special districts represent an important component of the American governing
structure. They are independent, special-purpose units of local government (other than
counties, municipalities, townships or school districts) that have administrative and
financial independence from general-purpose governments such as counties and cities
(US Census, 2007). These entities of government are established by a legislative body to
provide specialized services within limited boundaries (Mitchell, 1999).
Special districts are the most common form of local government. According to
US Census (2007) there are 89,425 local governments in the United States. Special
districts represent 41.8% of the total number of local governments, followed by
municipalities with 21.80%, townships with 18.47% and counties with 3.39%. Besides
being the most common form of local government, special districts have also increased
dramatically in the last five decades. Districts more than doubled their number in the last
55 years in comparison with a 16% increase for municipalities and a slight decrease of
0.62% for counties and 4% for townships. This increase of special districts is explained
through different reasons: service delivery for certain areas is better handled by special
districts (Bollens, 1957), districts were created as a consequence of legal, institutional
and political factors (Foster, 1997) and districts are financial mechanisms (Leigland,
1994; Porter et. al., 1992) whose proliferation overcomes the fiscal restrictions placed on
local general-purpose governments (Bowler & Donovan, 2004; McCabe, 2000).
The extant literature distinguishes special purpose governments by different
names. Eger III (2006) views special purpose entities as theoretical entities that have
different

names:

‘‘public

authorities,’’ ‘‘special

districts,’’

and

‘‘government

corporations.’’ Porter et. al. (1992) acknowledge that special districts are known by
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different names such as districts, authorities, boards and commissions. Foster (1997)
divides special-purpose governments in two categories: “taxing districts” which are local
governmental entities with the power to tax and levy special assessments and “public
authorities” which are government corporations without property taxing powers. Even
though the aforementioned typologies ‘‘public authorities,’’ ‘‘special districts,”
‘‘government corporations,’’ “boards” and “commissions” are used interchangeably in
the literature, the present study will focus on the category of special districts.
4.2.2 Characteristics of Special Districts
To better understand what special districts are and how they operate, it is
imperative to briefly describe their characteristics. This section focuses on those features
that distinguish special-purpose from general-purpose governments.
Special districts are governmental entities with narrow functions that combine
features of both public and private governmental units (Foster, 1997). Special districts
are similar to other forms of local government by exercising powers such as: the right to
enter into contracts and expend monies, to sue and be sued, to obtain and dispose of
property, to raise funds through taxes, fees and assessments as well as to borrow money,
to enter into agreements with other governmental entities, to exercise the power of
eminent domain and to use public easements and rights-of-way and so on. What
differentiates special districts from general-purpose governments is what districts cannot
do. They lack police powers, land–use control powers and they require state legislative
approval to change their functions. Special districts resemble private companies because
they are exempt from state constitutional limits on borrowing and property taxation
(Bunch 1991; MacManus, 1981; McCabe, 2000) and because they are exempt from civil
service, procurement and pension fund requirements (Foster, 1997).
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Special districts are characterized by functional specialization. Foster (1997)
defines special districts as “autonomous local governments that provide a single or
limited services” (p. 2). Most special districts are established to perform a single function,
but some are authorized to provide several types of services. The 2002 US Census shows
that most (91%) of special districts performed a single function while 9% of them
performed multiple functions. Some states (such as Illinois, Texas, California, Florida
and Pennsylvania) enabled the creation of multipurpose districts that can supply most of
the infrastructure needed for new development (Porter, 2008).
According to Porter et. al. (1992) special districts were traditionally established in
the 1800’s to cover functions such as toll roads and canal corporations. Among the initial
reasons that accounted for special districts proliferation were federal government
intervention in local service delivery and the possibility of using revenue bonds to
finance local government services (Foster, 1997; Porter et. al., 1992). Many states
adopted legislation pertaining to the creation of special districts due to public debt limits
on local general purpose governments (Bunch, 1991), tax and expenditure limitations
imposed on local general-purpose governments (Bowler & Donovan, 2004) and a need to
accommodate new development (Porter et. al., 1992).
Today, special districts are created to provide certain services in areas where
general-purpose governments lack administrative capacity and financial resources. The
functions of most special districts are dealing with water, housing, community
development, fire protection or flood control, utilities, highways, irrigation, parks and
recreation, soil conservation, health, hospitals, libraries and so on. Furthermore, special
districts are differentiated by various districts subtypes according to their functions, size,
structure, policy implications and outcomes (Foster, 1997).
Districts are noted for their institutional independence from general-purpose
governments. They decide on their administrative and financial issues and are subject to
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little or no oversight from general-purpose governments. Districts are governed by
independent boards of supervisors which are either elected or appointed. They collect
their revenues from ad-valorem taxes on property and other financial sources such as
special assessments, service charges and fees, rates etc. Most special districts can issue
bonds which are secured through assessments, fees and charges.
These entities can be classified as dependent and independent. The difference
between independent and dependent districts is determined by their autonomy from state
or local control. While dependent districts are established and controlled directly by local
governments, the independent districts enjoy a higher administrative and financial
autonomy. They are governed by an elected board of supervisors and enjoy financial
flexibility by determining their budgets, levying taxes, assessments and charges and
issuing debt as well as by functioning with little or no oversight from general-purpose
governments (Porter et. al., 1992).
Unlike general-purpose local governments, special districts are characterized by
geographic flexibility. They can be located on the territory of other special and/or
general-purpose government, thus partially or totally overlapping other jurisdictions.
Jurisdictional overlap is essential to special-purpose governments: “specialized
governments, by their nature, exist in groups, each relying on others as well as on
general-purpose governments, to provide essential services” (Berry, 2009, p. 45).
Last but not least, special districts are also known for their low political visibility.
Low visibility encourages political abuse (Porter, 1997) because of a lack of oversight
from general-purpose governments that may discourage citizen control (Bollens, 1957).
By enjoying low political visibility, special districts decisions are rarely subject to public
debate. Most of the time citizens do not understand that a service is being provided by a
jurisdiction that is politically independent from a general-purpose government. Therefore,
it is these four particular characteristics: narrow purpose, administrative and financial

52

independence, geographic flexibility and low political visibility that differentiate special
from general-purpose governments.
4.2.3 Special Districts Advantages and Disadvantages
As entities of government, special districts present both advantages and
disadvantages. Among the advantages the author would like to mention the following.
First, special districts can provide services in areas where general-purpose governments
have limited financial and administrative capacities (Porter, 2008). Unlike generalpurpose governments which provide services regardless of citizen demand, special
districts provide services that are tailored toward the community needs.
Second, special districts are considered to be independent from politics because
they enjoy administrative and financial autonomy (Porter et. al., 1992). Third, districts
are considered more efficient in delivering services due to their narrow scope (Porter,
2008). In comparison to general-purpose governments which handle a variety of
functions, special districts focus on one or a few limited functions and, therefore, are
expected to perform better than the former.
Fourth, special districts are favored because they finance facilities for new
development (Porter, 1997) usually at no direct cost to general-purpose governments.
Fifth, these entities shift the cost of improvements to those who directly benefit from
them and not to the general public (Porter et.al., 1992). Sixth, the use of special districts
allows communities to raise revenues without increasing general taxes. In addition,
special districts may be seen as a mechanism for financing infrastructure (Porter, 1997)
that spread the payment over 20-30 years due to their ability to issue bonds. Lastly,
districts are supposed to be responsive to their constituents (Bartling, 2007) because most
special districts are geographically smaller and have fewer residents than counties and
cities.
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Not only have special districts been praised but they have also been criticized.
Special districts have often been criticized because they encourage governmental
fragmentation both geopolitically (jurisdictional fragmentation) and functionally
generating coordination issues and administrative inefficiencies (Foster, 1997). The
existence of special districts weakens the powers of general-purpose governments by
removing specific functions from the latter (Bollens, 1957; Porter, 1997) and by leading
to an inequitable distribution of services (Chicoine & Walzer, 1985).
Special districts are considered uneconomic entities. As a result of their small size
and their functional specialization, the services provided by districts tend to be more
expensive and less efficient than those of general-purpose governments (Berry, 2009;
Bollens, 1961; Foster, 1997). Third, special districts may offer an irresponsible provision
of services because they do not coordinate their actions with those of general-purpose
local governments (Porter et. al., 1992).
Another criticism of special districts resides in their low political visibility as they
have been labeled “shadow governments” (Axelrod, 1992; Eger III, 2006). Special
districts may create confusion among residents as to which jurisdiction (a generalpurpose or a special-purpose government) has responsibility for providing certain
services (Carr, 2004).
Special districts operate with little or no oversight from state and local generalpurpose governments, fact that may foster opportunities for political abuse (Porter, 1997;
Porter et. al., 1992) and may impede citizen control (Bollens, 1957). Finally, special
districts have also been criticized because they support mainly the interests of private
developers (Burns, 1994; Porter et al., 1992).
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4.2.4 Summary
To sum up, special districts have been the fastest growing form of local
governments in the last fifty-five years. Their specific characteristics are narrow purpose,
specialized function(s), institutional independence, geographic flexibility and low
political visibility. It is these features that distinguish them from general-purpose
governments.
In theory, special districts have both pluses and minuses. On one hand, they
benefit communities through quality service provision in areas where general-purpose
governments are unable to provide them, through their efficiency and responsiveness in
delivering services, through their capacity to raise revenues without increasing taxes,
through their ability to link costs directly to those who benefit from the services provided
as well as through their capacity to finance infrastructure improvements.
On the other hand, districts may have some negative implications. They may
encourage governmental fragmentation, can facilitate fiscal abuse due to a lack of local
general-purpose government oversight, may deliver expensive, inefficient and
irresponsible services and they may create confusion among citizens due to their low
political visibility.

4.3 Special Districts in Florida
This section provides a brief overview about the types, functions and powers of
special districts in Florida to place the CDDs within a broader framework. In Florida,
special districts were first created in the mid 1800s to solve public transportation needs
and to coordinate public functions such as drainage and land management. In the mid
1900s and especially, after World War II, as a response to the Florida land development
and its population increase, there was a need for more specialized districts such as
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mosquito control, aviation authorities, beach erosion, hospital, and fire control districts
(Florida Special Districts Handbook, on-line). Today, there are approximately 1,628
active special districts in Florida2 that cover a diverse array of functions ranging from
community development and redevelopment, to water management and control, to
educational and health care facilities, to housing and recreation etc.
The comprehensive law for special districts titled The Uniform Special District
Accountability Act of 1989 was adopted “to have one centralized location for all
legislation governing special districts” (§189.402(2) Fla. Stat., 1989). It contains
provisions regarding the creation, operation, financial reporting, taxation, elections,
compliance with general law provisions and comprehensive planning of special districts
(Florida Special District Handbook, on-line). Chapter 189 Florida Statutes (Fla. Stat.)
defines special districts as “local units of special purposes as opposed to general purpose
government located within a limited boundary and created by general law, special act,
local ordinance or by Rule of the Governor and Cabinet” (§189.403(1) Fla. Stat., 1989).
The law clearly states that the term “special districts” does not include school districts,
community college districts, improvement districts, municipal service taxing/benefit unit
or entities that provide electrical service.
As mentioned earlier, special districts can be classified as dependent and
independent. Chapter 189 Fla. Stat. defines the status of districts as follows. A dependent
district is one that meets at least one of the following four criteria: it has a governing
body identical to that of a general-purpose government; all board members are appointed
by a general-purpose government; the board members can be removed by the generalpurpose government and the district’s budget requires approval from the general-purpose
government (§189.403 (a-d) Fla. Stat., 1989). An independent district is not a dependent
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As of September 1, 2010
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district as defined above. It is a special district that has administrative and financial
independence. The independent special district is governed by an independent body of
administrators and has financial control over its operations; it determines its budget,
levies taxes and charges, issues debt, elects a board of directors, employs staff and
consultants and operates facilities with little or no oversight from general-purpose
government. Independent special districts may have appointed or elected governing board
members, or a combination of both. In most states, local general-purpose governments
must agree to the creation of special districts (Porter et. al., 1992).
As depicted in Table 4.1, in Florida there are more independent than dependent
districts: more than 62% of the special districts are independent.
Table 4.1 The Status of Special Districts in Florida
District status
Dependent
Independent

Total

Number of districts

617

1011

1628

Percentage of districts

37.9%

62.1%

100%

Source: www.FloridaSpecialDistricts.org

In Florida there are different types of special districts, each type with its specific
powers. The functions of most special districts refer to community development and
redevelopment, water, housing, fire protection or flood control. Other purposes of these
entities include irrigation, health facilities, libraries, airports, industrial development,
parks and recreation, soil conservation, highways, mosquito control and the like.
The functions of dependent districts can be seen in Table 4.2, with the top five
functions being community redevelopment (30.69%), housing authority (10.23%),
subdivision/maintenance (7.94%), neighborhood improvement (5.04%) and health
facilities (4.58%).
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For the independent districts the top five functions are illustrated in Table 4.3:
community development (54.58 %), drainage and water control (7.27%), soil and water
conservation (5.57%), fire control and rescue (5.29%) and hospital (2.64%).
Table 4.2 Types of Functions by Dependent Status
Function
Community Redevelopment

Percentage
30.69%

Housing Authority

10.23%

Subdivision/Maintenance

7.94%

Neighborhood Improvement

5.04%

Health Facilities

4.58%

Housing Finance

4.12%

Industrial Development

3.66%

Library

2.75%

Drainage & Water Control

2.60%

Airport/Aviation

2.44%

Water & Sewer

2.14%

Downtown Development

1.83%

Educational Facilities

1.83%

Municipal Services

1.83%

Fire Control & Rescue

1.68%

Port

1.37%

Expressways & Bridges

1.07%

Recreation/Parks

1.07%

Other

13.13%

Total
Source: www.FloridaSpecialDistricts.org3

100%

Functions that accounted for 1 % or less are listed under other. A detailed list of all the functions can be
found in Appendix 3

3
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Dependent districts enjoy a wider variation than independent districts in terms of
functions fulfilled. More than half of the dependent districts perform functions pertaining
to community redevelopment, housing and neighborhood maintenance and improvement
whereas 54.5% of the independent districts perform activities solely in the area of
community development.
Table 4.3 Types of Functions by Independent Status
Function
Community Development

Percentage
54.58%

Drainage & Water Control

7.27%

Soil & Water Conservation

5.57%

Fire Control & Rescue

5.29%

Hospital

2.64%

Housing Authority

2.46%

Recreation/Parks

1.61%

Mosquito Control

1.42%

Expressways & Bridges

1.32%

Library

1.32%

Transportation

1.23%

Water Supply

1.13%

Water & Sewer

1.13%

Airport/Aviation

1.04%

Other

11.99%

Total
Source: www.FloridaSpecialDistricts.org

100%

While special districts can perform almost any function, the most common
performed functions by both dependent and independent districts are referring to water
management and control, transportation, housing, library and recreation. Within the State
of Florida, the status of a district seems to show preference for particular functions:
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dependent districts favor several areas such as community redevelopment, neighborhood
improvement, housing finance and educational facilities while independent districts favor
mostly the community development function. The preference for supporting the
aforementioned functions as well as the high number of special districts is driven both by
a rapid population growth that occurred in the State of Florida in the last 60 years as well
as a tax aversion sentiment among Floridians. Florida’s population grew extensively from
2.77 million people in 1950 (US Census, 1950) to 15.98 million in 2000 (US Census,
2000) and to 18.53 million in 2009 (US Census, 2009).
The Florida comprehensive law on special districts addresses major issues with
regard to creation, powers, functions, financing, merger or dissolution and elections of
both independent and dependent special districts. It entrusts the Florida Department of
Community Affairs to create and keep an official list of all special districts within the
State of Florida. The Special District Information Program was thus created within the
Florida Department of Community Affairs and, according to the Florida Special District
Handbook (on-line, section 1-3) the program is serving three roles. First, it is a
clearinghouse by collecting, maintaining and updating information about each special
district. Second, it provides technical assistance to special districts. And, third, it
monitors special-districts to comply with reporting requirements and helps local generalpurpose governments and state agencies to collect delinquent reports from special
districts.
Another intent of the Uniform Special District Accountability Act of 1989 was to
promote coordination between special districts and local general-purpose governments in
order to develop comprehensive plans subject to the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning and Land Development Regulation Act (Fla. Stat. 163, part II, 1985). Therefore,
state legislation requires each special district to submit a public facilities report and any
annual notice of changes to the containing general-purpose government as well as an
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updated facilities report every five years. The public facilities report should describe the
existing facilities and their operating capacities as well as the proposed facilities to be
built in the next five years; it should be submitted one year after the district is created.
Even though state legislation identifies the need of coordinating special districts’
infrastructure with that of local general-purpose governments, it does not enforce such a
provision and leaves it to the discretion of local general-purpose governments which
“may use and rely upon” public facilities reports (§189.415(6) Fla. Stat., 1989).
Chapter 189 Fla. Stat. also addresses accountability issues. According to the
enabling legislation, special districts have to report to three types of authorities. First,
each special district must submit the following reports to state agencies: the annual
financial report, the annual financial audit report, bond reports and retirement system
reports. Second, each special district must submit other types of reports to the local
general-purpose government in which it is located such as public facilities reports,
designation of registered office and agent and regular public meeting schedule. Third,
each special district must file the following documents with the Special District
Information Program: creation documents and amendments, a written statement about the
basis for its independent or dependent status and a map of the district. In cases when
special districts do not comply with the reporting requirements the Florida Department of
Community Affairs provides technical assistance and may initiate enforcement.
In conclusion, in Florida special districts are subject to the legislative regulations
of the Chapter 189 Fla. Stat. The state law contains provisions about the special districts’
creation, powers, operation, financing, compliance with state laws and comprehensive
planning.
According to the Florida Department of Community Affairs as of September 1,
2010 there were a total of 1616 active special districts in the State of Florida. Districts
perform a variety of functions ranging from community development and redevelopment,
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water, housing, fire protection, flood control, irrigation, health facilities, libraries,
airports, industrial development, parks and recreation, soil conservation, highways,
mosquito control and the like. Out of all these functions, community development
occupies the first place, with more than one third of special districts performing it.

4.4 Community Development Districts
This part of the chapter aims at offering background information about CDDs. It
first describes the historical and financial contexts within which CDDs were created.
Then, an overview of the creation, proliferation, activity and finances of CDDs is
provided. This exploratory analysis draws on document analysis (Florida State
legislation, Florida Special Districts Handbook) as well as secondary data from the
Florida Department of Community Affairs, Florida Department of Financial Services and
US Census Bureau.
4.4.1 Historical Context of Community Development Districts
Community Development Districts (CDDs) are multi-purpose, independent
special districts, empowered to plan, manage, finance and construct infrastructure
services that accommodate new development. The CDDs are authorized to issue taxexempt government bonds, typically backed up by special assessments, ad-valorem taxes
and charges on homebuyers. The State of Florida enabled the creation of this type of
special districts through the Chapter 190 Florida Statute (Fla. Stat.), entitled The Uniform
Community Development Districts Act of 1980, as a response to the inability of local
general-purpose governments to provide adequate infrastructure to service growth.
As a result of the population growth experienced by the State of Florida during
the 1950s and 1960s, local governments faced the burden of inadequate infrastructure
services. According to US Census (1960) Florida’s population almost doubled from 2.77
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million in 1950 to 4.95 million in 1960 and local governments had to find solutions to
provide the necessary infrastructure aimed at accommodating new development.
Chapter 190 Fla. Stat. should be understood as a solution to the Florida legislature
to adhere to a uniform method for establishing CDDs, thus overcoming the timeconsuming procedures of creating various special districts. In 1972 the Florida
Environmental Land and Management Study (ELMS) Committee was established to
manage the unplanned growth within the state of Florida. One of the ELMS committee
recommendations was to create special districts that provide basic infrastructure services
such as water, sewer, drainage and roads in large scale developments which had to be
approved as Developments of Regional Impact (DRI). As a consequence of the ELMS
recommendation, the New Community Districts Act was adopted in 1975. The Act of
1975 gave landowners the opportunity of creating special districts to fund the needed
infrastructure for new communities but the act “tied the districts approval to development
orders” (Florida Atlantic University/Florida International University Joint Center for
Environmental and Urban Problems, 1995, p. 1). Since the process of establishing DRI’s
was extremely tedious and expensive no districts were established under this law.
Chapter 190 Fla. Stat. was adopted five years later and, unlike its predecessor, it
encouraged landowners to create districts for infrastructure services by separating district
approval process from the development approval (Florida Atlantic University/Florida
International University Joint Center for Environmental and Urban Problems, 1995, p. 5).
One predecessor of CDDs is Reedy Creek Improvement District which was
established as “a catch-all municipal authority for governing development on Disney's
land” (Bartling, 2007, p. 3). The establishment of the Reedy Creek Improvement District
paved the way for special districts as providers of infrastructure services (Bartling, 2007).
The passage of Chapter 190 Fla. Stat. provided for a uniform method for establishing
CDDs and it has been considered “an attempt to offset past special district abuses and to
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curtail the proliferation of special acts” (Florida Atlantic University/Florida International
University Joint Center for Environmental and Urban Problems, 1995, p. i).
4.4.2 Financial Context
The creation of CDDs, in particular, and special districts, in general, should also
be related to the fiscal environment of tax and expenditure limitations imposed by states
on municipalities. In the United States capital projects have been the responsibility of
local governments rather than the national level since the 19th century. At the turn of the
20th century local governments (especially cities) have become major service providers in
the areas of infrastructure provision and economic development. “Municipal governments
carried out huge capital projects (…) city governments provided the most extensive, most
advanced public services” (Sbragia, 1996, p. 65). Because of the magnitude of their
capital projects cities have become “visible borrowers” (Sbragia, 1996) and states had to
impose debt limits on municipalities through constitutional amendments and statutory
laws. The limits referred to applying a specific percentage of the assessed property value
and to the requirement of electorate’s bond issues approval. At the same time, the
citizens’ dissatisfaction with the high level of government spending, dissatisfaction
manifested through the tax revolt of the 1970s led to the imposition of tax and
expenditure limitations (TELs).
In Florida TELs are mainly concerned with ad-valorem taxes. There are several
categories of limitations on the ability of local governments to levy ad-valorem taxes.
First, there are limitations on the rate of taxes expressed through caps on property mills.
In 1980, the Florida legislature passed the "Truth in Millage" Act which “establishes the
statutory requirements that all taxing authorities levying a millage must follow all notices
and budget hearing requirements” (Florida Department of Revenues, on-line). These
requirements were supplemented in 2007 to provide for maximum tax levies for counties,
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municipalities and independent special districts. Ad-valorem taxes may be increased
above the maximum specified rate only with supermajority and unanimous votes. There
are also referendum requirements for issuing general obligation debt.
The Florida Constitution authorizes a tax exemption on homestead property for
the first $25,000 of assessed value of homestead property to be exempted from taxation.
(Art.VII, §6(a) Fla. Const.). In 2008, voters approved the increase in exemption up to
$50,000 (Art.VII, §6(b) Fla. Const.). Beginning in 1995 the Florida “Save our Homes”
constitutional amendment limited the annual increase in the assessed value of
homesteaded properties to the lower limit of either 3% or the National Consumer Price
Index (§193.155(1) Fla. Stat., on-line). Finally, in 2009 a 10% cap on increases in assessed
value of non-homestead properties was adopted (Art.VII, § 4(g) Fla. Const.).

As a response to state limitations, local governments developed means of
circumventing them. Among the most famous mechanisms for escaping tax and debt
limits were federal tax exemption on municipal bonds, the adoption of revenue bonds and
the creation of new governmental units such as special districts, public authorities, public
corporations and the like. The municipal revenue bond was an important financial
mechanism since 1930s (Vogt, 2004) and by mid 20th century there was an extensive
increase in the number of special-purpose governments such as special districts and
public authorities (Pagano & Perry, 2008). In 1980s special-purpose governments were
considered to have taken over significantly the responsibility for local capital investment
(Sbragia, 1996, p. 191).
In order to finance capital projects and economic development local governments
used the strategy of circumventing the state limits placed on municipal spending and tax
limits. The mechanisms of circumvention referred to use of revenue bonds, federal tax
exemption on municipal bonds and the creation of special-purpose governments such as
special districts and public authorities.
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4.4.3 Growth Management Context
The context within which CDDs were created should be related to the
concurrency requirement of the Florida growth management legislation. The CDDs have
proliferated once the 1985 Florida Growth Management Act was adopted. Concurrency
required that adequate public facilities be available or fiscally accounted for prior to or
concurrent with new development but the state legislation did not address how the
infrastructure development was going to be funded. Therefore, local governments had to
identify financial sources for infrastructure development and special purposegovernments, in general, and CDDs, in particular, represented one of those sources. From
this perspective CDDs can be useful financial mechanisms for infrastructure
improvements which may fulfill the concurrency requirement for development, ensuring
that adequate public facilities are in place in a timely manner. Thus, districts can
coordinate infrastructure provision with new development and fund the “unfunded
mandate of concurrency.”
4.4.4 CDD Creation and Establishment
The justification for the creation of CDDs is considered as “a way for
development to pay for itself” (Bartling, 2007; Nicholas & Chapin, 2007) by providing
basic infrastructure improvements and ensuring its long-term maintenance. Even though
any entity or person can submit a petition for CDD formation, including a county or a
city, their formation is, generally, initiated by landowners/developers who petition their
surrounding local general-purpose government to create a CDD.
Each petition should include the following: name of the district, a description of
the CDD external boundaries, a written consent to establishment of all landowners who
own property within the district, initial designated board of supervisors, a map of the
district which should contain existing utilities if any, proposed timetable and estimated
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costs for construction, a designation of the future public and private uses of land for the
area and a statement of estimated regulatory costs (§190.005(a) Fla. Stat., 1980). After
conducting a public hearing, the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission or
local general-purpose governments can determine whether to grant or deny a petition for
the district’s establishment according to six factors set forth in §190.005(e) Fla. Stat.
The Law distinguishes the CDD process of establishment according to their size
(§190.005 Fla. Stat.). Therefore, a CDD containing 1,000 acres or more is established
through the Rule of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (consisting of
the Governor and the Cabinet) while a CDD with less than 1,000 acres in size is
established by an ordinance adopted by the board of county commissioners, (with the
approval of the municipality that contains the CDD) or through an ordinance adopted by
a municipality.

Figure 4.1 CDD Method of Establishment

Source: www.FloridaSpecialDistricts.org
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According to Figure 4.1 generated from the Florida Department of Community
Affairs’ data, 90.9 % of the CDDs were less than 1000 acres in size while 9.1 % were
more than 1000 acres in size. These figures show that the majority of CDDs were
established by local general-purpose governments. Out of these, Florida counties
established 64.2% while cities 35.8% of CDDs.
4.4.5 Proliferation of CDDs
Even though the first CDD was created in 1982 in Hillsborough County, districts
proliferation increased significantly during the 1990’s. The increase in CDDs was
facilitated by the adoption of the 1985 Florida Growth Management Act which required
the infrastructure to be in place and funding be available to new development (BenZadok, 2007; Nicholas & Chapin, 2007). Other factors that facilitated the increase in the
number of CDDs are related to the nature of these districts: CDD ability to offer
developers access to financial resources and a competitive advantage through the reduced
project costs (Bartling, 2007).
According to the Florida Department of Community Affairs, as of September 1st,
2010 there were 579 active CDDs in the State of Florida. As described in Figure 4.2, five
years after the adoption of the Chapter 190 Fla. Stat. only a few of CDDs were created.
The creation of CDDs increased steadily after 1990 when local comprehensive plans
were adopted. The figures reveal both a drastic increase in the creation of CDDs after
2000, with a peak in 2006 when more than 100 CDDs were created as well as a dramatic
decrease after 2007 with only one CDD being created in 2009. When looking at CDD
proliferation by decade it is worth noting that the majority of CDDs (82.3%) were created
in the 2000-2009 decade, 15.5% in the 1990s and the rest of the 2.2 % in the 1980s. The
CDD number seems to be fueled by the housing market within the State of Florida: they
boomed from 2000 until 2006 and then, declined considerably.
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Figure 4.2 Creation of CDDs by Year

Source: www.FloridaSpecialDistricts.org

With regard to CDD geographical distribution (depicted in Figure 4.3), 38 out of
the 67 counties in Florida have at least one CDD. Approximately 50 % (50.4%) of the
CDDs are located within six counties in Florida, as follows: Hillsborough (66), MiamiDade (58), Lee (51), Pasco (40), Manatee (38) and St. Lucie (40). At the other extreme
there are counties that contain only one district (Alachua, Desoto, Franklin, Martin and
Seminole). The CDDs seem to be mostly concentrated in counties located in the South
and Central Florida. They are mainly predominant in larger counties with almost one
third of the CDDs located in Miami-Dade, Broward, Palm Beach, Duval and
Hillsborough counties. It is also worth noting that there are counties which experienced
rapid growth but they either did not rely or they barely used CDDs as infrastructure
providers. This is the case of counties such as Pinellas, Martin and Seminole.
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Figure 4.3 CDD Geographic Distribution

Source: www.FloridaSpecialDistricts.org

4.4.6 Governance Issues
Initially, a CDD is governed by a five-member board of supervisors elected by the
landowners in the district within 90 days of the official establishment of the CDD. The
district’s governing board is first elected under a one-acre/one-vote system - a system
where landowners have one vote for each acre of land they own in the district. As the
CDD grows and reaches a certain number of residents, the board of supervisors is elected
by the residents for a four year period. Therefore, for districts with less than 5,000 acres
where there are at least 250 qualified electors, the residents take over the earliest six
years after the initial appointment of the original board; for the districts of more than
5,000 acres the time frame is ten years and there needs to be at least 500 qualified
electors (§190.006 Fla. Stat., 1980).
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4.4.7 Functions
Chapter 190 Fla. Stat. grants three broad categories of powers to CDDs. First,
CDDs are granted general powers such as: to sue and be sued, to acquire and to dispose
of property, to make and execute contracts, to adopt rules and orders, to borrow money
and issue bonds, to assess and impose ad valorem taxes, special assessments, user charges
and fees, to lease any project that the CDD is authorized to undertake, to exercise within
the district the power of eminent domain relating only to water, sewer, district roads and
water management; to cooperate with, or contract with, other governmental agencies and
consultants (§190.011 Fla. Stat., 1980).
Second, CDDs enjoy the following special powers: to plan, establish, construct,
operate and maintain water management and control, water supply, sewer and wastewater
management, bridges and culverts, district roads and projects for concurrency under
certain conditions (§190.012 Fla. Stat., 1980).
Last but not least, CDDs may exercise other special powers with the consent of
the local general-purpose government. They may plan, establish, construct, operate and
maintain systems and facilities such as: parks and recreational, cultural and educational
facilities, fire prevention and control, school buildings and related structures, security
including guardhouses, fences and gates, electronic intrusion-detection systems and
patrol cars, mosquito control, waste collection and disposal and the like (§190.012(2) Fla.
Stat., 1980).
4.4.8 Accountability Issues
In addition to complying with all the reporting requirements stated in Chapter 189
Fla. Stat. for special districts in general (see section on special districts within the present
chapter), CDDs are subject to Government-in-the-Sunshine and public records laws,
public bidding and competitive negotiation (§190.033 Fla. Stat., 1980).
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State law requires that the CDDs’ existence and taxing power be disclosed in
property records (§190.009 Fla. Stat., 1980) and in capital bold letters right before the
signature block of a home sales contract (§190.048 Fla. Stat., 1980) to all existing and
future residents of the district.
For the initial purchasers Chapter 190 Fla. Stat. states that every sales contract
should contain a disclosure language in bold letters right before the signature block
regarding the existence of the CDD and its right to assess the property within the district
to pay for improvements and for operation of the district. Then, for the subsequent
purchasers, the tax bill for the property to be purchased indicates that there is a CDD
assessment. Districts are also supposed to submit their proposed annual budgets for
disclosure and information only to local general-purpose governments that have
jurisdiction over the districts’ area (§190.008 (b) Fla. Stat., 1980).
4.4.9 Financial Aspects
Special-purpose districts, in general, and CDDs, in particular, are considered
financial mechanisms because of their ability to generate revenues from those who
directly benefit from services as well as due to their ability to issue bonds (Porter et. al.,
1992). The types of revenue sources that CDDs are entitled to collect may be classified as
lienable and non-lienable. The lienable revenues are represented by ad-valorem taxes and
special assessments. Ad valorem taxes (§190.021(1) Fla. Stat., 1980) are assessed, levied,
and collected in the same manner as county taxes. Special assessments (§190.021 Fla.
Stat., 1980) are assessed on the benefits received from land instead of the property value
and they are classified in two categories: benefit (back up bond issues) and maintenance
(cover operating costs) assessments. The category of non-lienable revenues is comprised
by fees, rentals, and charges (§190.035 Fla. Stat., 1980).
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In addition to raising revenues from those who directly benefit, CDDs have the
authority to issue tax-exempt bonds for financing infrastructure in the form of capital
projects. The most widely used bonds are revenue bonds (§190.016(8) Fla. Stat., 1980)
which are secured by special assessments, user charges and/or fees. The district may also
issue general obligation bonds (§190.016(9) Fla. Stat., 1980) which are secured by
CDDs’ ad-valorem taxes to finance or refinance capital projects or to refund outstanding
debt only through voter referendum. Other types of borrowing mechanisms that are
available to CDDs are: special assessment bonds (§190.022 Fla. Stat., 1980), bond
anticipation notes (§190.014 Fla. Stat., 1980) and negotiable notes or warrants (§190.015
Fla. Stat., 1980).
In order to determine the importance of CDD finances, the ways in which the
amount of CDD finances compare and relate to the finances of local general-purpose
governments are described. In fulfilling this scope, data from Florida Department of
Financial Services (DFS) from 1998 to 2007 are being used.4 The choice for choosing
this time frame is determined by the fact that no available data on CDD debt prior to
1998 could be collected.
According to the Florida DFS’ data, between 1998 and 2007 CDDs had raised
more than 14.57 billion dollars and had spent around 13.31 billion dollars, carrying an
outstanding debt in the amount of 7.14 billion dollars. The CDD revenues and
expenditures more than quadrupled over a ten year period whereas the finances of
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The number of CDDs included in the present analysis differs from the number of active CDDs. Florida
Department of Financial Services reports only the data for both general and special-purpose governments
that complied with the reporting requirements. The table below depicts both the total number of CDDs and
the number of reporting CDDs for every year since 1998 until 2007.
Year
Total # CDDs
Reporting # CDDs

1998
88
84

1999
103
90

2000
125
112

2001
151
139
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2002
189
162

2003
237
192

2004
308
262

2005
382
316

2006
489
409

2007
560
548

counties and cities increased with more than 50% and 60% respectively. Community
Development Districts appear to be the fastest growing local jurisdiction in terms of
financial resources among the three types of local governments for 1998-2007.5
Figure 4.4 shows a comparison among the percent of revenues raised by Florida
counties, cities and CDDs. The CDDs proved to raise a modest part of the total revenues
of local governments in the State of Florida, showing a somewhat steady trend from
1.07% in 1998 to 3.36% in 2007 with a peak of 4% in 2006.
Figure 4.4 Percent of Revenues by Type of Local Government

Source: Florida Department of Financial Services

These figures demonstrate that over a ten year period CDDs were used as a steady
though modest source of generating revenues while counties and cities showed a decrease
in generating revenues of 4.44% and .8% respectively. Even though the amount of CDD

5

The financial data were adapted to inflation using Consumer Price Index – all urban consumers - 198284=100 for the current year (2007)
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revenues increased over the years, they comprised a small fraction in comparison to cities
and counties.

Figure 4.5 Percent of Expenditures by Type of Local Government

Source: Florida Department of Financial Services

In the case of expenditures (Figure 4.5), the analysis shows a similar trend to the
situation of revenues. Counties are the local governmental entities with the highest rate of
spending, decreasing 2% in ten years from 46.03% in 1998 to 44.09 in 2007, followed by
cities with a decreasing trend in expenditures from 34.63% in 1998 to 32.94% in 2007
and CDDs whose spending pattern increased from 1.09% to 3.6 over the ten year span.
While CDD revenues and expenditures grew extensively, it is the amount of debt
they issued that is the most significant. The CDDs managed to raise debt four times more
than in 1998 whereas counties had a small increase of 9%, followed by cities with 34%.
In 2007 the amount of CDD outstanding debt represented roughly a third of the debt of
Florida counties compared to 1/20 ten years before. Even if the amount of debt issued by
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CDDs had increased considerably over time, it represents a small base when compared to
that of general-purpose governments.
When analyzing the entities by the amount of outstanding debt (see Figure 4.6)
there was a descending trend for general purpose governments with a decrease of 9.48%
for counties and 2.23% for cities. On the other hand, CDDs showed an ascending pattern
of 6.05%. The number of CDDs with outstanding debt increased almost five times from
78 CDDs in 1998 to 356 in 2007.6 Those CDDs that did not report any outstanding debt
were either in their early stages and did not issue any bonds or were older districts that
had already paid off their bonds.

Figure 4.6 Percentage of Debt by Local Government

Source: Florida Department of Financial Services

6

According to the Florida Department of Financial Services
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To sum up, the analysis of the financial data provided by the Florida DFS shows
that CDDs are an increasingly important finance tool. As a result of comparing the rate of
change for the finances of the three forms of local government over ten years (19982007), CDDs proved to be the fastest growing local governmental entity in terms of
generating revenues and issuing debt. According to the above analysis CDDs borrowing
capacity represents a competitive financial advantage in delivering public infrastructure
services.
4.4.10 Expansion, Contraction or Dissolving CDDs
The CDD board of supervisors may petition the authority that established the
CDD to expand or contract the boundaries of a district. The state law stipulates different
standards for expansion and contraction limits. Therefore, when districts were established
by administrative rule, boundary amendments should not exceed 10% and no more than
250 acres of the land in the initial district. In the case the districts were established by
county or city ordinance, the limitation refers to 50% and not to exceed more than 500
acres of land from the initial district (§190.046 (5)(f) Fla. Stat., 1980).
A CDD may be dissolved when there is no development permit within five years
of the date the district was established. Additionally, a district may be declared inactive
when it did not elect a governing body within four years of existence or when it did not
operate within two years of existence (§190.046 (6-8) Fla. Stat., 1980; §189.4044 Fla.
Stat., 1989).
Upon request, a CDD may petition the entity which established it for dissolution
when it has no outstanding financial obligations (§190.046(9) Fla. Stat., 1980).
According to the Florida Department of Community Affairs, as of September 1st, 2010
there were 36 dissolved CDDs in the State of Florida, out of which 15 were dissolved
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between 2008 and 2010. This was the case mainly for CDDs that were recently
established and could not begin their activity due to economic hardship.
4.4.11 Incorporation and Annexation of CDDs
Districts may incorporate as municipalities when they obtain some standards for
population or they may be annexed to an existing municipality. According to §190.047
Fla. Stat. corroborated with §165.061 Fla. Stat. a CDD may incorporate into a
municipality after a referendum is held and the following conditions are met: there should
be at least 1,500 residents for counties with less than 50,000 inhabitants and at least 5,000
residents for counties with more than 50,000 inhabitants. However, the ultimate
incorporation decision is made by the CDD board of supervisors.
4.4.12 Summary
Community Development Districts are a category of special districts that were
created through a Florida State Charter for the purposes of providing a limited number of
infrastructure improvements. The creation of CDDs in Florida should be viewed within
the historical context of special districts creation, the fiscal environment of tax rebellion
that led to state imposition of tax and expenditure constraints on municipal governments
as well as the Florida growth management legislation.
The CDDs are established through two different approval procedures according to
their size. Districts larger than 1000 acres are established by the Rule of the Florida Land
and Water Adjudicatory Commission while those smaller than 1000 acres are established
by local ordinances of counties and cities. The majority of the CDDs in Florida are
established by local general-purpose governments. Up to the moment of the writing of
this manuscript, CDD creation has been initiated by developers although any person or
entity can initiate their establishment.
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Districts began to be used in 1982 but it was not until the late 1990s that they
started to show a significant proliferation. Their growth shows that they have developed
according to the fluctuating housing market in Florida, which boomed in the late 1990s
until mid 2000s and then declined after 2006. The CDDs are mainly concentrated in
Central and South Florida, being predominant in the larger counties, with approximately
half of the CDDs being located within six counties: Hillsborough, Lee, Manatee, MiamiDade, Pasco and St. Lucie counties.
The CDDs are governed by an elected board of supervisors which, initially, is
made up of landowner’s representatives according to the one acre/one vote system. After,
districts reach a certain number of residents their representatives are elected among
residents within the district. Therefore, CDD major decisions are controlled by the
developers in the initial years of district’s existence. Districts are authorized to undertake
fundamental infrastructure improvements such as water management and control, water
supply, sewer and wastewater management, roads and bridges as well as a wide variety of
optional improvements such as parks and recreational facilities, cultural and educational
facilities, fire prevention and control, security and so on.
Districts may levy ad-valorem taxes, impose special assessments, fees and
charges and issue tax-exempt bonds to finance infrastructure improvements and cover the
district’s operating expenses. Under Chapter 190 Fla. Stat. developers have to disclose to
future purchasers the existence of CDD and its right to impose assessments and issue
debt.
From 1998 to 2007 CDDs managed to steadily increase their revenues, being the
fastest growing local government when compared to Florida cities and counties. However
districts’ financial resources represented a low tax base as opposed to that of local
general-purpose governments. The amount of debt that CDDs raised in ten years
increased four times since 1998 to 2007 compared to the debt of general-purpose
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governments which showed only a modest increase for the same time period. Thus, CDD
borrowing capacity gives them a competitive advantage in providing infrastructure
services.
If necessary, CDDs may be expanded or contracted according to the way the
development proceeds. By their nature, districts are perpetual entities but they may be
dissolved especially in cases of inactivity. Furthermore, in theory, districts can be
incorporated or annexed to the existing municipalities but, in practice, such instances are
rare. In conclusion, CDDs are perpetual institutional mechanisms for infrastructure
provision which enjoy governmental powers and protections.

4.5 Chapter Summary
Special districts occupy an important place in the American governing structure.
They differentiate themselves from local governmental entities of general-purpose (such
as counties and cities) through their specific characteristics: narrow specialization,
administrative and financial independence, geographic flexibility and low political
visibility. In Florida there are over 1600 special districts which fulfill a variety of
functions among which are community development and redevelopment, water, housing,
fire protection, flood control, irrigation, health facilities, libraries, airports, industrial
development, parks and recreation and so on.
Community Development Districts are a subtype of independent special districts
which are created through a state charter. They represent an efficient and unique way of
managing and financing infrastructure facilities and services that accommodate new
development. These entities enjoy administrative, political and financial autonomy.
The CDD governing structure differs significantly from other special districts in
Florida. They are independent special-purpose units of local government whose
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establishment is, in practice, initiated by developers or landowners as opposed to generalpurpose governments. They are governed by a board elected by landowners that is
independent from the local general-purpose government. The CDD infrastructure is offbudget of the containing general-purpose governments. The latter may use and rely on the
reports that CDDs are supposed to submit with no enforcement power.
Unlike the majority of special districts that have one or very limited functions,
CDDs are authorized to manage, fund and construct basic infrastructure facilities and
services such as water management and control, water supply, water and wastewater,
bridges and culverts, district roads and certain projects for concurrency as well as parks
and recreation facilities, security, fire prevention, education-related facilities and the like.
The CDDs are attractive because of their financial capacity and their recent
growth. When comparing the finances of CDDs with those of counties and cities in
Florida the former were the fastest growing local governmental entity in terms of rate of
revenue increase, expenditure increase and debt issuance.
The use of CDD to provide public infrastructure services implies both praise and
criticism. On the one hand, CDDs are praised because they deliver efficient services that
are managed and financed primarily through special assessments, allow communities to
raise revenues without increasing general taxes, provide communities with high quality
infrastructure services and facilities that are completed in a timely manner and create new
communities or improve the existing ones through their ability to incorporate into new
municipalities or to be annexed into the existing ones.
On the other hand, CDDs may be open to criticism because they encourage
governmental fragmentation. They are perceived as seeking mainly the interests of
developers and ignore those of residents and they can abuse their powers because of a
lack of local general-purpose government oversight.
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CHAPTER V

THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS IN GROWTH
MANAGEMENT

5.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the implications of CDDs to the growth management in
Florida by focusing on districts located within six Florida counties: Hillsborough, Lee,
Manatee, Miami-Dade, Pasco and St. Lucie. This aspect is important since CDDs are
perceived as being creatures of the Florida growth management legislation that was
enacted in 1975 in order to manage unplanned growth. In considering the issue of how to
coordinate urban development with infrastructure provision the author is interested in
answering the following question: Which are the contributions of CDDs to growth
management in Florida?
Growth suggests that CDDs are capable of being adequate managerial and
financial mechanisms for infrastructure provision and maintenance. While there is no
doubt that CDDs can provide and maintain infrastructure facilities and services for new
development, thus funding the “unfunded mandate of concurrency”, it is districts’
location, type and pattern of development that may have unintended consequences for the
way growth occurs.
This chapter proceeds with a brief description of the growth management policy
in Florida with particular emphasis on its concurrency requirement; then, it provides a
description of CDDs’ profile and their implications for growth management by
discussing district location, size and the type of development they support as well as
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infrastructure coordination issues; finally, the chapter concludes with a summary and a
discussion about the way CDDs influence growth.

5.2 Growth Management Legislation
The context within which CDDs were created should be related to the Florida
growth management legislation. Growth management can be defined as “the regulation of
the amount, timing, location and character of development” (Levy, 2006, p. 229). Downs
(2004) refers to growth management as a set of specific regulatory policies which intend
to influence future growth to occur in a rational manner. Growth management programs
aim to achieve many goals. Some of the most important goals include the following: limit
urban sprawl, improve transportation options, create more compact development,
coordinate urban development with infrastructure capacity and provide affordable
housing.
Growth management programs were adopted in response to environmental
concerns and to the way growth was occurring in the 1960s and 1970s. The first statewide growth management system was adopted in Hawaii in early 1960s, followed by
Oregon which enacted its growth management law in 1973 and became the model for
several other states. In Florida, because of a drastic increase in the population that could
not be accommodated by environmentally sensitive areas, the state legislature adopted its
first growth management-related legislation in 1972. The Environmental Land and Water
Management Act provided that state had ultimate decision in “areas of critical state
concern” and on “development of regional impact”. In 1975 the State Legislature enacted
the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act (LGCPA) which laid the foundation
for the Growth Management Act of 1985. Even though the LGCPA provided that every
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local government adopt a comprehensive plan in accordance with state requirements it
failed because there were no state enforcement provisions.
In 1985 the Growth Management Act (GMA) was passed. Florida’s growth
management program was considered to be the most comprehensive of all the states
(Pelham, 2007). Unlike its predecessor, the GMA provided for approval of local plans by
the state land planning agency as well as for financial sanctions for the non-compliant
local governments.
There are three main policies that are stipulated in the Florida GMA: consistency,
concurrency and compact development. Consistency requires that local and regional
plans be consistent with the state policies. Concurrency requires that adequate public
facilities be available or fiscally accounted for prior to or concurrent with new
development. Compact development intends to direct growth towards urban areas with
high densities and away from natural resources and agricultural lands.
Of particular relevance to this study is the concurrency requirement. The GMA
provides that "development shall be directed to those areas which have in place, or have
agreements to provide, the land and water resource, fiscal abilities, and service capacity
to accommodate growth in an environmentally acceptable manner" (§187.201(16)(a) Fla.
Stat., 1985).
Through its requirements, concurrency was intended to control growth and to
foster economic development (Ben-Zadok, 2007). The GMA requires every local
government to adopt a capital improvement program for public facilities and to establish
minimum level-of-service standards for certain public facilities to accommodate
projected growth. There are seven public facilities subject to the concurrency
requirement. These are sanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage, potable water (R. 9J-5.011
Fla. Admin. Code), parks and recreation (R. 9J-5.014 Fla. Admin. Code), roads and
public transit (R. 9J-5.019 Fla. Admin. Code) and public schools facilities (R. 9J-5.025
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Fla. Admin. Code). Local governments were given flexibility in choosing their own
level-of-service standards for all but one public facility – transportation which is subject
to state minimum level-of-service standards.
In Florida the concurrency requirement has been both lauded and criticized. In a
positive vein, concurrency can control growth through timing, location, type and pattern
of development (Ben-Zadok & Gale, 2001) as well as through denying permits for
inadequate public facilities (Ben-Zadok, 2007). Concurrency has also been praised for
being a tool for local governments to link development approvals to infrastructure
(Connerly, Chapin & Higgins, 2007). Two big achievements of concurrency requirement
were connecting planning with development (Ben-Zadok & Gale, 2001) and funding
capital infrastructure through developers instead of general-purpose governments. The
GMA created a “pay as you grow” system where developers had to pay their share to
obtain development permits (Pelham, 2007) thus, encouraging unabated growth.
Concurrency has often been criticized for contributing to sprawl by directing
growth to less populated areas (Turner, 1990). Probably the biggest criticism of the
growth management legislation was the lack of state commitment to fund concurrency
requirement - the so-called "unfunded mandate of concurrency" (Ben-Zadok & Gale,
2001; Connerly et. al., 2007; Pelham, 2001). Instead of providing direct revenue sources
for public infrastructure, the Florida legislature adopted a state growth approach with
local implementation (Chapin, 2007; Turner, 1990) where growth pays its own way
(Nicholas & Chapin, 2007).
The GMA and its subsequent amendments are considered to have failed because
they did not help implementing the concurrency and compact development policies
(Pelham, 2007). Some authors (Nicholas & Chapin, 2007) explained clearly why the
concurrency requirement did not succeed. There was a disconnect between the “fiscal
theory” and “fiscal reality.” When GMA was adopted an estimate of two thirds of
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revenues was supposed to come from the state in the form of a services tax and an
increase in motor fuel taxes and one third of revenues were expected from local
governments. But the services tax was not approved and local governments had to
generate their own funding sources for infrastructure provision such as local optional
taxes, impact fees, charges and other fees as well as the creation of special taxing
districts.
Therefore, CDDs can be considered tools that fund infrastructure facilities and
services while fulfilling the concurrency requirement for development, ensuring thus that
public facilities are in place and funded prior to or concurrent with new development. In
discussing the implications of CDDs for growth management, this chapter considered the
location and size of CDDs within six Florida counties as well as the type and pattern of
development districts supported.

5.3 CDD Profile and Growth Management Implications
Community Development Districts provide infrastructure services that are geared
toward new development. In doing so, districts make choices about location, type and
pattern of development. This section describes the CDD profile within the six Florida
counties by pinpointing the districts’ implications for growth management policies. It
discusses districts location, size, financial characteristics, type of development they
support and infrastructure coordination issues with their containing general-purpose
governments. While there is no doubt that CDDs role to adequately provide infrastructure
improvements for new development benefits growth management, it is the other aspects
of location, type and pattern of development that pose issues for the way growth occurs.
Most of the CDDs provide public facilities and services mainly for
unincorporated areas. 70.4% of districts are located in unincorporated areas of the six
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counties while the rest are to be found in the inner city areas. Table 5.1 depicts the
distribution of CDDs by their location status for each of the six counties. These figures
clearly demonstrate that CDDs are mainly located in unincorporated areas and, therefore,
operate in areas where counties do not or could not provide infrastructure services.
There are three trends that could be identified. First, there are instances in which
the majority of CDDs are located in unincorporated areas (Pasco, Manatee and
Hillsborough counties). Second, there are situations in which more than half of the CDDs
are located in unincorporated areas (Miami-Dade and Lee counties). Finally, there is St.
Lucie County that has two thirds of the CDDs located in incorporated areas. The CDDs
location choices demonstrate that, even though, overall, CDDs operate in areas where
counties do not or cannot provide infrastructure services, districts may very well be used
in municipalities.
Even though districts do not have planning and zoning powers, they still have a
significant influence on the way growth occurs through their location preferences. The
choice of creating CDDs in unincorporated vs. incorporated areas is related to the type of
development districts support Districts supporting mainly single-family residential
development are located on the fringe of cities, thus contributing to sprawl patterns.
Districts located within the boundaries of municipalities focus more on multi-family
residential and mixed-use development, contributing to denser development patterns.
There are also instances in which CDDs that are located within the boundaries of
municipalities are used for redeveloping inner-city areas or for providing more expensive
improvements such as roadways.
Therefore, on one hand, CDDs supporting residential communities with singlefamily houses tend to encourage development that is located on the fringe and, indirectly,
contribute to sprawl. On the other hand, districts that support multi-family and mixedused developments might contribute to denser development patterns.
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Table 5.1 CDDs Characteristics by County
CDD location

County
Hillsborough
Miami-Dade
Lee
Pasco
St. Lucie
Manatee
All

Unincorporated Incorporated
83.3%
16.7%
60.3%
39.7%
60.0%
40.0%
94.6%
5.4%
33.3%
66.7%
88.6%
11.4%
70.4%
29.6%

CDD size (acres)

Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

Mean
390.2
110.8
333.9
544.1
441.7
372.2
343.9

Min.
9.4
9.9
16.9
135
35.7
27.6
9.4

Property development

Max. Dwellings
1097
47,019
516.5
44,733
972
22,189
999
37,227
998.9
30,797
980.8
19,834
1097
201,799

Commercial/
Industrial
(sq.feet)
4,133,643
9,690,326
1,805,064
4,061,000
1,245,673
1,620,400
22,556,106

Note: the figures about property development are estimates provided by developers based on the petition data
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N

54
58
40
37
33
35
257

The CDDs size is spread on a continuum ranging from districts as small as 9 or 10
acres to extremely large CDDs which are over 1000 acres7 in size. Table 5.1 depicts
descriptive statistics for CDD size. The average size for CDDs by county reveals that,
with the exception of districts in Miami-Dade County which have a mean size of 111
acres, the districts located in the other five counties have an average that ranges from 334
to 544 acres. When looking at the minimum and maximum for CDD size, there are three
trends that stand out. All the counties under analysis but Miami-Dade have CDDs that are
in the vicinity of 1000 acres. Two counties (Hillsborough and Miami-Dade) have CDDs
as small as 9 and 10 acres. And Pasco County has the highest minimum value for CDD
size (135 acres). The analysis suggests that districts located in Pasco County are the
largest in size while those in Miami-Dade are the smallest.
The size of CDDs seems to be associated with their age. Larger CDDs were
created in the 1980s and 1990s and it was not until recently that one could document
CDDs as small as 10 acres. Thus, the vision of the Florida State legislation of creating
large enough and feasible CDDs seems to have changed. The existence of small CDDs
has most often been criticized for not being compact and big enough to justify the
creation of another form of local government. To be viable, the desired CDD average size
should be between 300 and 500 acres: “we’re always dealing with 300 acres, 400 acres,
500 acres and when it gets down to 14 acres, does it really make sense to make another
whole layer of government for such a small piece of property?” (Planning Department,
Manatee County).
The legislation does not provide for any minimum or maximum limits about CDD
size, it rather states that this issue will be decided upon on a petition-by-petition basis

7

Some CDDs exceed 1000 acres due to subsequent extensions of their boundaries
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after considering the factors stipulated in §190.005(1)(e) Fla. Stat. The factors refer to the
following:


whether the establishment of the district is consistent with all the elements
of the state and local comprehensive plans,



whether the area for the proposed district is of sufficient size, compactness
and is sufficiently contiguous to be developable as one community,



whether the district is the best alternative available for delivering
community development services and facilities,



whether the facilities of the district are compatible with the capacity and
uses of the existing services and facilities and



whether the district area is amenable as a separate special-district
government.

Therefore, the state legislation leaves the decision about CDD size with the
establishing authorities rather than stipulating for a CDD minimum and maximum since
the establishing authorities are considered to better judge the appropriateness of district
size for specific development projects.
Table 5.2 displays CDD financial characteristics. The estimated infrastructure
costs summed a total of $6,405,179,6268 and, as of 2007, the amount of CDD outstanding
debt accumulated $ 2,314,662,280. When looking at each county the financial data show
some interesting facts. On one hand, the counties with the highest estimated infrastructure
costs are Hillsborough, Pasco and St. Lucie. On the other hand, the top leading counties
in raising revenues and allocating expenditures are Hillsborough and Miami-Dade
counties. Also, Miami-Dade County has raised the highest amount of debt among the six
counties.
8

This amount represents the sum of all the CDD estimated infrastructure costs that have been transformed
in real dollar values using the current CPI index for 2008
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Table 5.2 CDDs Financial Characteristics
Estimated
infrastructure
costs*
County
Hillsborough $ 1,671,576,381
Miami-Dade
$ 888,670,560
Lee
$ 792,168,419
Pasco
$ 1,115,980,455
St. Lucie
$ 1,069,027,017
Manatee
$ 867,756,793
All
$ 6,405,179,626

Outstanding
N Revenues**
Expenditures** Debt**
50 $ 129,270,285 $ 130,110,247
$ 560,639,288
57 $ 93,172,741 $ 129,915,648
$ 809,112,723
33 $ 43,906,234
$ 61,409,469
$ 269,511,535
36 $ 62,616,976
$ 82,596,741
$ 221,076,565
29 $ 16,223,927
$ 46,512,373
$ 135,315,000
32 $ 65,387,090
$ 82,041,490
$ 319,007,169
237 $ 410,577,253 $ 532,585,968
$ 2,314,662,280

Note: * CDD petitions data; ** 2007 Florida Department of Financial Services data
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N
51
57
37
31
33
34
243

These figures show that CDDs in Miami-Dade County are newcomers compared
to the districts in the other five counties where a big chunk of the debt might have already
been repaid. Also, these numbers may indicate that developers in the other five counties
might have contributed more than the ones in Miami-Dade County towards the initial
infrastructure costs and, therefore, have less outstanding debt.
The next step of this section analyzes the main types of development that are
supported by CDDs as well as the factors that determine the preference for a particular
type of development. This aspect of the research is important because type of
development is closely related to the type of infrastructure that CDDs build.
The type of development is approved by general-purpose government when
developmental permits are issued. The type of development that CDDs support is found
to be related to the land-use of the respective area, to the preference of developers and to
the needs of a community.
When looking at the type of development by county, it is clear that residential
development is the main type of development that CDDs support. Figure 5.1 describes
the type of development for each of the six counties. Within the six Florida counties
CDDs support mainly residential and mixed-use development. Manatee and Miami-Dade
counties have CDDs that are predominantly residential (over 80%). In Hillsborough, Lee
and Pasco counties, residential development represents approximately 70% of all types of
development. St. Lucie is a stand-alone county where residential development represents
40%, commercial 50% and mixed-use 10%. The type of development trends corroborated
with the CDD location status (unincorporated vs. incorporated) demonstrate that CDDs
located in unincorporated areas focus more on residential development while those
located within the city boundaries are more likely to focus on commercial and mixed-use
developments.
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Figure 5.1 Type of Development by County

Type of Development
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
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Industrial
Mixed-use
Commercial
Residential

According to Table 5.1 CDDs in Hillsborough and Miami-Dade County are the
top two leaders in building housing units. For commercial and industrial property the top
leader is, by far, Miami-Dade County. The fact that the CDDs in Miami-Dade County are
ranked second in supporting housing units and first in supporting commercial and/or
industrial development may be explained by these districts’ focus on multifamily housing
and mixed-used development as opposed to the districts in the other five counties under
analysis.
The preference for residential development is attributable to two main factors.
First, CDDs fulfill the need for an increasing population within the State of Florida:
“residential is the favorite function because this was the major engine of growth for the
state” (CDD representative 2). Second, districts are an opportunity to generate profit for
developers: “CDDs focus mostly on residential development because developers prefer to
sell instead of leasing and thus make profits without keeping any of the responsibilities of
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paying taxes on commercial or industrial properties” (Division of Special Taxing
Districts, Miami-Dade County).
The residential communities that CDDs create could be classified according to the
types of improvements they offer. Through the amenities they provide the development
that CDDs support ranges from high-end to affordable communities:
We’ve had some CDDs that do pretty much exclusively
high end development, million dollars homes, but we’ve
also had some that have done more of the middle range
product - carriage homes and town houses and things like
that (…) and we’ve even had a CDD which is a big
community that’s considered an affordable area (Planning
Division, Lee County).
Starting off as residential planned communities, today CDDs experience a shift
towards mixed-use and commercial development: “We’re shifting more to the
institutional and commercial uses than, probably, would have been anticipated twenty
years ago” (Planning Division, Lee County). These two types of developments might fuel
the number of CDDs in the future especially given the recent slump in the demand for
residential development.
The analysis identified another type of development that CDDs may be useful for,
institutional development. Examples of institutional development consist of: educational
facilities such as schools and research facilities, public buildings, civic buildings, fire
stations, health care facilities and offices. The CDDs should be used more as a vehicle for
institutional development as opposed to residential development, especially in today’s
market where the demand for residential development has dramatically decreased.
There is a changing role of CDDs vis-à-vis development when considering what
the legislature intended and what is actually happening. Today CDDs’ primary focus is
on infrastructure development for residential communities even though the legislature
made them more flexible: “there was a contaminated soil clean up, redevelopment,
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blinded area, street lighting, simple things (…) rather than go to the state with every
single special interest” (Financial Management Department, Manatee County). Therefore,
in practice, CDDs’ area of interest evolved from what Chapter 190 Fla. Stat. stated they
can do and became adapted to other uses than they were originally intended to.
Finally, the analysis identified a lack of coordination between the infrastructure
provided by CDDs and that provided by local general-purpose governments. Even though
CDDs must comply with the planning and zoning requirements of local general-purpose
governments, the infrastructure districts provide is not included in the capital
improvement plan of their surrounding general-purpose governments: “the development
that comes out of CDDs is not coordinated with the comprehensive plan of a county; it's
consistent but not coordinated” (Planning Division, Lee County). General-purpose
governments do not include CDD infrastructure in their capital improvement plan
because they cannot control it and because they are not required to do so.
From this perspective CDDs are not believed to fulfill concurrency requirements
because most of the improvements that districts support are not subject to levels of
service standards as defined by the Florida Growth Management Act.
We look at concurrency through the most part like
transportation concurrency. We’re looking at our collector
and arterial system and where your project first impacts
that system. We’re looking at a particular link or road and
determine whether or not there is capacity, sufficient
capacity so, I don’t think that the districts are really
contributing to provide capacity in that fashion (Planning
Division, Lee County).
Concurrency compliance is, therefore, an optional preference of CDDs since the
state legislation does not require local general-purpose governments to include districts
infrastructure into their programs or CDDs to adopt capital improvement plans. The only
thing that CDDs are required to do is to submit public facilities reports to their
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surrounding general-purpose governments. However, these reports are for information
purposes only.
Those CDDs who enter into inter-local agreements with general-purpose
governments to build major infrastructure projects such as highways, roadways, parks,
fire stations, education facilities etc. coordinate their activity with counties but only for
those specific projects. Therefore, coordination issues between CDDs and their
surrounding general-purpose governments might be addressed through inter-local
agreements between the two entities.
In sum, CDDs are specialized governmental entities which provide infrastructure
services mainly in unincorporated areas, thus contributing to sprawl patterns. In theory, to
make economic sense, the optimum CDD size should be between 300 and 500 acres but,
in reality, their size vary from as small as 9.4 acres to as high as 1097 acres. Even though
CDDs may be used for any type of development within the six Florida counties districts
supported public facilities and services mainly for residential and, secondarily, for mixeduse developments. In determining the role CDDs play vis-à-vis concurrency requirements
this chapter found that districts manage to coordinate infrastructure provision with new
development but they raise important issues about how location, the type of development
they support as well as the lack of coordination with their surrounding general-purpose
governments impact growth management.

5.4 Summary
The CDDs are considered complements to other public or private forms of
infrastructure provision. Most of the public improvements that are supported by districts
focus on unincorporated areas, thus encouraging development to be located on the fringe
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of municipalities. Districts are used mainly for residential development and unless CDD
size does not average between 300 and 500 acres, they are not economically viable.
Even though CDDs were authorized to provide infrastructure for any type of landuse, they focused mainly on residential development. The future of CDDs might be
geared toward mixed-use and commercial developments since the potential of CDDs has
not been fully taken advantage in Florida. The districts’ usefulness could move beyond
providing infrastructure for residential developments, to institutional uses such as
educational and health care facilities, to contaminated soil clean up, redevelopment etc.
The findings of this chapter clearly showed that CDDs are believed to partially
fulfill the concurrency requirement by linking new development with the needed
infrastructure through the availability of funding and the timing of infrastructure.
Through their financial capacity districts can build infrastructure improvements in a
timely manner.
However, results also indicated that CDDs are not subject to the levels of services
standards set forth in the capital improvement plans of general-purpose governments for
the following infrastructure services: water and sewer, solid waste, drainage, parks and
recreation and roads. In other words, the development that districts support does not
comply with the capacity standards for each of the aforementioned infrastructure
improvements. From this perspective, CDDs no not seem to fulfill the concurrency
requirement since the infrastructure they provide is not included in the capital
improvement plans of general-purpose governments and, therefore, not subject to the
latter’s levels of services.
In sum, CDDs do not seem to foster growth management in Florida. Rather,
through their decisions about the location, type and pattern of development CDDs
encourage sprawl patterns. Even if districts coordinate infrastructure provision with new
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development they do not coordinate their infrastructure improvements with those of
general-purpose governments.
These findings raise two important questions. First, do CDDs influence the way
growth occurs? They certainly do. On one hand, CDDs influence growth patterns because
they are located primarily in unincorporated areas, thus encouraging sprawl. On the other
hand, CDDs have to comply with the planning requirements of general-purpose
governments. So, in places where there is plenty of space, CDDs offer “islands of luxury”
with single-family houses, golf courses and a lot of open space. In cases where there are
more stringent rules that control growth, CDDs encourage denser communities with
multi-family housing and mixed-use development.
Second, why have CDDs been used mainly for residential development and have
not supported facilities for educational, research or health care purposes? It appears that
developers have used this institutional mechanism for generating profits. In Florida we
probably will not see CDDs supporting educational or health-care facilities until other
entities or individuals than developers (such as public authorities and non-profit
organizations) - which are not necessarily profit-maximizers - will start utilizing these
multi-purpose districts.
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CHAPTER VI
THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS FOR
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

6.1 Introduction
This chapter assesses the contribution of CDDs to the infrastructure development
in Florida by analyzing CDDs’ profile within six Florida counties: Hillsborough, Lee,
Manatee, Miami-Dade, Pasco and St. Lucie. It is divided in two main parts: one that
describes the role CDDs play in infrastructure provision and maintenance and another
one that identifies indicators of infrastructure variation among CDDs. The chapter
proceeds with a brief description of the financing options available for infrastructure
development; then, the type of infrastructure improvements provided by CDDs is
described; further, the role CDDs play in the provision and maintenance of infrastructure
services is being discussed; finally, drivers of infrastructure variation are being identified.
Drawing on semi-structured interviews with public officials and CDD representatives as
well as on secondary data about CDD activity, findings point to the significant
contributions CDDs have made for infrastructure development within the State of
Florida.

6.2 Infrastructure Development
Infrastructure development is considered to be an important part of the growth
management programs for local governments (Porter, 2008). There are several methods
for funding public infrastructure. First, the most common way for local general-purpose
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governments to finance public infrastructure is through general revenues such as property
taxes, bond issues, increments in sales and excise taxes, fees and charges. Second, local
general-purpose governments may require developers to contribute towards public
infrastructure provision. Oftentimes developers are required to build and dedicate to local
general-purpose governments basic infrastructure and to fund off-site improvements such
as roadways or utility extensions. Third, local general-purpose governments impose
impact fees (assessments levied on new development to help pay for the construction of
infrastructure) on developers when building permits are issued. Last but not least, special
districts are an alternative means for funding public infrastructure. This is the case
particularly for the special districts with taxing powers that can levy taxes, assessments
and issue bonds to cover the costs of infrastructure.
Even though there are a variety of sources to fund public infrastructure,
infrastructure provision should be related to infrastructure management when deciding
upon the best alternative for infrastructure development, especially because managing
public infrastructure is a challenging process (Porter, 2008). Porter (2008) suggests that
local general-purpose governments should consider the following aspects when choosing
appropriate means for managing and financing infrastructure needs: importance and size
of the facility, efficiency in delivering services when specific needs are to be met, ability
to link the costs directly to service users, location, quality and timing of public
infrastructure construction as well as linking infrastructure development to its capacity.
In Florida, infrastructure management and financing represent a difficult issue for
policy-makers. While local general-purpose governments funded an important portion of
new development, the rapid increase in population could not keep pace with the demand
for growth. Because of the tax-averse sentiment of the Florida’s population, state-wide
taxes to fund infrastructure could not be adopted and local general-purpose governments
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were authorized to add optional motor fuels taxes, increase their sales taxes and
encouraged to impose impact fees and special assessments.
While local taxes such as increases in local sales taxes and local gas taxes as well
as impact fees and charges constituted a temporary solution for the infrastructure funding
problem, researchers argued that independent special districts, in general, and community
development districts, in particular, can fund infrastructure improvements (Bartling,
2007; Porter, 2008; Porter et. al., 1992).
In trying to answer the following question: Which are the contributions of CDDs
to infrastructure development in Florida? This chapter analyzes the type and amount of
infrastructure supported by CDDs, their role in providing and maintaining infrastructure
for new development as well as drivers of infrastructure variation within six Florida
counties: Hillsborough, Lee, Manatee, Miami-Dade, Pasco and St. Lucie.

6.3 Types of Infrastructure Provided by CDDs
Community Development Districts are local governmental entities that carry out
management and financing functions to fulfill their purposes of providing and
maintaining infrastructure. Through their financial powers districts borrow money and
fund infrastructure improvements, thus “helping developers build the infrastructure they
want to build” (Financial Management Department, Manatee County). The CDDs can be
considered self-help tools for infrastructure development since they are considered “a
way for development to pay for itself” (CDD representative 3).
The infrastructure CDDs provide can be classified according to its location in onsite and off-site improvements. On-site improvements are those types of infrastructure
supported by CDDs that are internal to the project while off-site improvements are
infrastructure improvements that are external to the CDD project and which usually
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require the presence of an inter-local agreement between a general-purpose government
and a district.
On-site improvements constitute the majority of the infrastructure that CDDs
build: “most of the money is spent inside the subdivision, developing basic infrastructure
within the subdivision” (Financial Management Department, Manatee County).
Following the infrastructure categorization proposed in Chapter 190 Fla. Stat. (basic
infrastructure and optional special improvements) the author classified on-site
improvements in public facilities and public amenities. The difference is relevant since
all CDDs provide at least one type of basic infrastructure but only some of the districts
choose to add optional special improvements when the petition for CDD creation is
submitted for review to local general-purpose governments.
The most common public facilities supported by CDDs refer to basic
infrastructure such as storm water management and drainage system, water and sewer
system, waste water system, irrigation water system, internal roads, conservation land,
sidewalks and street lights. Public amenities may range from recreational facilities such
as golf courses, clubhouses, pools, parks, tennis courts, playgrounds, walking or biking
trails to enhanced landscape with diverse entry features, security gates and water
fountains to security powers, to parking structures and traffic control devices within
communities such as speed humps and internal street signage. Within the six Florida
counties under analysis all CDDs provide at least a public facility from the basic
infrastructure category whereas less than two thirds of the districts (62.55%) choose to
provide public amenities.
Once the facilities and amenities are built, they have to be open to the general
public. CDDs should not be gated communities and there has to be public access to the
facilities and amenities they provide:
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When they build this infrastructure, especially roads, if
they’re using CDD money, that’s tax exempt bond money
and that can only be used for public facilities (…)
technically, those roads, even if they’re gated they can’t
keep the public out (CDD representative 4).
The Uniform Community Development Districts Act stipulates that off-site
improvements fall into the category of basic infrastructure. Unlike on-site improvements
which are provided by all CDD within the six Florida counties, the present analysis
suggests that off-site improvements are provided roughly by less than half of the districts
(48.8%). The majority of off-site improvements are transportation-related and they refer
to off-site major roadway, turn lanes, arterial or collector roads that access the
community, interchange improvements, traffic lights and bus shelters. There are also offsite improvements related to public utilities that connect services to the existing ones,
which may be some distance away, such as improvements that bring water and sewer
lines to a specific property.
The CDDs located in incorporated areas are typically focusing on roadway
improvements and less on utility extensions when compared to the districts located in
unincorporated areas. This can be explained by the fact that cities already have utility
systems in place and need help in upgrading their streets: “(In cities) it’s more common
to have CDDs for roads, not as common for water and sewer because we provide that
(…) and roads are so expensive!” (Planning Division, City of Ft. Myers).
The reasons behind the option of providing certain types of off-site improvements
are related to the following. First, the location of the new development requires access
which may not be supported by the existing infrastructure: “in order for the community to
get developed (…) the roads in front of the community have to be upgraded” (Planning
Division, City of Ft. Myers). Second, there are transportation or development order
requirements that need to be met: “in order for developments to meet certain
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requirements, the district must improve a major road or major interchange of a highway”
(Growth Management Department, Hillsborough County). Finally, general-purpose
governments are not willing or not able to extend the water and sewer lines up to where
the development supported by CDD begins.
To sum up, CDDs provide both on-site and off-site public improvements which
are supposed to be open to the general public due to the fact that CDDs use tax-exempt
bonds to finance them. Most of the infrastructure provided by CDDs is internal to their
projects and off-site improvements are primarily fostering on-site improvements. The
choice of focusing on external infrastructure is the result of several factors such as
vicinity to major roads and highways, existence of transportation or development order
requirements that need to be met or the inability or unwillingness of local generalpurpose governments to provide them.

6.4 Infrastructure Provision and Maintenance
In any given jurisdiction that favors special-purpose governments, public service
provision is shared by the public, private and non-profit sectors. Section 6.4 discusses the
role CDDs play in infrastructure provision and maintenance by considering two public
institutional choices for infrastructure delivery: local general and special-purpose
governments. Typically, CDDs provide public services such as storm sewer systems,
drainage systems, private roads, storm water ponds, while counties or cities focus on
water and sewer utilities, public roads, fire protection and public right-of-way.
Oftentimes these services are divided between the two types of local governments
(general and special-purpose) from the very beginning while other times CDDs construct
the infrastructure and then dedicate it to the county or the city they are located in.
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The analysis revealed that there are two scenarios related to the CDDs role in
providing infrastructure improvements. Districts may act as both providers and
maintainers of public facilities or they act only as providers but not maintainers of
infrastructure improvements. In the former case, examples of public infrastructure that is
most likely both provided and maintained by CDDs are: storm water management
systems – “I think it works quite well to have the CDD assume the primary responsibility
for a storm water maintenance because it has access and the ability to focus and
concentrate effort within a defined area” (CDD representative 2) or internal roads – “if
roads are going to be private, we (county) will be happy for them (CDDs) to finance and
maintain them“ (Planning Department, Manatee County).
The latter scenario is most likely the case for water and sewer facilities because
most general-purpose governments have already a comprehensive water and sewer
system in place. There are even instances when counties and cities would try to
discourage CDDs from building public utilities just to make sure districts are not
competing with them:
We (county) wouldn’t want them to provide water and
sewer on their own, we would try to discourage small
utility plants because we want to be the service provider. If
they’re going do that somehow, then we would want that to
be turned over to us at some point when we are next to
them or adjacent to them (County Attorney Office, St.
Lucie County).
Other examples of common public facilities that could be built by CDDs and
operated by a city or a county are recreational parks – “one of our CDDs in Dade County
did a new park for the new City of Doral. So, the CDD paid for the park improvements
and all that and then it handed over to the City of Doral and now it’s a city park (CDD
manager 2)” or roads – “if the district funded the construction of the roads, sometimes
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they’re maintained by the district and sometimes they’re turned over to the local
government” (CDD manager 1).
The CDDs act as providers but not necessarily as operators of public facilities
because of two reasons. First, CDDs can build infrastructure in unincorporated areas
where general-purpose governments do not have access or the necessary means to do it.
Then, CDDs manage to build infrastructure faster than general-purpose governments,
hence the benefit of ultimately getting the infrastructure ready in a timely fashion.
There are exceptions to the rule, though. There are instances in which large
districts build and own their own public facilities because they can afford to do so: “the
larger the district, the more likely they will have their own utility” (CDD representative
4). The instances in which CDDs provide and operate their own water and sewer utilities
are rare because such projects require extensive costs and because general-purpose
governments already service most of the areas:
It’s kind of cost-prohibitive, you’ve got to start a huge
capital investment and there’s not enough room to spread
that investment once you take out the areas that are covered
by the service areas of the two largest general-purpose
governments that operate utilities (CDD representative 2).
In addition to provision, maintenance of public infrastructure is an important
function of CDDs. Infrastructure maintenance may be performed by either a special or a
general-purpose government. When deciding which level of local government (specialpurpose or general-purpose) is better at handling a particular piece of infrastructure, the
analysis demonstrated that there are several factors to be considered. One of the most
important factors is represented by local conditions such as the particularity of the
project. If it is a large project such as a water and sewer management system it makes
more sense for a general-purpose government to operate it since it has the capacity and
experience while a drainage system could very well be handled by a CDD.
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Other factors include: efficiency – determining the most efficient way to handle a
certain piece of infrastructure regardless of the entity that built it; considering the service
provider – sometimes it would be wiser for the entity that provided the service to also
maintain it; and the type of land-use - for instance, residential development would need
different facilities as compared to agricultural land and integration with the overall
surrounding facility system.
The maintenance function may be related to the life-cycle of CDDs. Unlike other
entities which disappear after they fulfill their scope, CDDs are not terminated once the
facilities get built because they are “perpetual entities.”
Just because the bond is paid off doesn’t mean that the
CDD goes away because there’s still the ongoing
maintenance. CDD owns the recreational facilities, CDD
owns the landscaping, CDD owns and maintains the
drainage and the water management system and just to
continue to pay vendors to keep up the playground and
parks and clean the ponds and so forth. So, there’s still the
ongoing operation and maintenance assessment that still
goes on, that property owners’ tax is billed even though the
bond repaying the assessment goes away (CDD manager
1).
Maintenance should also be understood in the context of board of supervisor’s
transition from developers to residents. The CDDs can be classified in two categories.
One category refers to dormant districts where “all they’re doing is maintaining what
needs to be done to continue to be in existence as a district and maintaining the
infrastructure and pay off the bond” (CDD representative 1). The other category
represented by active districts, perform improvements for the community on a continuous
basis.
Summing up when supporting infrastructure development, CDDs have different
roles. On one hand, CDDs act as both providers and maintainers of public improvements
such as storm water management systems and internal roads. On the other hand, CDDs
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act as providers but not as maintainers of public services for infrastructure improvements
such as water and sewer systems, internal roads and parks. Besides infrastructure
provision, maintenance is perceived as one of the most important functions that CDDs
fulfill. Moreover, infrastructure maintenance is perceived as a natural function of the
CDDs’ perpetual nature.

6.5 Indicators for Infrastructure Variation
After analyzing the role of CDDs for the infrastructure provision and maintenance
in Florida it is also important to understand why districts choose to provide certain types
of infrastructure in detriment of others. Relying on secondary data coming from CDD
petitions and Florida Department of Financial Services within the six aforementioned
counties this section seeks to analyze how CDDs differ when providing public
infrastructure.
Since there are no prior theoretical perspectives but only a few empirical studies
(Gross, 2005; Mitchell, 2008) that explain service variation for special-purpose
governments, the author’s choice for indicators of infrastructure variation is a
consequence of the suggestions identified in the semi-structured interviews, the
preliminary exploratory analysis about CDD functions and activity and previous literature
(Gross, 2005; Mitchell, 2008). General-purpose governments within which districts were
located (Mitchell, 2008) and district size (Gross, 2005) were found to explain service
provision variation in the case of Business Improvement Districts.
The final choice of indicators that were included in the analysis comprised of the
following: the county within which CDDs are located (COUNTY), CDD location status
of unincorporated vs. incorporated (LOC), CDD size (SIZE), CDD year of establishment
(YEAR), the type of development CDD support (DEVELOP), whether CDDs have
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optional special powers or not (IF SPECIAL), number of services that were owned and
maintained by CDDs (OWN), whether CDDs provide off-site improvements (IF OFFSITE), whether CDDs have outstanding debt or not (IF DEBT) as well as financial
characteristics such as CDD revenues (REV), expenditures (EXP), estimated
infrastructure costs (INFRCOST) and amount of outstanding debt (DEBT). Infrastructure
variation among CDDs was expressed as the number of services provided by CDDs.
6.5.1 Significant Differences
In order to assess whether there are differences in the amount of services provided
by CDDs, cross-tabulations were first employed. Lambda was chosen to identify
significant differences between the number of services provided by CDDs and the
following independent variables that were measured at the nominal level: COUNTY,
LOC, DEVELOP, IF SPECIAL, IF OFF-SITE and IF DEBT. Out of the six explanatory
variables that were measured at the nominal level only three showed significant
differences in explaining the variation for CDD provided services, as depicted in Table
6.1. All three variables showed a weak but significant relationship with the number of
services provided by CDDs.
Table 6.1 Differences in the Number of Services Provided by CDDs
Independent variable

Lambda

P value

N

IF SPECIAL

.201

.000

249

COUNTY

.158

.001

249

DEVELOP

.038

.018

247

First, the variable IF SPECIAL showed a fairly weak association with the number
of services provided by CDDs. Overall, CDDs with special powers provided a higher
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number of services than the districts which do not have such powers. 87% of the CDDs
that do not have optional special powers provided between four and five services while
76.4% of the CDDs that have optional special powers provided between six and eight
services. Furthermore, CDDs with no special powers offered a maximum of six services
as compared with nine services provided by their counterparts.
Then, the number of CDD provided services differed within the six counties. At
one extreme there is Miami-Dade County with the majority of CDDs (86.2%) providing
four and five services while at the other extreme there is Pasco County with 83.7% of the
CDDs providing between seven and nine services. More than half of the CDDs in St.
Lucie County (58.1%) provided six services. In the other three counties the number of
services was distributed as follows. In Lee County more than half of the CDDs (52.8%)
provided between four and five services, Manatee has less than half of the CDDs (44.1%)
providing between five and six services and Hillsborough County shows a more even
dispersion of services: 77.3% of CDDs provided between five and seven services with
approximately equal distribution in the five, six and seven category of services offered.
The highest number of services for Miami-Dade and St. Lucie counties were
seven and six respectively, while Hillsborough and Lee counties had eight services each.
The only counties that provided nine services are Manatee (20.6%) and Pasco (35.1%).
Overall, the results demonstrated that CDDs located on the Florida East coast offered
fewer services than those located on the West coast.
Finally, type of development had the weakest contribution towards the number of
services districts provided. Most of the CDDs which provided infrastructure for
commercial (70%) and all of the CDDs that provided services for industrial (100%)
developments offered five services as opposed to 22% for residential and 18.6% for
mixed-use developments. The CDDs that supported residential development showed a
similar trend to those that supported mixed-use development. 69.5% of the districts
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supporting residential development and 67% of those supporting mixed-use development
provided between four and six services. Overall, the services offered by residential and
mixed-used CDDs showed a wider variation ranging from three to nine services for
residential and one to eight services for mixed-use as compared to commercial (four to
seven services) and industrial ones (five services).
Summing up, the number of services provided by CDDs differed according to
whether they had or not special powers, the county within which they were located and
the type of development they supported. The CDDs with special optional powers
provided a higher number of services than the districts that did not have such powers.
Districts in Pasco and Manatee counties provided the highest number of services with
nine services each, followed by Hillsborough and Lee counties with eight services each
and, finally, Miami-Dade and St. Lucie counties with seven and six services,
respectively. Finally, CDDs supporting residential and mixed-use development provided
more services (nine and eight services respectively) and showed a wider variation than
the CDDs supporting commercial and industrial development (seven and five services
respectively).
6.5.2 Determinant Predictors of CDD Infrastructure Variation
Since there were no previous studies dealing with the factors that determine
variability among CDD infrastructure services the author decided the order of entering
the variables into the regression model by conducting partial correlation and controlling
for the selected variables. Initially, a number of seven independent variables were
retained for the analysis because they had significant correlations with the dependent
variable (see prior section).
Multiple linear regression analysis was employed to help determine which of the
seven indicators could be used to predict the variation of CDD infrastructure. The seven
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explanatory variables accounted for 72% of the variance of CDD infrastructure variation
(F (7,226) = 87.404). Three predictor variable with the lowest non-significant regression
coefficients were removed leaving four independent variables for the final model.
The analysis used stepwise, enter and backward methods to obtain the best fit for
the model. Stepwise method was first used because it is adequate for exploratory
purposes. The other two methods were used to check whether there were any differences
for the regression analysis models. All three methods generated the same four indicators
that explained the highest amount of variance in predicting CDD infrastructure variation.
Their descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics for Variables
Variable
PROVIDE

Mean
5.69

St. deviation
1.49

N
249

OWN

3.23

1.57

249

IF SPECIAL

1.37

.485

251

LGINFRCOST

7.26

.415

233

LOC

1.30

.457

257

As depicted in the table above, on average, CDDs provide more services than they
maintain. The average number of services provided by CDDs supports the CDDs’
primary role as service providers but also points at the importance of the management
function that the districts fulfill.
Table 6.3 shows the magnitude of correlations between dependent and
independent variables as well as correlations between independent variables. First, the
number of services provided is highly correlated (.78) with the number of services owned
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and maintained by CDDs. The more services owned and maintained by CDDs, the more
services CDDs provide overall.
Table 6.3 Bivariate Correlations between Predictor Variables
Variable
OWN

PROVIDE
.78*

OWN

IF SPECIAL

IF SPECIAL

-.65*

-.50*

LGINFRCOST

.30*

.19*

-.24*

LOC

-.21*

-.19*

.08

LGINFRCOST

LOC

-.02

*P<.05

The second highest correlated indicator with the number of services provided by
CDDs is IF SPECIAL (-.65). The CDDs that have optional special powers provide more
services than those who do not have special powers. LGINFRCOST showed a moderate
correlation (.30) with PROVIDE suggesting that higher infrastructure costs are associated
with more services. Finally, CDD location status is weakly associated with PROVIDE,
indicating that CDDs located in unincorporated areas provide more services than those
located in incorporated areas.
The final model that emerged from the stepwise analysis contained only four
explanatory variables. Table 6.4 describes the results of multiple regression analysis. The
four predictor model accounted for explaining 74% of the variance of CDD infrastructure
provision. The overall model was significant: F (4,228) = 162.511, p< .001.
The strongest predictor variable of CDD infrastructure variation was OWN ( =
.57). This explanatory variable had a positive relationship with the number of services
provided by CDDs suggesting that the number of CDD provided services increases as the
number of CDD owned and maintained services increases. Managing their own
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infrastructure utilities, facilities and amenities represents an incentive for CDDs to offer
more services.
Table 6.4 Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis of Factors that Influence the CDD
Infrastructure Variation
Variables
Intercept

B
1.749

Std. error
.936

β

OWN

.537

.038

.576

.001

-1.079

.126

-.345

.001

LGINFRCOST

.370

.127

.102

.005

LOC

-.256

.111

-.079

.05

IF SPECIAL

p value

R squared = .74
No. observations = 236
DV = number of services provided

The second most significant predictor of CDD infrastructure variation was IF
SPECIAL ( = -.34). The CDDs that have optional special powers provided more
services than those without such powers. The argument behind this finding is obvious.
The CDDs entitled to perform optional special powers such as recreational facilities,
enhanced landscaping, parking structures and traffic control devices in addition to the
basic infrastructure services, are expected to provide a larger array of functions than the
CDDs which are not granted such powers.
The third significant predictor of infrastructure variation was LGINFRCOST ( =
.10), suggesting that the higher the cost of infrastructure services, the higher the number
of CDD provided services. When compared to general-purpose governments which offer
a variety of services that might have very different costs, the specialized nature of the
CDD-provided services should not generate extreme different costs. The types of services
CDDs offer are rather limited to basic infrastructure services such as water, sewer,
drainage, roads, parks and recreation and the like districts are not expected to encounter
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big cost differences. Therefore, higher infrastructure costs were expected to reflect a
larger number of services.
Finally the fourth significant predictor of CDD infrastructure variation was LOC
( = -.08). It indicated that CDDs located in unincorporated areas provided more services
than those located in incorporated areas. The former were expected to provide more
service than the latter since the unincorporated parts of the county are underdeveloped
and have more infrastructure needs than the inner-city areas.
Summing up, the multivariate regression analysis demonstrated that the CDD
number of services is influenced by four explanatory factors: the number of CDD owned
and maintained services, whether the districts have optional special powers or not, CDD
estimated infrastructure costs and CDD location status (unincorporated vs. incorporated).

6.6 Summary
This chapter presented the role CDDs play for public infrastructure development.
CDDs main functions are to manage and fund basic infrastructure improvements such as
storm water management systems, water and sewer systems, irrigation systems, roads and
parks and recreation. They can also provide optional amenities such as recreational
facilities, enhanced landscape, security gates, parking structures and traffic control
devices and so on.
CDDs provide both on-site and off-site improvements and their contribution to
the infrastructure development in Florida has been to support basic capital improvement
projects. Districts contributed mainly to providing infrastructure that is internal to the
developments they support and, to a lesser extent, in helping local general-purpose
governments take the burden of major capital improvement projects (such as major roads,
highways or bridges) off their shoulders. These findings should be related to the fact that
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CDD infrastructure is not coordinated with that of general-purpose governments since the
former is not being included in the latter’s capital improvement plan.
The role of CDDs in offering public facilities and utilities may be different. They
are either both providers and maintainers for public facilities such as storm water
systems, drainage systems, internal roads and the like, or they are only providers but not
maintainers of public utilities such as water and sewer systems or recreational parks.
CDDs benefit general-purpose governments when the former builds and dedicates
infrastructure at no direct cost to the latter. This is mainly the case for water and sewer
systems and off-site improvements to major arterial roads and highways.
One question that these results may raise is which is the best mode for delivering
infrastructure-related services: a general or a special-purpose government? The answer is
probably both. Context and particularity of each jurisdiction seem to tell part of the story.
The present analysis revealed that there are no clear guidelines to determine what works
best for each community when deciding which local government (special vs. generalpurpose) should provide and maintain a service. Rather, it is a matter of considering all
the parameters involved for each particular situation.
Besides the traditional role of providing infrastructure, maintenance seems to be a
long-term function of CDDs. They are local governmental entities with perpetual
existence whose ultimate function is to continuously maintain the services provided.
Then, what happens with CDDs when build–out? It seems that some districts oversee that
the debt is paid off and the maintenance is properly ensured while others act as “minigovernmental entities” and continue to add additional improvements to their communities
according to the desire of their residents. In this instance, do all CDDs justify the
governmental protections forever or should their life span be limited?
As suggested before, CDDs are more than service providers they are also
managers of infrastructure-related services. This fact may have long-term consequences
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on the quality of improvements. Then, why do not CDDs maintain all the services they
provide? Is it because general-purpose governments do not consider districts prepared
enough to handle certain pieces of infrastructure? Is it because general-purpose
governments do not want competition in certain areas? Or is it something else?
This chapter has also identified the factors that influenced the amount of
infrastructure that has been provided by CDDs. The present analysis revealed that the
number of services provided by CDDs differed according to whether they have special
powers, according to the county within which they were located and the type of
development they supported. Overall, CDDs that have optional special powers, those
located on the Florida’s west coast and those supporting residential and mixed-use
development offered more services than their counterparts.
Finally, when identifying indicators that could be used to predict CDD
infrastructure variation results indicated that there were four explaining factors that
predicted the variation in the amount of infrastructure provided by CDDs. These are: the
number of CDD owned and maintained services, whether the districts have optional
special powers or not, CDD estimated infrastructure costs and CDD location status
(unincorporated vs. incorporated). Districts with a higher number of owned and
maintained services, those with optional special powers, those that had higher estimated
infrastructure costs and those located in unincorporated areas determined an increase in
the number of CDD provided services.
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CHAPTER VII
THE PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS AND RESPONSIVENESS OF
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS AS SERVICE PROVIDERS

7.1 Introduction
Today governance in the United States is considered to be specialized (Mullin,
2009). The context within which this chapter should be understood is that both general
and special-purpose governments are delivering public services to citizens. Whereas
general-purpose governments have to provide services that accommodate different needs,
CDDs focus on a limited number of services. Thus, the latter are expected to be more
effective and responsive to their constituents than the former. In trying to answer the
following question: Are CDDs perceived to be an efficient and responsive institutional
model for infrastructure delivery? the purpose of this chapter is to determine the role of
CDDs for infrastructure delivery by assessing districts pluses and minuses as well as their
effectiveness and responsiveness as service providers.
This chapter is comprised of three sections. The first section presents a descriptive
analysis about the perceived advantages and disadvantages of CDDs impact on service
delivery by employing univariate descriptive statistics and cross-tabulations. The second
section presents the findings related to the effectiveness and responsiveness of CDDs for
service delivery. It describes the results of exploratory factor analysis as well as the
creation of three indexes that represent CDD favorability: cost-effectiveness, managerial
responsiveness and institutional flexibility. These indexes measure practitioners’ general
perceptions about developing and implementing CDDs. They can be useful to decision-
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makers when considering CDDs as a means of financing and managing infrastructure.
The final section describes the perceived drawbacks of CDD implementation by focusing
on the qualitative analysis of the survey.

7.2 CDD Perceived Pluses and Minuses
The first section of the survey results depicts the perceived advantages and
disadvantages of CDDs impact on service delivery. It presents a description of the
individual characteristics of individuals participating in the survey, differences between
the on-line and mail modes of survey, a description of the survey items as well as
differences among respondents’ perceptions according to their individual characteristics.
7.2.1 Individual Characteristics of Survey Participants
The survey participants are differentiated by several demographic and
professional characteristics. These are: age, highest level of education completed, the
department they belong to, whether they have a professional certification or license, their
experience within the current position, whether the present position is a supervisory one
or not

and whether they have working experience outside the State of Florida. A

summary of the frequencies for all these demographic and professional indicators are
depicted in Table 7.1. Survey participants fall into different age categories. Two thirds
of the respondents are between 46 and 65 years of age while less than 7% are 35 years of
age and less. These figures demonstrate that most respondents have a high degree of
seniority.
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Table 7.1 Demographic and Professional Characteristics of Participants
Variables
Percentage of participants
Age
25-35
6.6%
36-45
23.1%
46-55
36.3%
56-65
31.9%
66+
2.2%
Education
Highschool
Associate degree
College degree
Master’s degree
Advanced graduate

4.1%
1%
26.5%
53.1%
15.3%

Department
Growth Management
Planning & Zoning
Community/Economic Development
County/City Attorney
County/City Administration
Budget & Financial Management
Public Works & Building
Other

19.4%
23.7%
15.1%
10.8%
12.9%
5.4%
9.7%
3.2%

N
91

98

93

Professional certification
Yes
No

98
65.3%
34.7%

Years in current position
0-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21+

45.7%
21.3%
8.5%
14.9%
9.6%

94

Type of current position
Supervisory
Non-supervisory

99
88.9%
11.1%

Experience outside Florida
Yes
No

44.4%
55.6%

99

120

Participants in this survey are extremely well educated with only 5% having a
degree less than college. Furthermore, figures about educational attainment show that
more than half (51.5%) of the participants have a Masters’ degree and almost 15% have
an advanced graduate degree beyond Master’s, thus demonstrating that the survey
respondents are among the elites in terms of educational attainment.
Survey respondents come from different departments/divisions as follows:
Planning and Zoning, Growth Management, Community/Economic Development,
County City Administration, County City Attorney, Public Works and Building, Budget
and Financial Management and other. All these departments are involved, to a certain
degree, with reviewing the CDDs’ creation and/ or monitoring documentation
requirements. It is no surprise that Planning and Zoning, Growth Management and
Community/Economic Development represent the top three departments in providing
survey participants. Also, the participants from these departments have a planning
background and, therefore share similar outlook through training and experience.
The presence of a professional certification or license reveals that almost two
thirds of the respondents hold such a certificate and, are, considered, experts in their field
of endeavor. Over 45% of the participants spent five years or less in their current
position. The professional certification indicator is not consistent with the trends
described for age and education where one would expect that a group comprised of
mainly experienced and highly educated participants to also have workplace longevity.
Type of current position describes the supervisory vs. non-supervisory status. An
overwhelming majority (88.9%) of the survey participants hold a supervisory position.
This fact may be explained by both age and education of the respondents. Finally, a bit
more than half of the participants do not have experience outside the State of Florida. The
author would expect this indicator to reveal significant differences in the bivariate
analysis.
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Table 7.2 describes summary measures for central tendency and variability for
two individual indicators: age and number of years in current position. While age is
almost normally distributed, the distribution for the variable number of years in current
position is positively skewed, its mean of 9.5 years exceeding its median of 6 years.

Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics for Age and Years in Current Position
Variable
Mean
Median
Standard deviation
Age
50
51
10.2

N
91

Years in current position

94

9.5

6

8.5

In sum, the survey participants represent an elite/ managerial type of group with
most members being comprised of experienced and highly educated individuals who hold
supervisory positions within their work units and have a strong professional planning
background.
7.2.2 Difference Between On-line and Mail Surveys
Respondents for the on-line and mail surveys offered fairly similar views about
CDD advantages and disadvantages. There were two survey items which yielded
different answers between the two groups. Table 7.3 illustrates these differences. Sixty
two point two percent of the respondents from the on-line surveys compared to 42.8% of
the respondents from the mail survey disagreed and strongly disagreed with the fact that
CDDs relieve property tax burden by levying independently.
The second survey item that showed significant differences between the on-line
and mail questionnaires was the item measuring whether CDDs circumvent debt limits of
general-purpose governments. Those answering by mail were more supportive of the
belief that CDDs circumvent the debt limits of general-purpose governments than on-line
respondents.
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Table 7.3 Differences between On-line and Mail Surveys
Variable
CDDs relieve property tax burden
CDDs circumvent debt limits of GP governments

Gamma
-.294

P value
.046

N
101

-.350

.016

101

For this particular study the survey mode does not affect the way participants
responded. The participants in both on-line and mail survey were approximately evenly
distributed with no significant differences among their individual attributes. Also, survey
participants share a homogenous professional background, that of being public officials.
Their workplace provides them with both internet access and e-mail addresses and,
therefore, internet is part of their work.
7.2.3 Survey Items
In addition to the individual characteristics of participants, the survey consisted of
twenty five items. The survey items were classified into five major categories. These are
structure flexibility, financial implications, economic development, accountability and
general overview. The items in the first four categories were categorized according to a
five point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The items in the
general overview section were measured by using a seven point semantic differential
scale.
The first step of the analysis described percentage frequencies for each of the
survey item. The results in this section are displayed according to the main sections of the
survey. When asked about the three different aspects of CDD structure flexibility there
was a clear pattern of agreement which was differentiated as follows: 63% of the
participants agreed with the fact that CDDs provide community-tailored services, 50 % of
the participants agreed with the survey item “CDDs enjoy little oversight from generalpurpose governments” and 38% agreed with the fact that CDDs are self-supporting
mechanisms over time (Table 7.4).
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Table 7.4 CDD Structure Flexibility
Strongly
Variable name
Disagree
CDDs are self-supporting
mechanisms
5%
CDDs provide community
tailored services
1%
CDDs enjoy little oversight
from GP governments
3%

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

N

24%

25%

38%

8%

101

11%

13%

63%

12%

100

15%

11%

50%

21%

99

The second section of the survey refers to CDD financial implications related to
three main groups of beneficiaries: general-purpose governments, developers and
residents. The results are depicted in Table 7.5. Survey participants did not consider
CDD financial implications have benefits for general-purpose governments. 41% of the
respondents disagreed with the fact that CDD assessments are more stable than the taxes
and fees of general-purpose governments, 38% of respondents disagreed with the fact
that CDDs relieve property tax burden by levying independently and 35% of respondents
disagreed with each of the following statements: “CDDs circumvent debt limits of
general-purpose governments” and “CDDs relieve general-purpose governments from
capital projects”.
Overall survey respondents did not consider that CDDs have any beneficial
financial implications for general-purpose governments. The CDDs were perceived of not
relieving general-purpose governments from capital infrastructure provision and property
tax burden or circumventing their debt limits. Neither were CDDs’ assessments
considered more reliable than the taxes and fees of general-purpose governments.
When considering the CDD financial implications for developers, respondents’
opinions showed an agreement pattern. Forty one percent of the respondents agreed with
the fact that CDDs increase short-term profitability for developers and 39% of them

124

agreed that CDDs allow developers to enhance amenities at lower cost. Therefore, survey
participants perceived CDDs as having beneficial financial implications for developers.
Table 7.5 CDD Financial Implications
Strongly
Variable name
Disagree
CDDs relieve property tax
burden by levying
independently
13%
CDDs circumvent debt limits
of GP governments
7%
CDDs' assessments are more
stable than the taxes of GP
governments
13%
CDDs relieve GP governments
from capital projects
14%
CDDs increase short-term
profitability for developers
1%
CDDs allow developers to
enhance amenities at
lower cost
4%
CDDs' assessments are
commensurate with quality
3%
CDDs' levies give bigger
"bang for the buck" than
ad-valorem taxes
9%

Disagree Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

N

38%

23%

23%

3%

101

35%

28%

26%

3%

101

41%

33%

12%

1%

101

35%

17%

30%

4%

100

5%

29%

41%

24%

101

15%

30%

39%

12%

100

21%

43%

31%

2%

101

29%

37%

24%

1%

101

Finally, the CDD financial implications for residents revealed that the opinions of
respondents were mainly neutral. If, on the one hand, 43% of the respondents neither
disagreed nor agreed with the fact that CDD assessments are commensurate with the
quality of services, on the other hand, 31% of them agreed with this statement. While
37% of them neither disagreed nor agreed with the fact that CDD levies give bigger
"bang for the buck" than ad-valorem taxes, 29% of the respondents disagreed with this
item. Results concerning the financial implications for residents are mixed. Survey
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participants agreed with the fact that the quality of CDD services justifies the amount of
their assessments but disagreed with the fact that CDDs levies offer a bigger value for the
monies spent when compared to the ad-valorem taxes of general-purpose governments.
The results for the third section of the survey, CDD economic development
implications, are depicted in Table 7.6. The CDDs economic development implications
were described in comparison with general-purpose governments. The results for this
section are mixed. When asked about whether CDDs provide infrastructure in areas
where general-purpose governments are not able to, respondents provided balanced
answers: while 37% of the respondents disagreed with the statement, 36% of them agreed
to it.

Table 7.6 CDD Economic Development Implications
Strongly
Variable name
Disagree
CDDs provide infrastructure
in areas where GP
governments are not able to
3%
CDDs build infrastructure
faster than GP governments
3%
CDDs provide services cheaper
than GP governments
3%
CDDs impose hidden costs to
the surrounding GP
governments
3%
CDDs offer residents higher
quality infrastructure than
GP governments
8%
CDDs better maintain services
than GP governments due to
their narrow purpose
5%
CDDs better maintain services
than GP governments due to
their smaller size
5%

Disagree Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

N

37%

22%

36%

2%

101

19%

28%

42%

8%

101

40%

45%

12%

0%

100

27%

33%

29%

8%

101

39%

31%

20%

2%

101

33%

35%

25%

2%

101

33%

31%

28%

3%

101
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The same situation applies to the survey item “CDDs impose hidden costs to the
surrounding general-purpose governments” where 27% of the respondents disagreed with
the statement and 29% of them agreed to it. In this instance, the figures support a neutral
view where CDDs are not necessarily perceived as being complements of public services
for general-purpose governments or as imposing additional costs to the containing
general-purpose governments.
Whereas respondents showed a strong agreement (42%) with the fact that CDDs
build infrastructure faster than general-purpose governments, 40% of them disagreed
with the fact that the services provided by CDDs are cheaper than those provided by
general-purpose governments. Furthermore, 39% of the respondents disagreed with the
fact that CDDs offer residents higher quality infrastructure than general-purpose
governments.
Finally, respondents did not think that CDDs better maintain infrastructure
services when compared to general-purpose governments neither because of their narrow
purpose or because they cover a smaller geographic area. 33% of the respondents
disagreed with each of the two survey items concerning infrastructure maintenance.
These findings are contrary to the public choice theory which states that smaller
governmental units are more efficient than the larger ones.
The fourth survey section discussed CDD accountability issues in relation to
general-purpose governments. Results in this section are presented in Table 7.7. There is
a disagreement sentiment about the coordination of CDD reports and infrastructure with
the capital improvement plans of general-purpose governments. Forty five percent of the
respondents disagreed with the fact that CDD reports were used and relied upon by
general-purpose governments when designing capital improvement plans and 35% of
them disagreed with the item “CDD infrastructure is well coordinated with capital
improvement plans of general-purpose governments.” Respondents’ answers were neutral

127

(61% of them neither disagreed nor agreed) in assessing whether CDDs overstep their
powers as a result of limited oversight.
Table 7.7 CDD Accountability Issues
Strongly
Variable name
Disagree
CDD reports are used and
relied upon by GP
governments
9%
CDDs infrastructure is well
coordinated with GP
governments
6%
CDDs overstep their powers
due to limited oversight
1%

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

45%

32%

14%

0%

100

35%

41%

17%

1%

99

16%

61%

20%

2%

99

N

Lastly, the results for CDD general overview section are displayed in Figure 7.1.
The variables in this section are measured by seven point semantic differential scales
where 1 and 7 have opposite values. For the variable growth management 1 means
“foster growth management” and 7 means “gut growth management”. Respondents had a
neutral opinion about the CDDs’ implications for growth management. On a scale of 1 to
7, 40 % of the survey participants chose number 4 supporting the neutral view.
Furthermore, as suggested in Figure 7.1, all the other answer categories were fairly
balanced.
The second survey item in this section, fiscal balance is described as follows: 1
means CDDs encourage fiscal balance and 7 means CDDs add to the fiscal stress of the
surrounding entities. The answers of the respondents were geared toward the fact that
CDDs add to the fiscal stress of the surrounding communities. On a scale of 1 to 7, 29.3%
of the respondents chose 5, 10.1% chose 6 and 4% of them chose 7.
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Figure 7.1 CDDs’ General Overview
CDDs' general overview
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For the third variable, coordinating development, 1 means CDDs encourage
coordinated development and 7 means CDDs discourage coordinated development. The
opinion of respondents indicated the preference for the fact that CDDs encourage
coordinated development. On a scale of 1 to 7, 22.2% of the respondents chose 3, 12% of
them chose 2 and 71% chose 1.
The final variable in this section, stability of housing prices, was measured as
follows: 1 means CDDs facilitate stability of housing prices and 7 means CDDs
contribute to the “boost an boom” in the housing prices. Respondents considered that
CDDs contribute to increases in housing prices. 26% of them opted for a 5, 18% for a 6
and 11% for a 7.
To sum up, respondents perceived CDD pluses and minuses differently. They
favored all the aspects of CDD structure flexibility. Therefore, respondents considered
that CDDs meet the needs of their communities, they are independent from generalpurpose governments and they are self-supporting institutions.
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Results about CDD financial implications differed according to the three groups
of beneficiaries: general-purpose governments, developers and residents. On the one
hand, CDDs are not perceived as having any financial benefits for general-purpose
governments. Respondents disagreed with the assertion that CDDs relieve the burden of
general-purpose governments with capital projects and property tax and the former
circumvent the debt limits of the latter. On the other hand, CDDs are viewed as having
beneficial financial implications for developers because they generate short-term profits
by allowing for improvements to be built at lower costs. The CDD financial implications
for residents are mixed, being either beneficial or non-beneficial. Respondents favored
the fact that the quality of services offered by CDDs are commensurate with the
assessments they impose but they disagreed with the fact that CDD assessments offer
better investment returns than ad-valorem taxes.
Results about CDD economic development implications suggest that CDDs are
not necessarily better than general-purpose governments in providing and maintaining
infrastructure services. Even if CDDs build infrastructure faster than general-purpose
governments, the former do not, necessarily, provide infrastructure cheaper or of higher
quality than the latter. Furthermore, respondents did not consider CDDs better maintain
public services than the general purpose governments when their specialized function and
geographic boundaries are considered.
Respondents’ views about CDD accountability issues in relation to generalpurpose governments suggested that CDD activity is not coordinated with that of generalpurpose governments. Finally, the results for the CDD general overview section were
mixed. While overall, respondents had a neutral perception about the CDD impact on
growth management, they considered that CDDs supported coordinated development.
Furthermore, CDDs are more likely to contribute to the fiscal stress of the surrounding
communities and to increase the housing prices.
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7.2.4 Differences among Respondents
The second step of the analysis consisted of cross-tabulations. Contingency tables
were constructed to determine whether there is an association between the participants’
individual characteristics and the survey items. The statistical technique for measuring
association was Gamma since all the explained variables were ordinal and the
explanatory variables were categorized as either dichotomous and interval variables. The
construct “department type” was transformed into a dichotomous variable by defining its
categories as planners and non-planners. The participants from Growth Management,
Planning and Zoning and Community/Economic Development departments were
combined into the category named “planners” and the participants from the other
departments were combined into the “non-planners” category. The decision to classify
the participants in the two aforementioned categories resides in the fact that 62% of the
respondents with a professional certificate hold an American Institute of Certified
Planners certificate and, therefore, have a planning professional background. The types of
licenses that respondents hold are presented in Table 7.8.

Table 7.8 Type of Professional Certification
Professional certification

Percentage respondents

American Institute of Certified Planners
BCC&LG
Professional Engineers
Bar
Other9

61.7%
3.3%
11.7%
16.7%
6.7%

Total number of respondents who hold a professional certification: 60

9

Other refers to the following certifications: Certified Public Accountant, International City/County
Management Association certification and State Certified Building Code Administration.
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The significant results of the cross-tabulations are depicted in Table 7.9. One out
of the seven explanatory variables, “years in current position” did not have any effect on
the survey items and it was not reported in the table below.
Table 7.9 Association of Survey Items by Individual Characteristics
Independent variable
Gamma
Age
CDDs’ levies give “bigger bang for the buck”
-.25
Education
CDDs enjoy little oversight from local GP governments
.36
Department type dichotomous
CDDs provide community-tailored services
.47
CDDs enjoy little oversight from local GP governments
.41
If professional certificate
CDDs build infrastructure faster than GP governments
.45
CDD reports are used and relied upon by GP governments -.32
Type of current position
CDDs circumvent debt limits of GP governments
.58
CDD reports are used and relied upon by GP governments
.44
Experience outside Florida
CDDs remain self-supporting institutions over time
.37

P

N

.034

91

.006

97

.007
.008

94
94

.004
.051

98
98

.009
.058

99
98

.010

99

Age is significant in explaining the fact that CDD levies give “bigger bang for the
buck” than ad-valorem taxes. This association is negative (-.25) which means that the
younger the respondents the more they favored the statement that CDDs assessments are
offering higher benefits for the money spent when compared to the taxes of generalpurpose governments. 50% of the participants in the 25-35 years range, 33.3% for the 3645 years range to 24.2% for 46-55 and 17.2% for 56-65 year range. Though significant,
the association is weak since the number of younger participants is relatively low
compared to the number of the more experienced participants.
Education is moderately associated (.36) with the fact that CDDs enjoy little
oversight from local general-purpose governments. This association is a positive
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relationship meaning that the more educated the respondents are, the more they support
the fact that there is little oversight on part of general –purpose governments for CDD
activity. Sixty four percent of the participants with a college degree, 78.8% of the
participants with a Master’s degree and 80% of the respondents with an advanced
graduate degree agreed and strongly agreed with this statement.
Type of department makes a difference in predicting two survey items. First,
department type shows a moderate association (.47) with the fact that CDDs provide
community-tailored services. Eighty seven percent of the participants who do not have a
planning background (non-planners) agreed and strongly agreed with the fact that CDDs
provide community tailored services in comparison to 63.5% of participants with
planning background (planners). Second, type of department helped improve the
prediction of the survey item ”CDDs enjoy little oversight from local general-purpose
governments” by 41%. Ninety percent of non-planners in comparison to 52.9% of
planners agreed and strongly agreed with the fact that there is a lack of control on the
activity of CDDs.
The fourth explaining variable, the presence of a professional certificate is also
associated with two survey items. The presence of a professional certificate is moderately
associated (.45) with the fact that CDDs build infrastructure faster than general-purpose
governments. Sixty one percent of the participants who have a professional certificate
agreed and strongly agreed with the fact that CDDs build infrastructure faster than
general-purpose governments in comparison to only 35.3% of the respondents who do
not hold such a certificate. The presence of a professional certificate is negatively
associated (-.32) with the fact that CDDs reports are used and relied upon by generalpurpose governments when local comprehensive plans are designed. Seventy-two point
five percent of the respondents with a professional license disagreed and strongly
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disagreed with the fact that general-purpose governments use and rely on CDD reports as
opposed to only 38.2% of the respondents who do not hold a professional certificate.
Type of current position is strongly associated (.58) with the survey item “CDDs
are a means of circumventing debt limits of general-purpose governments.” Supervisors
may understand the depth of the problem. Fifty-four point five percent of the participants
who do not hold a supervisory position agreed and strongly agreed with the fact that
CDDs help circumventing debt limits in comparison to 25% of the participants who
actually hold a supervisory position. Furthermore, 47.8% of those who have a
supervisory position disagreed and strongly disagreed with the fact that CDDs
circumvent debt limits when compared to only 9.1% of those with non-supervisory
positions.
Last but not least, working experience outside the State of Florida showed a
moderate association (.37) with the fact that CDDs remain self-supporting institutions
over time. Sixty-one point four percent of those respondents who have work experience
outside Florida agreed or strongly agreed with the fact that CDDs are self-supporting
mechanisms over time as opposed to 36.4% of those respondents who do not have
working experience outside the State of Florida.
Summing up, the individual characteristics of respondents showed a significant
association relationship with nine out of twenty one survey items. Most of the significant
associations were moderate, ranging from .32 to .47, one was fairly weak (.25) and one
was strong (.58). Younger respondents favored the statement “CDD levies give “bigger
bang for the buck” than ad-valorem taxes” while the elder ones disagreed with it.
Respondents with higher education supported the statement that CDDs enjoy little
oversight from local general-purpose governments. Respondents who do not have a
planning professional background considered that CDDs provide community tailored
services and that CDDs have little oversight from general-purpose governments.
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Respondents with a professional certificate thought that CDDs build infrastructure
faster than general-purpose governments. However, they did not support the fact that
CDD reports are used and relied upon by general-purpose governments when the capital
infrastructure plans are designed. Respondents with non-supervisory positions supported
the fact that CDDs help circumventing debt limits of general-purpose governments while
respondents with supervisory positions disagreed with this statement. Finally,
respondents who had working experience outside the State of Florida considered that
CDDs remain self-supporting institutions over time.

7.3 Factor Analysis and Indexes Creation
The second main section of the survey results describes the analysis and results of
factor analysis (FA) and index creation for the perceived pluses and minuses of CDDs.
This study uses exploratory FA to determine the importance of including selected items
into indexes of CDD favorability. The option of developing composite measures resides
in the fact that indexes are expected to have higher reliability and validity than individual
variables (Babbie, 1990; Neuman, 2004; O’Sullivan et. al., 2003). The second section of
the survey results describes the principal component analysis and its results as well as the
procedures followed to construct three indexes depicting CDD favorability.
7.3.1 Principal Component Analysis
Principle components analysis was used because there are no prior theoretical
drivers to guide this study. The primary purpose of the analysis is to identify and
construct composite measures for the factors underlying the survey items. Principal
component was chosen because it is more common in exploratory FA and its usefulness
resides in the fact that it generates factors that are used in subsequent analysis (Bryant &
Yarnold, 1995).
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Initially twenty one items were considered for being included in the analysis.
There were four problematic items that were eliminated from the analysis because they
were cross-loading with several variables and they did not belong to the factor structure.
The elimination process was performed during several steps with one item being
eliminated at a time and then, re-running the analysis. The item “CDDs impose hidden
infrastructure costs to the surrounding general-purpose governments” had cross loadings
of -.45 and .43 with two factors. The item “CDD reports are used and relied upon by
general-purpose governments when local comprehensive plans are designed” had cross
loadings between .4 and .52 with three factors. Furthermore, its presence in the analysis
decreased the reliability of its underlying factor. Then the item “CDDs enjoy little
oversight from local general-purpose government” did not fit to the structure of the factor
measuring CDDs’ cost-effectiveness and it was removed from the analysis because of
low communalities (.39). Finally, the item “CDDs overstep their powers because of
limited oversight from general-purpose governments” was redundant since it was similar
to “CDDs enjoy little oversight from local general-purpose government”. It was
eliminated from the analysis because it decreased the reliability of its underlying factor.
Principal component FA with varimax rotation was conducted to explore the
remaining seventeen items of the CDD survey. The initial eigen values showed that the
first factor explained 28.55% of the variance, the second factor 11.18% of the variance,
the third factor explained 10.75% of the variance, the fourth factor explained 7.63% of
the variance and the fifth factor explained 6.14%. Four, five and six factor solutions were
examined, using varimax rotations of the factor loading matrix since the scree plot
showed that six factors could be extracted. The five factor solution, which explained
64.26% of the variance, was chosen because four factor solutions was too difficult to
interpret and the six factor solution ended up with a single item underlying the final
factor. The factor loadings matrix is presented in Table 7.10.
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Table 7.10 Factor Loadings and Communalities (N=96)
Items
Cost
Effectiveness
CDDs are self-supporting mechanisms

Factors
Communality
Managerial
Flexibility Financial
Developers’
Responsiveness
Mechanisms Interest
.73
.61

CDDs provide community-tailored services

.74

.64

CDDs relieve property tax burden

.76

.75

CDDs circumvent debt limits of GP
governments

.65

.67

CDDs' assessments are more stable than
the taxes and fees of GP governments

.60

CDDs relieve GP governments from the
burden of capital infrastructure funding

.47
.77

CDDs increase short-term profitability for
developers
CDDs allow developers enhance amenities
at lower cost

.53

CDD assessments are commensurate with
quality of improvements

.46

CDD levies give bigger "bang for the buck"
than ad-valorem taxes

.63

.52

.71
.84

.75

.54

.62
.49
.47
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Table 7.10 Factor Loadings and Communalities (continued)
Items
Factors
Communality
Cost
Managerial
Flexibility Financial
Developers’
Effectiveness Responsiveness
Mechanisms Interest
CDDs provide infrastructure in areas where
GP governments are not able to

.77

.70

CDDs build infrastructure faster than GP
governments

.70

.64

.51

.58

CDDs provide services cheaper than GP
governments

.49

CDDs offer residents higher quality
infrastructure than GP governments

.74

.67

CDDs better maintain services than GP
governments due to their narrow purpose

.79

.79

CDDs better maintain services than GP
governments due to their smaller size

.77

.72

CDD infrastructure is well coordinated with
GP governments' capital improvement plans
Eigenvalues

.71
11.18%

28.5%

.55
10.75%

7.63%

6.14%

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Factor loadings less than .4 were suppressed
from the table
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The factors were named according to the items that had the highest loadings. The
first factor was labeled cost-effectiveness, the second was named managerial
responsiveness, the third one institutional flexibility, the fourth one financial mechanisms
and the fifth factor was labeled developers’ interest. Cronbach’s alpha was used to
examine the internal consistency of each of the five factors extracted.
With the exception of the last factor, developer’s interest (.390 for two items), the
values of Cronbach’s alpha were good and moderate: .826 for cost-effectiveness factor
(four items), .715 for managerial responsiveness (four items), .701 for institutional
flexibility (four items) and .605 for financial mechanisms (three items). Overall the
principal component analysis indicated that four factors were representative for the public
officials’ responses and the items of the CDD survey.
The final step of the analysis consisted of constructing composite measures for
CDD favorability. Based on the results of FA, three indexes were created. These indexes
were related to the first three factors extracted from the FA: CDD cost-effectiveness,
CDD managerial responsiveness and CDD institutional flexibility. The composite
measures were created by adding the scores of each survey item comprising the first three
factors extracted by FA.
The items in each index were given equal values. Index items are supposed to be
weighted equally unless there are theoretical or methodological reasons for weighing
(Babbie, 1990; Neuman, 2004). The three indexes were validated by conducting
reliability analysis. Item analysis was employed to examine the degree to which the
composite measure is related to the survey items.
The values of the indexes ranged from 4 to 20 where 4 means respondents
strongly disagree with the fact that CDDs are cost-effective, responsive and flexible
entities and 20 means respondents strongly agree with the three aforementioned attributes
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of CDDs. Descriptive statistics for all three composite measures are summarized in Table
7.11.
All of the three composite measures have a fairly normal distribution. Skewness
and kurtosis coefficients had values within the range of normal distribution and the
histograms of indexes showed that the distributions were almost normal (see Appendix
7). According to the values of the mean, CDD cost-effectiveness and institutional
flexibility are ranked lower than the CDD managerial responsiveness. Results suggest
that the survey respondents considered CDDs are more responsive to their communities
than they are flexible or cost-effective. Also, looking at the minimum and maximum
values, CDD responsiveness had the widest dispersion, followed by CDD costeffectiveness and institutional flexibility.
Table 7.11 Descriptive Statistics for Indexes
Index
Cost-effectiveness

No. of items Mean
4
11.25

St. dev.
3.05

Min.
4

Max.
19

N
101

Alpha
.82

Managerial responsiveness

4

12.79

2.65

4

20

98

.71

Institutional flexibility

4

11.41

2.61

4

18

100

.70

What do these values mean? The facts behind these numbers reveal the following
story. The CDDs are a responsive and flexible institutional choice for infrastructure
delivery but not necessarily an effective one. The biggest advantage of the CDD structure
resides in its managerial responsiveness. The CDD specialized nature ensures that the
community’s needs are fulfilled. Through their administrative and financial independence
from general-purpose governments CDDs’ self-supporting feature supports the provision
of services that are tailored to community’s needs. Districts’ perpetual existence and
narrow focus explain their managerial responsiveness. Responsiveness is also perceived
as a quality/cost ratio. Respondents considered the CDD assessments are commensurate
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with the quality of the services provided. The CDDs support infrastructure services
according to the wishes of their communities: some may entail high-end amenities while
others may be very modest and extremely affordable communities.
Flexibility is the second most important factor perceived by respondents when
assessing CDDs. Districts are mainly favored as flexible institutions because they manage
to build infrastructure faster than general-purpose governments and because they provide
services in places where general-purpose governments are not able to. Not only are CDDs
fast in building infrastructure but they are also addressing a type of public or private
market failure. However, respondents did not view flexibility through the lenses of lowercost services. CDDs tend to supply services that are the same value or higher with/than
other public or private infrastructure providers. Flexibility also resides in the fact that
CDD assessments are not as stable as the taxes of general-purpose governments. The
flexibility of districts’ assessment may pose significant burdens to residents since districts
may increase the amount of assessments as they see fit.
CDD effectiveness shows the least favorability on part of public officials. CDDs
are considered as being less effective than general-purpose governments when providing
and maintaining infrastructure services. Respondents are neutral in assessing whether
CDD services are of higher quality than those of general-purpose governments. Districts
are perceived as providing about the same quality of services with the surrounding
governmental entities. This fact is supported by the perception that CDD levies are not
necessarily better spent than the taxes of general-purpose governments. The CDDs are
also perceived as not being more effective than general-purpose governments when
maintaining infrastructure services. Therefore, the assumption that smaller units of
governments performing specialized functions better handle public services is not
supported by the findings of this study.
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To sum up, in order to assess CDD favorability an exploratory FA of seventeen
survey items was conducted. Five major factors were identified. These are: CDD costeffectiveness, managerial responsiveness, institutional flexibility, financial mechanisms
and developers’ interests. Three of them were useful in developing indexes measuring
CDD favorability. The favorability indexes were labeled the same as the factors
extracted: CDD cost-effectiveness, managerial responsiveness and institutional
flexibility. This analysis demonstrated that CDDs are a responsive and flexible
institutional choice for infrastructure delivery but not as effective as anticipated. These
indexes of favorability are expected to serve as guideline for decision-makers when
assessing the effects of CDDs.

7.4 Qualitative Analysis of Survey
The survey also contained an open-ended question about the things respondents
would change in CDD implementation. The aim of this survey question was to reveal the
perceived drawbacks of CDD implementation. When asked about what things they would
change, respondents provided various explanations. They focused on six main common
issues. First, they recommended for better disclosure requirements about CDDs and their
financial obligations to prospective residents. Second, respondents suggested more
administrative and fiscal local and state oversight. Third, survey participants
recommended better intergovernmental coordination between CDDs and local generalpurpose governments. Fourth, respondents had opposite views on the authority that
should establish CDDs. Two respondents suggested that all CDDs should be established
by local general-purpose governments vs. one respondent who stated that the state should
deal with CDD establishment and granting of additional special powers. Fifth,
respondents recommended that CDD life span should be limited. Once they build the
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infrastructure and they pay off the debt, they should cease to exist. Finally, respondents
recommended that CDDs should be allowed only in areas where infrastructure is unlikely
to be built such as infill and economically distressed areas.
In addition to the aforementioned common themes, respondents identified other
things that they might change in the implementation of CDDs. Some recommendations
were related to CDD functions. These are: CDDs should be responsible for basic
infrastructure services, CDDs should be used to finance new infrastructure improvements
rather than reimbursing developers for infrastructure that is already in place as well as
CDDs should adhere to the building and maintenance requirements of local generalpurpose governments. Other recommendations referred to limiting the numbers of CDDs
within a development, allowing residents to decide the changes to their assessments rates,
requiring developers to demonstrate long-term stability before being able to file a petition
for CDD creation, requiring the commitments in the petitions to be binding and
addressing the issue of what ultimately happens to the infrastructure in case CDDs cease
to exist. Respondents stressed the fact that all these changes could only be ensured
through amendments to Chapter 190 Fla. Stat.

7.5 Summary
The analysis of the survey data provided some significant findings that will assist
in the further understanding of the role of CDDs in providing and maintaining
infrastructure improvements and services. The descriptive analysis of the survey items
revealed several important findings. First, structure flexibility is viewed as an advantage
of CDDs. Survey participants prioritized CDD structure flexibility as follows: fulfilling
the needs of the community, being independent from general-purpose government and
being self-supporting entities.
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Second, CDD financial implications varied according to the type of beneficiaries.
On one hand, CDDs were not perceived as having beneficial financial implications for
general-purpose governments because they do not relieve general-purpose governments
from the burden of capital infrastructure or the property tax and because they do not
circumvent the debt limits of general-purpose governments. On the other hand, CDDs
have beneficial financial implications for developers and residents. Districts are thought
of benefiting developers because the former generate short-term profits for the latter and
allow enhancement of amenities at lower costs. The CDDs also benefit residents because
district assessments are commensurate with the quality of services that are provided.
Third, CDDs are not necessarily better than general-purpose governments in
providing and maintaining infrastructure services. Whereas CDDs build infrastructure
faster than general-purpose governments, the former do not provide infrastructure
cheaper or of higher quality than the latter. Furthermore, districts are not viewed as better
maintaining public services than general-purpose governments when their specialized
function and geographic boundaries were considered.
Fourth, CDD activity was not found to be coordinated with the capital
improvement plans of general-purpose governments. If respondents had a neutral opinion
about the CDD impact on growth management, they supported the fact that CDDs
encourage coordinated development. CDDs were also perceived to contribute to the fiscal
stress of the surrounding communities and to increases in the housing prices.
The analysis also suggested that there were some important differences in the way
respondents perceived CDD pluses and minuses. The results revealed significant
differences for nine out of the twenty one survey items analyzed according to the
individual and professional characteristics of respondents. There is a clear distinction
between the preferences of those who are more experienced, higher educated, with a
supervisory position, planning background and working experience outside the State of
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Florida vs. those who are younger, less educated, with no supervisory position, without a
planning background and with working experience in Florida. The first category of
respondents are more critical than the second one when assessing CDD pluses and
minuses.
The results of the principal component FA showed that respondents perceived
CDD according to five common factors: cost-effectiveness, managerial responsiveness,
institutional flexibility, financial mechanisms and developer’s interest. However, only
three out of five extracted factors were useful in creating indexes of CDD favorability.
CDD favorability indexes were named as follows: CDD cost-effectiveness, managerial
responsiveness and institutional flexibility. Districts were perceived as being responsive
and flexible mechanisms for service delivery. Their narrow focus and perpetual existence
make them provide services that are tailored towards the needs of the communities they
support. The CDD institutional flexibility allows them to build infrastructure in a timely
manner and in areas where other entities cannot. However, their effectiveness in
providing and maintaining services is not as high as predicted. In fact, districts are less
effective than general-purpose governments in delivering infrastructure-related services.
Finally, the qualitative analysis of the survey revealed that there are six main
issues that should be changed with regards to CDD implementation. These are: better
disclosure requirements about CDDs and their financial obligations to prospective
residents,

more

administrative

and

fiscal

local

and

state

oversight,

better

intergovernmental coordination between CDDs and local general-purpose governments,
designating local general-purpose governments as solely establishing authorities for
CDDs, limiting the CDD’s life span and allowing CDDs to be established only in areas
where infrastructure is unlikely to be built. The qualitative analysis suggested that CDDs
are too independent in fulfilling their functions and there should be better oversight on
their powers and activity.
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In conclusion, CDDs have both advantages and disadvantages. Overall, the results
of this analysis suggest that CDDs are desirable institutional choices among public
officials because of their managerial responsiveness and institutional flexibility. The
CDD responsiveness makes them closer to community’s needs than any other public or
private mechanisms which provide infrastructure services. The CDD flexibility gives
them a competitive advantage of building infrastructure faster and in remote areas but
may also have negative implications for residents. However, districts are not as favorable
for their effectiveness in providing and maintaining infrastructure services. Furthermore,
CDDs are not perceived as helping general-purpose governments to overcome their debt
limits, to maintain or decrease the level of their taxes or to take the big ticket
infrastructure items off their shoulders. CDDs are considered a developers’ tool that
facilitates the latter’s access to financial mechanisms such as tax-exempt municipal
revenue bonds. Planners and respondents who do not have working experience outside
the State of Florida are less favorable of CDDs. They consider districts as a sprawl
stimulation that favors a build-out rather than a growth management tool.
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CHAPTER VIII
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

8.1 Introduction
Community Development Districts (CDDs) are a particular type of multi-purpose,
independent special districts created by a state charter, whose main purpose is to manage
and finance infrastructure services that accommodate new development within the State
of Florida. They have important implications for both growth management policies and
public service delivery. Districts influence the way growth occurs by coordinating the
infrastructure provision with development as well as by guiding the location, rate and
type of development through their decisions. The CDDs also have important implications
for service delivery due to their flexible institutional structure which may allow for
efficient and responsive infrastructure services provision.
Even though CDDs are similar to local governments of general purpose such as
counties and cities there are a few features that differentiate the former from the latter.
These are: districts’ specialized function of providing and maintaining specific
infrastructure services, districts’ institutional independence from other governmental
entities through administrative, financial and political autonomy, districts’ ability to
overlap the territory of other jurisdictions and districts’ low political visibility as they
have often been characterized as “shadow governments”.
As infrastructure management and financing have become extremely important
for policy makers, special-purpose governments are seen as a solution for dealing with its
development in an era of fiscal stringency (Porter, 2008; Porter et al., 1992). The CDDs
are authorized to cover a fairly broad spectrum of infrastructure facilities and services
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such as water management and control, water supply, water and wastewater, bridges and
culverts, district roads and certain projects for concurrency as well as amenities such as
parks and recreation facilities, security, fire prevention, education-related facilities and
the like.
The context within which CDDs were created should be related to the planning
and fiscal realities in Florida in the 1980s and 1990s. Districts have proliferated in
response to the concurrency requirement of the 1985 Florida Growth Management Act.
The Florida growth management legislation requires that adequate public facilities be
available or fiscally accounted for prior to or concurrent with new development but it
does not address how the infrastructure development is going to be funded. Therefore,
local governments are responsible for identifying financial sources to support
infrastructure development and special purpose-governments represented one of these
sources.
The CDD formation should also be understood in the context of creation and
proliferation of special-purpose governments in general as well as tax and debt
constraints that were adopted by states to impose limitations on local general-purpose
governments. In Florida such constraints started in 1980 with the adoption of millage
caps on property tax, followed in the 1990s by referendum requirements for issuing
general obligation bonds and adoption of limits on the annual increase in the assessed
values of homestead properties. These fiscal realities corroborated with a tax-averse
population facilitated the proliferation of CDDs within the State of Florida.
By examining the role of CDDs on growth management and service delivery in
Florida, this study focused on the following research purposes: providing an overview of
CDD functions and activity, analyzing the contribution of CDDs for growth management
and infrastructure development, identifying drivers of CDD infrastructure variation as
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well as determining the role of CDDs for infrastructure service provision by assessing
districts advantages and disadvantages as service providers.
The study contributes significantly to the scholarly literature. It fills an important
gap in the academic literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of a subtype of
multi-purpose districts. It assesses the effectiveness and responsiveness of CDDs in
delivering infrastructure services through the perceptions of public officials and CDD
representatives. The study also addresses methodological issues identified in the extant
literature by relying on state-level secondary data and primary data about CDD impacts.
The CDD study used a mixed methods research approach, drawing on secondary
data about CDD features and activity, interviews with CDD representatives and public
officials as well as on a survey of public officials within the counties and cities that have
established CDDs. The findings of the study demonstrated that the CDD institutional
model is both a policy and a service delivery tool for responsive infrastructure provision
that can be adopted by states across the United States. However, the Florida experience
showed that the CDD model should be used with caution.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: it summarizes and discusses each
finding according to the research questions; it discusses implications for future research;
it connects the results of this study to the theory behind it; it acknowledges the limitations
of this study and concludes with an overall summary.

8.2 Discussion of Results
8.2.1 An Overview of the CDD Model
Community Development Districts are the most commonly used type of
independent special districts in Florida. They are perpetual institutional mechanisms for
infrastructure delivery which enjoy governmental powers and protections. The CDDs are
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uniformly created by a state charter and they have been established, according to their
size, by either local general-purpose governments or the Florida Land and water
Adjudicatory Commission. Although, virtually anyone can petition an establishing
authority to create a CDD (even a county or a city), in Florida, CDDs have only been
initiated by developers.
Their utilization reflects the need for new services driven by a rapid population
growth that has taken place within the last six decades. The legislation that created
CDDs was passed in 1980, but it was not until late 1980s – early 1990s when districts
showed a steady increase. They flourished from late 1990s until the mid 2000s and
dramatically decreased after 2006. The CDD proliferation was driven by the adoption of
local comprehensive plans by local governments as well by the boom of the Florida real
estate market. Districts are primarily located in larger counties in Florida concentrating in
the southern and central parts of the state. District location pattern shows that CDDs
proliferated within the counties and cities that experienced higher population increases.
Community Development Districts enjoy administrative and financial autonomy.
They are governed by an elected board of supervisors which is initially elected from
among landowners’ representatives and, subsequently, it transitions to a board comprised
of residents. Districts may pose democratic accountability issues to their residents
because of the one-acre/ one-vote system where landowners vote for each acre of land
they own in the district until a certain quorum of electors is achieved. The one-acre/onevote system does not allow residents to be democratically represented for at least the first
six to ten years of CDD existence. A probable a solution to this would be the institution
of a situation similar to condominiums where residents should be allowed to participate
in CDD decisions once the majority of housing units are owner-occupied.
Districts can be considered self-supporting entities since the development they
generate pays for itself. CDDs have significant financial implications especially with
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regard to the amount of outstanding debt they issued. From 1998 to 2007 the amount of
debt that CDDs have issued increased four times while the debt of general-purpose
governments stagnated. The comparison between the amount of debt issued by CDDs and
local general-purpose governments demonstrated that CDD borrowing capacity gives
them a competitive advantage in providing infrastructure services when compared to
other local governmental entities. Even if CDDs are considered independent in raising
their revenues, they are truly subsidized by the federal government through the nature of
the tax-exempt bonds they float for funding.
8.2.2 The Implications of CDDs to Growth Management
In discussing the implications of CDDs for growth management, the study
considered the location and size of CDDs within six Florida counties as well as the type
and pattern of development districts supported. Overall, more than two thirds of the
CDDs (70.4%) provided infrastructure services for unincorporated areas. The choice of
creating CDDs in unincorporated vs. incorporated areas is related to the type of
development CDDs support. Districts that support residential development are mainly
located on the fringe of municipalities, fulfilling the preferences of citizens for the
suburbs. As expected, mixed-use and commercial development is predominant for the
CDDs located within the boundaries of municipalities. Therefore, on one hand, CDDs
supporting residential communities with single-family houses tend to encourage
development that is located on the fringe and, indirectly, they contribute to sprawl. On
the other hand, districts that support multi-family and mixed-used developments might
contribute to denser development patterns. There are also instances in which CDDs that
are located within the boundaries of municipalities are used for redeveloping inner-city
areas or for providing more expensive improvements such as roadways. Ultimately, the
decision about the way a jurisdiction develops belongs to general-purpose governments
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since they are the ones which have planning and zoning powers. Districts have to comply
with these requirements.
The CDD size ranges from as small as 9.4 acres to as high as 1097 acres, with an
average size of approximately 344 acres. With the exception of Miami-Dade County
where the CDD average is 111 acres, all the other five counties have a mean size between
334 and 544 acres. These figures confirmed the suggestions of public officials who
recommended that CDD should be between 300 and 500 acres in size to be economically
feasible. The small CDD size in Miami-Dade County might be explained by the fact that
CDDs in this county favored more residential development in the form of multi-family
and condominiums and less single-family housing or that the development community is
dominant. Furthermore, CDDs in Miami-Dade County focused more on providing basic
infrastructure services and less on supporting optional amenities. It can, therefore, be
argued that CDD size influences the quality and quantity of infrastructure improvements.
Larger CDDs, especially those located on the Florida’s west coast have more open space
and nicer amenities such as lakes, golf courses and the like.
The state legislation does not mention any minimum or maximum size for CDDs,
leaving the decision about CDD size with the establishing authority. The question should
not necessarily be about the minimum or maximum size for a CDD but rather consider
the adequacy of CDD size so that future residents have the opportunity of being
democratically

represented.

The

CDDs

supporting

residential

and

mixed-use

development should be comprised of at least 500 housing units to give residents the
opportunity of being democratically represented and to avoid developers’ control once
the units are owner-occupied. As documented by the petitions’ data there were plenty of
instances in which CDDs had less than 500 proposed housing units even if they had
reached their ideal size. The establishing local general-purpose governments should pay
more attention to this issue when deciding the appropriateness of the CDD size.
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Within the six Florida counties districts supported public facilities and services
mainly for residential development. The CDD focus on residential development may be
explained by the existence of a demand for residential development due to the rapid
population increase and to the housing boom in the 2000s. Once the demand for housing
has decreased, CDDs ceased to be attractive to developers (fact reflected by the dramatic
decrease in the CDD number after 2006).
The Florida legislature made CDDs a vehicle for any person or entity to provide
infrastructure but only developers have taken advantage of this institutional choice of
infrastructure provision. The idea of CDD as an institutional choice for infrastructure
provision was initiated by developers’ interests in South Florida (Broward, Collier and
Hillsborough counties (communication with Kenza van Assenderp - one of the lawyers
who drafted Chapter 190 Fla. Stat. - on March 11, 2009) but the legislature made it
applicable to virtually anyone who wants to build basic infrastructure services in Florida.
However, it remains unclear why other individuals, groups or entities have not used it so
far.
The CDDs drastic decline in the last five years may suggest that CDDs might be
“creatures of a dead era.” Only time will tell whether young CDDs (those that have
issued debt but did not complete construction or sold their housing units) will survive the
current housing crisis. However, as a result of a recent proposition concerning the
empowerment of the Florida residents to decide on the adoption and amendments of
future land-use plans (Amendment 4 to Florida Constitution), CDDs could remain a
useful tool for developers to continue building in remote areas since the infrastructure
provided by CDDs is not included in the capital improvement plans of local generalpurpose governments.
In the future the CDD applicability could seek the interests of public institutions,
local governments, non-profit organizations or any other interested party in building
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facilities and improvements for institutional uses such as educational, research, healthcare
institutions and the like. The future of CDDs might be geared toward mixed-use and
commercial developments since the number of new CDDs dropped dramatically after
2006. As stated before, their usefulness could move beyond providing infrastructure for
residential developments, to institutional uses such as educational and health care
facilities, to contaminated soil clean up, redevelopment etc.
Depending on the preference of developers, CDD may support both exclusive and
affordable communities. Developers’ preference for high-end amenities encourages the
development of exclusive communities while those who do not value such amenities
develop more affordable communities. Probably the intent of the state legislation was not
to make CDD a driver for providing “islands of luxury” as these hi-end communities
have often been described. Rather, CDDs were intended to provide the needed
fundamental infrastructure. Thus, CDD tax exempt powers should be applied towards
funding basic infrastructure while the enhanced amenities might be taxed.
What seems to be missing in a scenario where oversight from general-purpose
governments does not exist is a lack of coordination and cooperation between the general
and the special-purpose governments. The CDD infrastructure is not coordinated with
that of general-purpose governments since the former is not being included in the latter’s
capital

improvement

plan.

This

disconnect

happens

because

general-purpose

governments do not have any enforcement powers on CDDs and, therefore, keep all the
reports they receive from districts for information purposes only. The issue of
infrastructure coordination might be partially addressed by stimulating local
governmental entities to enter into intergovernmental agreements when delivering
infrastructure services. As suggested by Mullin (2010) coordination issues might be
addressed through collaboration. A solution for solving the lack of coordination might be
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the presence of inter-local agreements between CDDs and their surrounding generalpurpose governments.
According to Ben-Zadock and Gale (2001) concurrency requirement can manage
growth through timing, location, type and pattern of development. Concurrency is
described in terms of available land and water resources, available financial resources,
level of service standards and timing. The findings of this study clearly showed that
CDDs are believed to partially fulfill concurrency by linking new development with the
needed infrastructure through the availability of funding and the timing of infrastructure.
Through their financial capacity districts can build infrastructure improvements in a
timely manner.
Concurrency also requires local general-purpose governments to adopt capital
improvements programs with minimum levels of service for the following infrastructure
services: water and sewer, solid waste, drainage, parks and recreation and roads. In other
words, there has to be enough capacity for each of the aforementioned infrastructure
improvements for the development to go through. From this perspective, CDDs no not
seem to fulfill the concurrency requirement since the infrastructure they provide is not
included in the capital improvement plans of general-purpose governments and,
therefore, not subject to the latter’s levels of services. From this perspective, the
concurrency compliance ultimately depends on the decisions of CDDs.
In sum, CDDs do not seem to foster growth management in Florida. Even if
districts coordinate infrastructure provision with new development their decisions about
location, type and pattern of development have the unintended consequences of
encouraging sprawl. This finding is consistent with Turner (1990) who stated that
concurrency may lead to sprawl.
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8.2.3 The Contribution of CDDs to the Infrastructure Development in Florida
Community Development Districts are perceived as being an alternative to other
public or private means of providing infrastructure. They either cover some type of public
or private market failure by providing services and improvements where other entities
cannot or do not want to, or they fulfill the desire of a community to provide certain
services. The contribution of the CDDs to the infrastructure development in Florida has
been multifold. In discussing the CDD profile within six Florida counties, this study
indicated some important findings.
The CDDs provide both on-site and off-site improvements and their role to the
infrastructure development in Florida has been to support basic capital improvement
projects such as stormwater management and drainage systems, water and sewer
facilities, waste water systems, roads, sidewalks and streetlights, recreational facilities
etc. Districts contributed mainly to providing infrastructure that is internal to the
developments they supported and, to a lesser extent, in helping local general-purpose
governments take the burden of major capital improvement projects (such as major roads,
highways and bridges) off their shoulders. Off-site improvements are primarily fostering
on-site improvements and they are either transportation-related or refer to extension of
utility lines to the development site.
Once built CDD facilities are supposed to be open to the general public because
of the fact that CDDs use tax-exempt bonds to finance them. In reality, CDD
improvements rarely benefit the general public but rather those who pay for the services,
enjoy them. Oftentimes districts are viewed as gated communities due to their impressive
security features.
The role of CDDs in offering public facilities and utilities may be different. They
are either both providers and maintainers for public facilities such as storm water
systems, drainage systems, internal roads and the like, or they are only providers but not
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maintainers of public utilities such as water and sewer systems or recreational parks.
There are no clear guidelines when deciding which local governments (special vs.
general-purpose) should provide and maintain a service. Rather, it is a matter of
considering all the parameters involved for each particular situation.
The CDDs have also contributed to the infrastructure development in Florida by
building and dedicating infrastructure to general-purpose governments at no direct cost to
the latter (mainly water and sewer systems and off-site improvements to major arterial
roads and highways). This way, CDDs are attractive for general-purpose governments
because the latter have the infrastructure in place without having to pay for it.
The CDDs are more than funding mechanisms; they are also management tools
for infrastructure services. Once CDDs build the infrastructure they are supposed to, their
role is to act as managers of the newly created communities. Unlike other entities which
disappear after they fulfill their scope, CDDs are perpetual entities. Some districts act in a
manner similar to homeowners’ associations by maintaining the infrastructure and paying
off the bond while others continue to perform improvements for the community. This
way districts could be a real solution to managing public infrastructure (Porter, 2008).
While CDDs are clearly a real solution for providing infrastructure improvements
it is a question of deciding which entity (general-purpose or special-purpose) should
maintain the services provided by CDDs. This decision is dependent on several factors
among which are: the nature of the service, the size of the project, service efficiency, the
entity that is the service provider, the type of land-use as well as linking the infrastructure
capacity with development (Porter, 2008). In addition to these reasons, the author would
like to add the fact that a general-purpose government will ultimately make this decision
by suggesting CDDs to undertake or not the maintenance of certain services. When
developers petition a general-purpose government to establish a CDD they have to
include a statement of estimated regulatory costs which contains a table estimating the
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entities that provide and/or maintain infrastructure improvements for the new
development. General-purpose governments may approve or disapprove the proposed
providers and maintainers of services and suggest further changes when they consider
districts are not suitable to maintain specific services. Other times general-purpose
governments may not want competition or duplication of services. Because of the fact
that the majority of CDDs are located in unincorporated areas of the counties, they seem
to complement rather than compete with the services provided by general-purpose
governments at least in the short-term.
CDDs are perceived as alternative mechanisms for infrastructure provision. This
fact reinforces the view of Van Assenderp (n.d.) who stated that besides CDDs, there are
other alternatives for the provision and maintenance of infrastructure which are classified
in relation to their efficiency and accountability. These are either public alternatives such
as general-purpose governments, dependent districts such as municipal service tax units
and municipal service benefit units or private alternatives which include private
developers and/or companies who get bank loans to provide the necessary infrastructure
as well as homeowners’ associations. In Van Assenderp’s (n.d.) view CDDs are a public
alternative for infrastructure provision which is more efficient and less accountable than
general-purpose governments and more efficient and more accountable than
homeowners’ associations.
8.2.4 CDD Infrastructure Variation
When identifying drivers of infrastructure variation the present analysis revealed
that the number of services provided by CDDs differed according to whether districts
have optional special powers, the county within which they are located and the type of
development they support. Overall, CDDs that have optional special powers, those
located on the Florida’s west coast and those supporting residential and mixed-use
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development provided more services than their counterparts. The CDDs located within
the counties on the Florida’s west coast differed from those located on the east coast
through the fact that the former had more optional special powers and served larger
communities when compared to the latter. Moreover, CDDs on the west coast enjoyed a
lot of open space and provided amenities such as lakes and golf courses, favored
residential development that focused on single-family housing as opposed to
condominiums and multi-family housing which were predominant in the CDDs located
on the east coast. The infrastructure variation between the west and east coast can be
explained by the facts that CDDs within Miami-Dade County are the smallest in size and
St. Lucie County has two thirds of its CDDs located within the boundaries of
municipalities.
Residential and mixed-use development attracts, through their nature, more
amenities than commercial and industrial developments. In order for developers to be
competitive on the housing market, they aim at making communities more attractive for
prospective buyers by offering enhanced amenities. It is these optional amenities that
make a difference among the number of services provided by CDDs because, overall, all
CDDs provide basic infrastructure, offering, more or less, the same type of fundamental
infrastructure services.
This study also suggested that there were four indicators that predicted the amount
of infrastructure provided by CDDs. An increase in the number of CDD provided
services was associated with an increase in the number of CDD owned and maintained
services, with districts that had optional special powers, with an increase in the amount of
the CDD estimated infrastructure costs and with districts located in unincorporated areas.
When a petitioner wants to initiate the establishment of a CDD one has to specify
both the entity which is responsible for the construction and the owner of district facilities
and services. The CDDs that are proposed to be both owners and maintainers of district
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facilities are more likely to build more services. Being the managers of specific
infrastructure facilities and services proved to be a strong incentive for CDDs to build
more services. Since infrastructure facilities such as water and sewer and internal roads
are mainly just financed through CDDs and then, turned over for maintenance to generalpurpose governments, it is the other infrastructure items that influence the infrastructure
variation. Therefore, CDDs are, indeed, more than funding mechanisms, they are
management tools.
Higher infrastructure costs influenced the provision of more services. Compared
to general-purpose governments which handle a variety of services CDDs focus on
specific infrastructure services. Thus, CDD infrastructure services are not expected to
show a significant price difference. Districts that provide high end amenities are expected
to spend more than those which provide only basic infrastructure. The more money is
spent, the higher the number of services provided. It can be argued that optional
amenities play an important role in predicting the amount of infrastructure services
provided by CDDs.
Finally, as anticipated, CDDs located in unincorporated areas provide more
services than those located within city boundaries. This is explained by the fact that
unincorporated areas have more infrastructure needs than municipalities. The latter might
need just to upgrade the existing facilities while the former need to build everything from
scratch.
8.2.5 The Perceived Effectiveness and Responsiveness of CDDs as Service Providers
In order to determine the role districts play in service delivery this study assessed
CDD pluses and minuses as well as their effectiveness and responsiveness in delivering
services. The CDDs were perceived as being favorable for developers and residents and
not so favorable for general-purpose governments. Their favorability resides in the
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following. First, structure flexibility was seen as an advantage of CDDs because it fulfills
the needs of the community, allowing districts to be independent from general-purpose
government and be self-supporting entities. CDDs are considered to benefit developers
because they generate short-term profits for the latter by allowing them to build enhanced
amenities at lower costs. Through their tax-exempt powers districts represent an incentive
for developers as long as they generate profit. CDDs are also perceived to benefit
residents because their assessments are commensurate with the quality of services
offered. Moreover, CDDs are considered favorable because they build infrastructure
faster than general-purpose governments. Therefore, the needed infrastructure might be in
place in a timely manner. Even though residents are those who ultimately bear the costs,
they have the infrastructure in place when they need it.
Finally, CDDs are desirable because they encourage coordinated development.
CDDs might aid the growth management in Florida by ensuring the presence of
infrastructure. As long as development orders are consistent with the land-use of an area,
it can be argued that CDDs encourage coordinated development. But the infrastructure
that CDDs provide is not coordinated with the capital improvement plans of generalpurpose governments, a fact that may lead to sprawling development patterns.
Community Development Districts were not considered as beneficial for generalpurpose governments. They were perceived of not relieving general-purpose governments
from the burden of capital infrastructure or the property tax, neither of circumventing the
debt limits placed on general-purpose governments by states. These findings disconfirm
the view expressed in the scholarly literature that special-purpose governments are
established to avoid increases in property taxes or to circumvent tax and expenditure
limitations placed on general-purpose governments by states (Bowler & Donovan, 2004;
Carr, 2006; Foster, 1997; McCabe, 2000). Rather, the results of this study revealed that
CDDs were created to serve the interests of developers (Burns, 1994; Porter et. al., 1992)
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and to facilitate their access to tax-exempt bonds. Contrary to the opinion of survey
participants, secondary data about CDD financial activity point to the fact that districts
have taken advantage of their borrowing powers and increased their debt considerably.
Results also indicated that CDDs were not necessarily better than general-purpose
governments in maintaining infrastructure services. Districts did not provide a less
expensive or higher quality infrastructure when compared to general-purpose
governments. Furthermore, survey participants considered that CDDs were more likely to
contribute to the fiscal stress of the surrounding communities and to increases in the
housing prices.
Instead of relieving their surrounding governments from the burden of their taxes,
CDDs were perceived as contributing to the fiscal stress of general-purpose governments
by overburdening taxpayers. Even though CDDs were not perceived as having financial
benefits for general-purpose governments, they contributed significantly to the
infrastructure development in Florida. Their contribution focused mainly on providing
infrastructure for CDD developments and, to a lesser extent, on building highway or
major roadway improvements.
However, CDDs built fundamental infrastructure facilities such as water and
sewer utilities, stormwater systems, drainage systems and internal roads. And some of
these facilities were turned over to general-purpose governments, fact that represents a
great relief for the latter. The present study suggested that general-purpose governments
preferred that certain pieces of infrastructure such as water and sewer systems be turned
over to them once built due to local governments’ capacity to manage big utility systems
and due to their desire to avoid duplication of services. It appears that CDDs, similar to
other special districts, provide services that are complementary rather than competitive
with those of general-purpose governments (Carr, 2004b).
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The study indicated there were some important differences in the way respondents
perceived CDD pluses and minuses. The opinions of survey respondents were divided
between two camps. Respondents with planning background, those with more
experience, those with higher education and working experience outside of Florida were
more critical about CDD structure flexibility, financial and economic development
implications as well as issues of coordination with general-purpose governments when
compared to their counterparts. In other words, overall, the minority favored CDDs while
the majority did not. The majority of respondents expressed critical views about CDDs in
most of the studied areas. They considered that CDDs did not provide infrastructure
according to a community’s needs but according to the willingness of developers.
The contribution of CDDs to the service delivery showed that specialized
governance is more responsive and more flexible but less effective than general-purpose
governance. The biggest advantage of CDDs resides in their managerial responsiveness.
The CDD specialized nature ensures that the community’s needs are fulfilled. Through
their administrative and financial independence from general-purpose governments
CDDs support the provision of services that are tailored toward their residents. The
CDDs’ perpetual existence and narrow specialization also explain their managerial
responsiveness. Finally, respondents perceived responsiveness through the fact that CDD
assessments are commensurate with the quality of the services provided.
Districts are mainly favored as being flexible institutions because they manage to
build infrastructure faster than general-purpose governments and because they provide
services in places where general-purpose governments are not able to. Not only are CDDs
fast in building infrastructure but they are also addressing a type of public or private
market failure.
Community Development Districts are considered as being less effective than
general-purpose governments when providing and maintaining infrastructure services.
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Respondents were neutral in assessing whether districts’ services are of higher quality
than those of general-purpose governments. The CDDs were, therefore, perceived as
providing about the same quality of services with their surrounding governmental
entities. Districts were also perceived as not being more effective than general-purpose
governments when maintaining infrastructure services.
Unlike public choice theorists who argued that special-purpose governments
improve the efficiency and effectiveness in local service delivery (Bish & Ostrom, 1973;
Ostrom, 1999) the results of this study confirm the findings from the empirical literature
that special-purpose governments are less efficient than the general-purpose ones (Berry,
2009; Foster, 1997; Mullin, 2009). Then, the question that comes to mind is why does
specialized governance continue to be on the rise in Florida? In the case of CDDs,
developers’ interest played a significant role in initiating their creation and fueling their
proliferation. The findings of this study are consistent with previous scholars (Bollens,
1957; Burns, 1994) who argued that it is the desire of interests groups to provide certain
functions that leads to the formation and proliferation of special-purpose governments.
Finally, the qualitative analysis of the survey revealed that there are six main
issues that should be changed with regard to CDD implementation. These are: better
disclosure requirements about CDDs and their financial obligations to prospective
residents,

more

administrative

and

fiscal

local

and

state

oversight,

better

intergovernmental coordination between CDDs and local general-purpose governments,
designating local general-purpose governments as solely establishing authorities for
CDDs, limiting the CDD life span and allowing CDDs to be established only in areas
where infrastructure is unlikely to be built.
Future home purchasers need to be educated about what CDDs are and what
powers they have. Prospective buyers do not seem to pay enough attention to the
available disclosure mechanisms when they purchase a property within a CDD or to the

164

fact that CDD assessments cannot be claimed on their income tax returns. Disclosure
mechanisms about the nature of CDDs are in place for both initial and subsequent
purchasers. For initial purchasers Chapter 190 Fla. Stat. stipulates that there should be a
disclosure language, in bold letters, right before the signature block about the existence of
CDD and its right to assess the property within the district to pay for infrastructure
improvements and operation of the district (§190.040 Fla. Stat., 1980). For subsequent
purchasers there are disclosure mechanisms such as a previous tax bills for the property
to be purchased or notices of establishment to issue bonds - which will show the property
is subject to a CDD assessment. In some instances, additional disclosure requirements
have been required by the CDD establishing authority. For example, Miami-Dade County
requires CDD petitioners to provide a declaration of restrictive covenants which contains
estimated infrastructure costs and the assessments’ fixed amount for the first three years.
Therefore, disclosure mechanisms about CDDs are in place and future purchasers need to
do their homework before buying a property.
As previously asserted (Florida Atlantic University/Florida International
University Joint Center for Environmental and Urban Problems, 1995), CDDs are too
independent and their establishing authorities should play a more active role in
overseeing a district’s activity. As per Chapter 190 Fla. Stat. The CDDs are perpetual
mechanisms which enjoy governmental powers and protections. But what happens with
the districts after they build the infrastructure they are supposed to and pay off their debt?
Does the maintenance function justify the need to keep CDDs in place or should their life
span be limited? As suggested by the experience of other independent special districts,
only time will tell if CDDs will truly justify the governmental protections they enjoy.
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8.3 Implications for Further Research
While the findings of this study have answered the existing research questions
they, certainly, have raised others. This study provided a comprehensive view about CDD
role and implications for infrastructure growth and service delivery in Florida. It is a
starting point since CDDs’ impacts have not been systematically researched. Therefore,
there are plenty of research directions toward which this study may lead. Further research
might focus on the following:


accountability issues between CDDs and their residents,



the implications for infrastructure delivery when inter-local agreements
between CDDs and general-purpose governments are considered,



the impact of CDDs on housing values,



the influence of the overlapping jurisdiction arrangement on the debt
burden of general-purpose governments when CDDs are considered,



assessing the efficiency of CDDs in comparison to general-purpose
governments by using different performance indicators,



assessing CDD contribution to the infrastructure financing by comparing
the magnitude of CDD financial impacts with those of impact fees and
capital spending of general-purpose governments;



identifying the usefulness of CDDs for other states by documenting and
comparing CDDs with similar districts in other states and



assessing the impacts of sociological factors such as migration patterns by
performing a comparative analysis between CDDs located on the Florida’s
west vs. east coast.
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The present study has considered only the views of public officials and CDD
representatives. To provide a complete picture of CDDs, the voice of other stakeholders
such as developers and residents should be heard.

8.4 Relationship of Results to Theory
The conceptual framework for this study was New Public Management (NPM), a
public management reform movement that is on the rise since 1970s. Within the NPM
framework, CDDs represent one of the “hollowed-out” alternatives for delivering public
infrastructure services. The findings of this study demonstrated that CDDs are a flexible
institutional mechanism which was employed as a solution to a lack of state and local
funding as well as to direct service provision.
The theory of NPM suggests that CDDs, as specialized local governments, are
expected to provide more responsive and efficient services than general-purpose
governments. Since CDDs are smaller in size than general-purpose governments, they are
expected to better consider the needs of communities. Districts’ functional specialization
is supposed to offer higher quality services thus, making them more efficient than
general-purpose governments. In practice, districts proved to be responsive but not
necessarily efficient in delivering infrastructure-related services. Unlike public choice
theorists that argued that special-purpose governments improve the efficiency and
effectiveness in local service delivery (Bish & Ostrom, 1973; Ostrom, 1999) the results
of this study confirm the findings from the empirical literature that special-purpose
governments are less efficient than the general-purpose ones (Berry, 2009; Foster, 1997;
Mullin, 2009).
Consistent with the criticism addressed to NPM, findings of the present study also
suggest that CDDs raise accountability issues for their residents and the surrounding
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general-purpose governments and there is a disconnection between specialization and
coordination (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). Supporting the view of metropolitan reformers,
the activity of CDDs was found not to be coordinated with that of general-purpose
governments. Moreover, districts were perceived to support mainly the interests of
private developers (Burns, 1994; Porter et. al., 1992).
The results of this study are consistent with most of the values of NPM but one.
The contribution of CDDs to the service delivery showed that specialized governance is
more responsive and more flexible but possibly less effective than general-purpose
governance.

8.5 Limitations of the Study
Although the author made every effort to ensure reliability and validity of the
findings there are some limitations that need to be acknowledged. One of the limitations
resides in the fact that the secondary data used in the hapter five of this study represent
estimations of petitioners at the time when CDDs were established rather than actual facts
about CDD activity. Since no publicly released data about CDD activity were available,
the author had to compromise and use estimated data.
Another limitation of this study refers to the non-involvement of developers and
residents. This may bias the research findings towards the views of public officials and
CDD representatives. Initially developers were considered for inclusion in the study but
the author could not get access to them and decided to exclude them from this analysis.
The findings in chapters five and six are not necessarily generalizable to other
parts of Florida. Even though approximately half of the CDDs are concentrated within six
Florida counties, the selection of CDDs to be included in the analysis was not random.
Also, the findings of the entire study have low validity and may not be directly
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generalizable to other states although the CDD model has certainly the potential to be
adopted in other states.
Finally, the author acknowledges the fact that both the interviewees and the
respondents to the survey might not offer honest and complete answers. The survey
results represent part of the story.

8.6 Summary
This study tried to shed light on CDD impacts contributing to a better
understanding of special districts in general. The CDDs are perpetual institutional
mechanisms for infrastructure delivery which enjoy governmental powers and
protections. The present study showed that districts are both policy and service delivery
tools. Districts have important implications for growth management by coordinating the
timing and financing of infrastructure provision with development as well as by making
choices about location, type and pattern of development. The CDDs have also significant
implications for public service delivery since they are flexible institutional choices for
responsive infrastructure service provision.
Community Development Districts were perceived as being an alternative to other
public or private means of providing infrastructure. Districts either cover some type of
public or private market failure by providing services and improvements where other
entities cannot or do not want to provide, or they fulfill the desire of a community to
provide specific services.
When discussing the CDDs role for growth management this study found that
CDDs manage to coordinate the timing and financing of infrastructure provision with
new development but they raise important issues about how location, the type of
development they support as well as the lack of coordination with their surrounding
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general-purpose governments impact growth management. Through their decisions to
locate mainly in unincorporated areas and focus on residential development, districts
encourage sprawl patterns. Moreover, the infrastructure that CDDs provide is not subject
to the levels of services standards set forth in the capital improvement plans of generalpurpose governments. The practical applicability of the CDD institutional model should
be extended beyond supporting mainly residential development, to institutional uses such
as educational and health care facilities, to contaminated soil clean-up, redevelopment of
distressed areas and the like.
When infrastructure variation was assessed localized conditions played an
important role. The amount of infrastructure CDD provided was predicted by the amount
of infrastructure service owned and maintained by districts, by whether districts had or
not optional special powers, by the districts estimated infrastructure costs and by the
district location status in unincorporated vs. incorporated areas.
The contribution of the CDDs to the infrastructure development in Florida has
been to support basic capital improvement projects such as stormwater management,
drainage systems, water and sewer systems, waste water management, roads, sidewalks
and streetlights. Districts contributed mainly to providing infrastructure that is internal to
the developments they supported and, to a lesser extent, to helping local general-purpose
governments take the burden of major capital improvement projects such as major roads,
highways or bridges off their shoulders. However, districts have helped general-purpose
governments by building and dedicating public improvements to the latter.
This study demonstrated that CDDs are more than funding mechanisms; they are
management tools for infrastructure services. Once CDDs build the infrastructure they
had to, their role is to act as managers of the newly created communities. Unlike other
entities which disappear after they fulfill their scope, CDDs are perpetual entities which
could solve the issue of managing public infrastructure (Porter, 2008).
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The contribution of CDDs to the service delivery showed that specialized
governance is more responsive and more flexible but less effective than general-purpose
governance. The CDDs are desirable institutional choices for infrastructure delivery
because of their managerial responsiveness and institutional flexibility. Districts’
responsiveness makes them closer to the needs of their communities than any other
public or private mechanisms which provide infrastructure services. The CDD flexibility
gives them a competitive advantage of building infrastructure faster and in remote areas
but may also have negative implications for residents. However, districts are not as
favorable as the theory suggests for their effectiveness in providing and maintaining
infrastructure services. Furthermore, CDDs are not perceived as helping general-purpose
governments to overcome their debt limits, to maintain or decrease the level of their taxes
or to take the big ticket infrastructure items off their shoulders. The CDDs are considered
a developers’ tool that facilitates the latter’s access to financial incentives such as taxexempt municipal revenue bonds.
Overall, the findings of this study are consistent with the views expressed in the
scholarly literature that specialized governance is a flexible and responsive institutional
design that meets local services demands (Mullin, 2009) but not as efficient as anticipated
(Berry, 2009; Foster, 1997). According to the Florida’s experience CDDs have proven to
be an entrepreneurial institutional mechanism for infrastructure delivery. However, the
decision of using this institutional choice for service delivery should be used with
caution, especially considering its unintended consequences for the way growth occurs.
Decision-makers should balance districts institutional flexibility with their unintended
consequences for growth management when they make policy choices about
infrastructure provision. The CDD institutional model is not necessarily the ideal model
but an alternative means of managing and funding infrastructure. Ultimately, as Foster
(1997) points out the way in which services are delivered depends on policy choices. In
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Florida, the decision to use CDDs may be a mixed blessing in terms of benefits and costs
to the surrounding general-purpose governments.
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1 - Interview Guide for Semi-Structured Interviews
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1. If you had to describe CDDs in a paragraph/phrase, how would you do it?
2. How would you describe the functions that CDDs perform?
3. Do you know who provides and maintains local services such as roads, sanitary
sewer, solid waste, drainage, potable water, recreation facilities and mass transit
in your community? In your opinion, who do you think should provide and
maintain the aforementioned services – a general-purpose or a local-purpose
government?
4. As entrepreneurial entities of government, CDDs represent a means of funding
facilities for new development. How would you describe the development
(communities) that CDDs create?
5. Do you believe these developments and the accompanying infrastructure would
exist if CDDs weren’t in place?
6. Considering your experience with CDDs, what types of public improvements
develop within or around CDDs?
7. Do you believe that residents understand that they are part of a government
structure where public functions are split between CDDs and local governments
such as counties/cities?
8. In your opinion, how do residents perceive CDDs’ financial obligation? Do you
think that residents distinguish between CDDs’ assessments and fees and a
general-purpose government property tax?

9. CDDs can be considered tools that fund infrastructure facilities & services while
fulfilling the concurrency requirement for new development. Is the infrastructure
provided by CDDs included in the concurrency management system/capital
improvement plan of your county?
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10. In your opinion, do CDDs coordinate their activities with local comprehensive
plans/local general-purpose governments?
11. Who do you think benefits and who doesn’t from the creation of CDDs ?
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Appendix 2 – Cover Letter and Survey Instrument
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Dear Sir/Madam:
Community Development Districts (CDDs) may be considered viable institutional
choices for managing and funding infrastructure needs within the State of Florida. The
survey we are asking you to complete is concerned with the strengths and weaknesses of
CDD implementation. Your professional expertise within local government provides a
distinct vantage from which you can assess CDDs’ strengths and weaknesses. This
survey will require no more than 15 minutes to complete and does not require your
retrieval of other information.
To our knowledge, this survey is the first to address CDDs and their place in
infrastructure provision within “The Sunshine State.” Hence your opinions are vitally
important to this study. Results from this study will play an important role in the ongoing
debates surrounding growth management in Florida and other states and we will be happy
to send summaries of findings if so desired.
Your individual responses are confidential and participation is voluntary but as an
inducement, we will contribute $1.00 to the American Cancer Society for each completed
survey.
Professor Frank and I look forward to your response. If you have any questions or wish to
discuss this subject at greater length, please contact Gina Scutelnicu at (786) 218-9658 or
gscut001@fiu.edu . We deeply appreciate your participation and thank you in advance
for the important information you are providing.

With warmest regards,
Ms. Gina Scutelnicu
Doctoral Candidate

Dr. Howard Frank
Professor of Public Administration
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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS SURVEY
This survey aims to assess your perceptions of Community Development Districts
(CDDs) in terms of four issues: management structure, financial impacts, economic
development impacts and administrative accountability. Each of these issues is addressed
in separate sections. There are no “right” or “wrong” answers; we are seeking your
perceived impact of CDDs on these critical aspects of public policy.

I. STRUCTURE
CDDs are considered to have a flexible structure due to their administrative and financial
autonomy. On a scale of 1 to 5, please indicate your level of agreement with the
following statements (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree):
3. Neither
1.Strongly
disagree, nor
5. Strongly
disagree 2.Disagree agree
4.Agree agree
CDDs remain self-supporting institutions over time











CDDs provide community-tailored services











CDDs enjoy little oversight from local generalpurpose governments











II. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
This section asks questions about the financial implications of CDDs for general-purpose
governments, developers and residents. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = strongly disagree and 5
= strongly agree), please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements
as they pertain to each of the three aforementioned groups:

1. GENERAL-PURPOSE GOVERNMENTS
3. Neither
1.Strongly
disagree, nor
5. Strongly
disagree 2.Disagree agree
4.Agree agree
CDDs relieve general-purpose governments’ property
tax by levying independently





CDDs are a means of circumventing debt limits of
general-purpose governments











CDD levies are more stable over time than the
taxes and fees of general-purpose governments











CDDs relieve general-purpose governments from
the burden of capital infrastructure financing
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2. IMPACT ON DEVELOPERS
3. Neither
1.Strongly
disagree, nor
5. Strongly
disagree 2.Disagree agree
4.Agree agree
CDDs increase short term profitability for developers 









CDDs allow developers to enhance amenities at
lower costs











3. RESIDENTS/COMMUNITY
3. Neither
1.Strongly
disagree, nor
5. Strongly
disagree 2.Disagree agree
4.Agree agree
CDD assessments are commensurate with the
quality of facilities they support











CDDs’ levies give “bigger bang for the buck” than
general-purpose governments’ ad-valorem taxes











III. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. CDDs act as both providers and maintainers of
infrastructure for new communities. On a scale from 1 to 5 (where 1 =strongly disagree
and 5 = strongly agree), please state your opinion for each of the following items:

1. INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION
3. Neither
1.Strongly
disagree, nor
5. Strongly
disagree 2.Disagree agree
4.Agree agree
CDDs provide infrastructure in areas where
general-purpose governments are not able to











CDDs build infrastructure faster than generalpurpose governments











CDDs provide infrastructure services cheaper
Than general-purpose governments











CDDs impose hidden infrastructure costs to the
surrounding general-purpose governments











2. INFRASTRUCTURE MAINTENANCE
3. Neither
1.Strongly
disagree, nor
5. Strongly
disagree 2.Disagree agree
4.Agree agree
CDDs offer residents higher quality infrastructure
than general-purpose governments











CDDs better maintain infrastructure than generalpurpose governments due to their narrow purpose
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CDDs better maintain infrastructure than generalpurpose governments due to their smaller size











IV. ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES. This section depicts CDDs’ accountability issues in
relation to local general-purpose governments.
On a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree) please indicate your
level of agreement with the following statements:
3. Neither
1.Strongly
disagree, nor
5. Strongly
disagree 2.Disagree agree
4.Agree agree
CDD reports are used and relied upon by generalpurpose governments when local comprehensive
plans are designed











CDD infrastructure is coordinated with the capital
improvements plans of the surrounding governments











CDDs overstep their powers because of limited
oversight from general-purpose governments











V. GENERAL OVERVIEW. The following questions ask for your general opinion
about various aspects of CDDs. Please select where you stand in regard to these issues
presented as “bookends” of possible opinions:
1. CDDs
1

Foster
growth
management

2


2. CDDs
1
2


Encourage long-term
fiscal balance of
surrounding communities

3


4


5


6


3


4


5


6


3


4


5


7

Gut
growth
management

7

Add to fiscal
stress of surrounding
communities

3. CDDs
1

Encourage
coordinated
development

2
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6


7

Discourage
coordinated
development

4. CDDs
1

Facilitates
stability of
housing prices

2


3


4


5


6


7

Contribute to
“boom and bust”
in real estate prices

5. CDDs are likely to remain part of Florida's community development landscape for the
foreseeable, but if there is one thing you could change in regard to their implementation,
what would it be?
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
VI. A few questions about yourself:
1. What year were you born in?
_________________________________________
2. What is the highest level of education completed?
 High school

 Associate degree

 College degree

 Master’s

 Advanced graduate
(J.D. or Ph.D)

3. Which Department/Division do you belong to?
__________________________________________
4. Do you currently hold any professional certifications/licenses?
 Yes

 No

If yes, please indicate which ones:
 American Institute of Certified Planners (AICP)
 Certified Government Auditing Professional (CGAP)
 Certified Management Accountant (CMA)
 Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
 Professional Engineers (PE)
 Professional Surveyors (PS)
 Other (please specify) ________________________________________________________________
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5. How many years have you been employed in your current position?
_____________________________________
6. What type of position do you currently hold?
 Supervisory

 Non-supervisory

7. Do you have professional experience outside Florida?
 Yes

 No

Thank you very much for your participation!
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Appendix 4 – Techniques Employed in the Qualitative Analysis
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When analyzing data and generating meaning the author used various approaches
suggested by Miles & Huberman (1994). These are:


identifying themes and patterns of variables through considering
similarities and differences among categories as well as through processes
which take place within a certain context;



searching plausibility by drawing conclusions that seem reasonable and
that make sense;



clustering variables by subsuming particulars into general;



counting words;



making comparisons among categories;



factoring variables by reducing large numbers of variables into smaller
ones and



drawing theoretical conclusions by moving from empirical to conceptual
constructs and theories.
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Appendix 5 – Assumptions of Multiple Regression Analysis
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Before running the analysis, the assumptions of the multiple regression analysis
were tested. The indicators included in the analysis were either interval level or
dichotomous variables. Dichotomous variables may very well be used as independent
variables in multiple regression analysis (O’Sullivan et. al., 2003). Normality of the
variables was tested by inspecting the values of the skeweness and kurtosis coefficients
and by visualizing histograms and normality plots of individual variables as well as
scatterplots of residuals.
With the exception of the variable describing CDD estimated infrastructure costs
which was positively skewed, all the other variables were fairly normally distributed. To
make sure the assumption of normality is met, this variable was transformed using a
logarithmic transformation.
Then, data were checked for univariate outliers on the dependent variable and
multivariate outliers on the independent variables by looking at the studentized residuals
and Mahalanobis distance scores. One univariate outlier (case 257) was identified and
removed from analysis.
Bivariate scaterplotts between the independent and the dependent variables as
well as plots between observed and predicted residuals showed that the variables were
linearly related. Data were also checked for multicolinearity by looking at the variation
inflation factor (VIF) value and at correlations between independent variables. The VIF
values ranged from 1.044 to 1.424 and all the correlations between the independent
variables were low and moderate. This indicated that multicolinearity was unlikely to be
a problem. The correlations between the four predictors and the dependent variable were
moderate and high indicating that data was suitably correlated with the dependent
variable and, therefore, an examination through multiple regression was appropriate.
Homoscedasticity was tested both by looking at the residual plots and at
scatterplots between each independent variable and the dependent variable The plots
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indicated reasonable consistency of spread through the distributions. Then, the
independence of error terms was tested by looking at the Durbin-Watson statistic (1.26)
as well as the autocorrelation plot of residuals. Results showed that successive residuals
were not correlated.
Last but not least, the adequacy of the sample size was addressed. According to
Tabachnick & Fidell (1989) the ratio of number of cases to variables employed should be
of 20:1 but no less than 5:1. With four independent variables for 233 cases, this analysis
has a 58:1 ratio cases to variables, exceeding by far the minimum cases-to-variables ratio.
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Appendix 6 – Assumptions of Factor Analysis
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The assumptions of factor analysis (FA) can be classified in two broad categories.
The first category refers to the suitability of the data for analysis. FA requires interval
level measurement, but it may also be used with ordinal variables such as Likert scale
data (O’Sullivan et. al., 2003). In this study all the variables used for factor analysis are
measured by Likert scales. FA also assumes normality of observed variables (Barnes,
Cote, Cudeck & Malthouse, 2001; Ho 2006). The variables were tested for normality
through the inspection of skewness and kurtosis coefficients. Skewness coefficients
ranged from .01 to .99 being comprised within the + 1 accepted interval and kurtosis
coefficients ranged from .04 to 1.24 being comprised within the + 2 accepted value range.
Another assumption that falls within this category refers to the fact that factors and their
supporting variables should be linearly related (Cudek & MacCallum, 2007; Walker
1999). Matrix scatterplots were constructed and then visually analyzed to determine that
the items were linearly related to the factors they generated.
Factor analysis also assumes that sample size is sufficient. While some authors
use minimum accepted sample size for conducting factor analysis others consider the
ratio of subjects-to-variables for determining the adequacy of the sample size. Minimum
sample sizes for conducting FA have been recommended as low as 100 cases (Hatcher,
1994) and as high as 500 cases (Comrey & Lee, 1992). Costello & Osborne (2005)
consider the 10:1 subject-to-item ratio as a rule of thumb when determining the adequacy
of the sampling size but they document the utilization of 5: 1 and less than 5:1 subjectsto-items ratios Hatcher (1994) suggests a minimum of 5:1 subject-to-item ratio. The
scholarly literature points out to the fact that cut-off numbers are not the only criteria for
establishing an optimal sample size for conducting FA. Sample size should also be
determined according to the nature of data (Costello & Osborne, 2005) as well as to the
theoretical and methodological issues of a study (Walker, 1999). The sample size of the
present analysis consisted of 96 cases (after using listwise deletion), with over 5 cases per
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variable. The mean for communalities is .63. Even if the sample size is fairly small, the
results of the FA are expected to yield reliable results considering the sampling frame
was not too big either (197 cases) and the first sampling cluster included the entire
population.
The second main category of the FA assumptions refers to the factorability of
variables. This implies the presence of many moderate correlations among variables (Ho,
2006; Leech, Barrett & Morgan, 2005). There were several means of checking for data
factorability that were used in this study. First, the correlation matrix showed that 16 out
of 17 items included in the analysis had correlations of at least .3 with at least one other
item, fact that indicated a good factorability of variables. Then the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
measure of sampling adequacy was .74, more than the recommended value of .6 (Cudeck
& MacCallum 2007), and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (2 (136) = 556.137,
p < .01). Third, the diagonals of anti-image correlation matrix showed values of .47 and
more, supporting the factorability of each of the seventeen items included in the analysis.
Finally, most of the communalities were above .5 with a few in the upper .4s (see Table
7.10), fact that demonstrated that each item shared some common variance with other
items.
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Appendix 7 – Histograms of Indexes
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